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Introduction 
In the terms of reference for the Steering Committee on Media and Information Society 
(CDMSI) for the biennium 2018 – 2019, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
asked the CDMSI to “study the development and use of new digital technologies and services, 
including different forms of artificial intelligence, as they may impact peoples’ enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the digital age, with a view to giving guidance for 
future standard-setting in this field” and approved the committee of experts on human rights 
dimensions of automated data processing and different forms of artificial intelligence (MSI-
AUT) as a subordinate structure to facilitate the work of the CDMSI.  
In its first meeting on 6-7 March 2018, the expert committee decided to focus the study on the 
the implications of AI decision-making for the concept of responsibility within a human rights 
framework. Prof. Karen Yeung was appointed as rapporteur for the preparation of the study. 
Composition of the Committee of Experts MSI-AUT 
Abraham BERNSTEIN, Professor of Informatics, University of Zürich 
Jorge CANCIO, International Relations Specialist, Federal Office of Communications, 
Switzerland 
Luciano FLORIDI, Professor of Philosophy and Ethics of Information, Oxford University 
Seda GÜRSES, Assistant Professor, Technical University Delft 
Gabrielle GUILLEMIN, Senior Legal Officer, ARTICLE 19 
Natali HELBERGER, Professor of Information Law, University of Amsterdam 
Luukas ILVES (Chair), Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Lisbon Council 
Tanja KERŠEVAN SMOKVINA, State Secretary, Ministry of Culture, Slovenia 
Joe MCNAMEE, Independent Consultant 
Evgenios NASTOS, Head of Information Unit, Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecoms & Media, 
Greece  
Pierluigi PERRI, Professor of Computer Law, University of Milan  
Wolfgang SCHULZ (Vice-Chair), Professor of Law, University of Hamburg  
Karen YEUNG, Interdisciplinary Professorial Fellow in Law, Ethics and Informatics, University of 
Birmingham  
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Executive Summary 
Advanced digital technologies and services, including task-specific artificial intelligence (‘AI’) 
bring with them extraordinary promise. They have already generated very substantial benefits, 
particularly in the form of enhanced efficiency, accuracy, timeliness and convenience across a 
wide range of digital services.  
Yet the emergence of these technologies has also been accompanied by rising public anxiety 
concerning their potentially damaging effects: for individuals, for vulnerable groups and for 
society more generally.  If these technologies are to be a force for good which enables, rather 
than undermines, individual and societal flourishing, then it is imperative that we acquire a 
deeper understanding of these concerns. Not only does this require us to acquire a deeper 
understanding of their impact on the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
but it also entails careful consideration of questions concerning where responsibility should lie 
for their adverse consequences.   
This study begins from the premise that, within contemporary constitutional democratic 
orders, a society’s concepts, institutions and practices of responsibility are of critical 
importance.  This is necessary in order to ensure that individuals and organisations are 
appropriately held to account for the adverse effects of their actions on others, and in order to 
establish and maintain the foundations for trustworthy and peaceful social cooperation and 
coordination.   
Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to examine the implications of advanced digital 
technologies (including AI) for the concept of responsibility, particularly in so far as they might 
impede the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms protected under the ECHR 
and how responsibility for those risks and consequences should be allocated.   
Its methodological approach is interdisciplinary, drawing on concepts and academic 
scholarship from law, the humanities, the social sciences and, to a more limited extent, from 
computer science.  It concludes that, if we are to take human rights seriously in a globally 
connected digital age, we cannot allow the power of our advanced digital technologies and 
systems, and those who develop and implement them, to be accrued and exercised without 
responsibility. Nations bear the primary duty to protect human rights. They must therefore 
ensure that those who wield and derive benefits from designing, developing and deploying 
these technologies are held responsible for their adverse impacts.  This includes obligations to 
ensure that there are effective and legitimate institutional mechanisms that will operate to 
prevent and forestall violations to human rights which these technologies may threaten, and to 
attend to the health of the larger collective and shared socio-technical environment in which 
human rights and the rule of law are anchored.  This summary gives a brief overview of the 
main content of the report. 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Chapter 1 outlines what AI is and how task-specific AI technologies work. It refers to AI as a 
set of advanced general-purpose technologies which use techniques from statistics, computer 
science, and cognitive psychology to enable machines to do highly complex tasks efficiently. 
These technologies aim either to reproduce or surpass abilities that would require 
‘intelligence’ in humans; e.g. reasoning, autonomy, creativity, etc.  It describes how AI 
technologies work using machine learning, enabling computational systems to learn from 
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examples, data, and experience and consequently to perform specific tasks intelligently. It 
explains how machine learning technologies raise issues of responsibility due to their capacity 
to enable task automation and to enable machines to make decisions and perform tasks to 
some extent independently from their human developers.  
The Chapter draws attention to the capacity of machine learning systems to learn and change 
over time, dynamically setting their own sub-goals, and their ability to adapt to local 
conditions via external sensor information or updated input data. Human designers of these 
systems decide upon and set their initial parameters and the overarching goal which these 
systems are intended to optimise. At the same time, machine learning systems are designed to 
operate by making independent decisions that choose between alternatives in ways that are 
not pre-programmed in advance, and to do so without any human intervention.  Because 
these systems learn dynamically and iteratively from their environment, which is itself often 
volatile and continuously changing, this has implications for the stability and predictability of 
their operation.  In particular, these systems have the potential to evolve in unexpected ways 
(section 1.3).   
Chapter 1 then explains how, in the context of our contemporary global data infrastructure, AI 
technologies display a range of other properties that have direct implications for the concept 
of responsibility, including their: 
• inscrutability and opacity 
• complex and dynamic nature  
• reliance on human input, interaction and discretion 
• general purpose nature 
• global interconnectivity, scalability and ubiquity 
• reliance on large data-sets 
• automated, continuous operation, often in real-time  
• capacity to generate ‘hidden’ insight from merging data sets   
• ability accurately to imitate human traits  
• greater software complexity (include vulnerability to failure and malicious attack)  
• capacity to ‘personalise’ and configure individual choice environments, and 
• capacity to configure social choice environments, thus redistributing risks and benefits to 
optimise a pre-specified goal (section 1.3) 
The chapter also explains the interdisciplinary ‘human rights perspective’ adopted in the 
study, which draws on the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected under the ECHR 
in order to: 
• understand the nature of the risks and adverse consequences generated by advanced 
digital technologies,  
• help identify how responsibility for those threats, risks and consequences should be 
attributed and allocated, and  
• inform consideration of the kinds of institutional mechanisms that may be needed to 
ensure that human rights are effectively protected.   
Finally, the discussion draws attention to existing work concerning the adverse impact of AI 
technologies on human rights and fundamental freedoms, and upon which the discussion in 
Chapter 2 seeks to build. 
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Chapter 2: Threats, risks, harms and wrongs associated with advanced digital technologies 
Chapter Two examines a range of adverse consequences potentially associated with the use of 
advanced digital technologies.  It begins by considering the socio-historical context of 
technological innovation, suggesting that on-going advances in networked digital technologies 
are likely to prompt far-reaching changes to social and economic life of a scale and magnitude 
as unsettling and disruptive as the original Industrial Revolution.  The resulting ‘New’ Industrial 
Revolution now dawning may resemble the original Industrial revolution in that it is likely to 
generate myriad benefits but, in so doing, might also generate unintended adverse effects that 
were not recognised at the time of the revolution’s unfolding. Accordingly, making reliable 
predictions about the aggregate, cumulative effects of the current networked digital 
revolution over time is extremely challenging.   
The discussion then considers how the use of algorithmic decision-making  (‘ADM’) systems 
that rely on data-driven profiling techniques may threaten several human rights (section 2.1), 
including:  
• rights to a fair trial and to ‘due process’ (Art 6 ECHR), particularly where ADM systems are 
used to automate decisions that significantly affect individuals, yet typically deny the 
affected individual the opportunity to participate, contest or otherwise challenge the 
outcome of the decision or the decision-making inputs. Some of these systems are 
incapable of producing an explanation of its underlying logic in terms that are intelligible 
and comprehensible to the individual; 
• rights to freedom of expression and information (Art 10 ECHR), particularly given the 
powerful influence which global digital platforms now exert over the informational 
environments of both individuals and societies, in which automated algorithms typically 
decide how to handle, prioritise, distribute and delete or remove third-party content 
online, including during political and electoral campaigns.   Although platforms have been 
well-intended in seeking voluntarily to identify and remove ‘extremist’ content, there are 
serious risks that these activities may not meet Art 10(2)’s requirements of legality, 
legitimacy and proportionality for permissible interference with freedom of expression; 
• rights to privacy and data protection (Art 8 ECHR), due to the reliance of data-driven 
profiling technologies on the collection and processing of digital data gleaned from 
tracking the on-line behaviour of individuals at a highly granular level, across a population, 
the use of these techniques invariably affect the Article 8 right to private and family life.  
Although contemporary data protection regimes (such as modernised Conv 108) play an 
important role in safeguarding the rights and interests of data subjects, they might not in 
practice provide effective and comprehensive protection; 
• rights to protection against discrimination in the exercise of rights and freedoms (Art 14 
ECHR), may be implicated due to the significant risks of bias and discrimination arising 
from the use of machine learning algorithms, due to the opportunities for bias of the 
algorithm’s developers, bias built into the model upon which the systems are built, biases 
inherent in the data sets used to train the models, or biases introduced when such systems 
are implemented in real world settings.  Such biases might not only violate the right to 
protection against discrimination in the exercise of rights and freedoms protected under 
Art 14, but may also reinforce biases against groups that have historically been 
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disadvantaged, thereby compounding and exacerbating discrimination and structural 
disadvantage. 
The discussion then considers how data-driven profiling techniques, when employed at scale, 
may implicate collective values and interests because they make practices of pervasive 
surveillance, personalisation and manipulation possible at a population level in ways that risk 
undermining human dignity and autonomy, for example, by systematically treating individuals 
as objects rather than as moral subjects (section 2.1.2).  
The adverse social implications that might accompany the development and use of AI 
technologies generally, including those that do not rely on the profiling of individuals, are then 
considered (section 2.2). They include: 
• risks of large-scale harm from malicious attacks  
• unethical system design or unintended system failure  
• loss of authentic, real and meaningful human contact  
• the chilling effect of data repurposing 
• the exercise of digital power without responsibility  
• the hidden privatisation of decisions about public values (including distributive justice) &  
• the exploitation of human labour to train algorithms. 
Finally, the discussion highlights the power asymmetry between those who develop and 
employ AI technologies, and those who interact with and are subject to them (section 2.3). 
While digital service providers (and relevant third parties) that utilise AI systems can acquire 
very detailed, fine-grained data about the users of their services which they can mine to 
generate predictions about user traits, tastes and preferences with considerable accuracy, the 
users themselves (typically) do not understand the complexities of the digital technologies that 
they use.  Nor do they have equivalent access to detailed information about the organisations 
and firms whose services they use. This opacity and asymmetry not only expands opportunities 
for potential exploitation, but may substantially threaten collective values and interests that 
are not readily expressed in existing human rights discourse, including threats to the socio-
technical foundations of moral and democratic community. These collective threats and risks 
are exacerbated by the capacity of these technologies to operate at unprecedented speed and 
scale, generating novel threats, risks and challenges which contemporary societies have not 
historically had to confront.  At the same time, they are also likely to generate problems of 
collective action: although the aggregate adverse effects may be very large, the effect on any 
particular individual may be relatively minor and remedial action may not be sought.  
Chapter3: Who bears responsibility for the threats, risks, harms  
and wrongs posed by advanced digital technologies? 
Chapter 3 considers who bears responsibility for the adverse consequences posed by advanced 
digital technologies. It begins by clarifying what we mean by responsibility and why 
responsibility matters, emphasising the vital role of our institutions and practices of 
responsibility in holding to account those whose actions have adverse impacts upon others 
and on collective interests and values.  These institutions and practices serve the vital role of 
securing and enabling peaceful, trustworthy social co-operation, and giving expression to the 
rule of law.  Although the concept of responsibility can be understood in many different 
senses, it highlights the distinction between: 
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• historic (or retrospective) responsibility: which looks backwards, seeking to allocate 
responsibility for conduct and events that occurred in the past; and 
• prospective responsibility: which establishes obligations and duties associated with roles 
and tasks that looks to the future, directed towards the production of good outcomes and 
the prevention of bad outcomes.  Prospective responsibilities serve an important guiding 
function, offering guidance about our rights and obligations vis-à-vis others, and about the 
way we should behave in our dealings with others. 
It argues that we must attend to both the prospective and historic allocation of responsibility 
for the adverse consequences associated with AI technologies (section 3.2).  Only then can we 
have confidence that efforts will be made to prevent harms and wrongs from occurring (and if 
they do occur, then these will be brought to an end) as a result of the development and 
implementation of these technologies. Societies must therefore ensure that they have 
institutional structures and mechanisms that can be relied upon to ensure appropriate 
reparation, repair, and the prevention of further harm or wrongdoing arising from the 
operation of AI technologies. 
It then investigates how advanced digital technologies (including AI) implicate existing 
conceptions of responsibility (section 3.3).  To this end, it highlights differences between the 
concept of moral responsibility, on the one hand, and legal responsibility on the other.  Unlike 
morality, the law has a highly developed system for institutionalising and enforcing 
responsibility (including the application of sanctions) because it must adjudicate real world 
disputes. It is also important to bear in mind the distinction between two separate and distinct 
(albeit sometimes overlapping) types of adverse effect that can arise from the operation of AI 
systems:  
• violations of human rights (including the rights protected under the ECHR) and 
• tangible harm to human health, property or the environment. 
This study is primarily concerned with analysing responsibility for human rights violations 
rather than for tangible harm, focusing primarily on those who create, develop, deploy and 
preside over AI systems and their settings, and on the responsibilities of nation states to 
ensure that human rights are adequately protected.   
Because AI systems can operate in time and space in new and unprecedented ways, these 
technologies may challenge our existing conceptions of responsibility.  Chapter 3 considers 
two core themes raised in contemporary discussions concerning the adverse effects of AI 
technologies.  First, the role of the tech industry in promulgating and voluntarily committing 
themselves to abide by so-called ‘ethical standards’.  It argues that although these voluntary 
initiatives are in many ways welcome, these codes and standards typically lack any 
enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms and cannot therefore be relied upon to provide 
effective protection (section 3.3.1).   Secondly, the alleged ‘control problem’ that is claimed to 
flow from the capacity of AI-driven systems to operate more or less autonomously from their 
creators is claimed to create a ‘responsibility gap’ because the developers of those systems 
cannot fairly be blamed for their outputs.  Chapter 3 demonstrates that the so-called ‘control 
problem’ is based on a very particular moral theory of responsibility, one which places undue 
attention on the conduct of the agent, and fails to give due weight to the interests of victims in 
security of the person and property (section 3.3.2).   
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The discussion in Chapter 3 then identifies and briefly outlines a range of different 
‘responsibility models’ that could be adopted to govern the allocation and distribution of 
responsibility for different kinds of adverse impacts arising from the operation of AI systems 
(section 3.4), including models based on:  
• intention/culpability (section 3.4.1) 
• risk/negligence (section 3.4.2) 
• strict responsibility (section 3.4.3), and  
• mandatory insurance schemes (section 3.4.4).  
In order to identify which of these models is most suited for the allocation of historic 
responsibility for the adverse effects of AI systems, the analysis emphasises the importance of 
distinguishing between human rights violations, on the one hand, and tangible harm to human 
health, property or the environment on the other (although a single event may result in both 
tangible harm and a violation of human rights).  Responsibility for rights violations of any kind, 
including human rights violations, is widely understood as ‘strict’.  Thus, provided that a 
human rights violation has been established, there is no need for proof of fault.  In contrast, 
the allocation of obligations of repair for tangible harm to health or property may be legally 
distributed in accordance with a variety of historic responsibility models.  Each model strikes a 
different balance between our interest, as agents, in freedom of action and our interest, as 
victims, in rights and interests in security of person and property.  It is argued that none of 
these models are self-evidently the ‘correct’ or ‘best’ model for allocating and distributing the 
various threats, risks and harms associated with the operation of advanced digital 
technologies.  Rather, identifying which (if any) of these models is most appropriate will entail 
a social policy choice concerning how they should be appropriately allocated and distributed.   
Chapter 3 then draws attention to several acute challenges that arise in seeking to allocate 
responsibility for the risks and other adverse impacts arising from the operation of complex 
and interacting socio-technical systems (section 3.5):  
a) the ‘many hands’ problem, which arises because the development and operation of AI 
systems typically entails contributions from multiple individuals, organisations, 
machine components, software algorithms and human users, often in complex and 
dynamic environments.   The problem of ‘many hands’ is not new, and rests largely on 
a ‘choice theory’ of responsibility in moral philosophy.  Contemporary legal systems 
have developed a relatively sophisticated set of principles and procedures for 
determining liability involving multiple defendants who can all be understood as 
having causally contributed to some adverse event.  The law’s ability to devise 
practical and effective responses to the many hands problem is partly due to the 
greater emphasis which the law places on the legitimate interests of victims (and 
potential victims) in security of the person.  In this respect, the law’s response differs 
from choice theories of responsibility in moral philosophy which focus almost 
exclusively focus on the moral agent.  Moreover, in relation to the human rights 
violations arising from the operation of AI systems, the discussion highlights the 
importance of mechanisms that prevent and forestall human rights violations arising 
from the application of advanced digital technologies. The need for effective 
prevention is particularly important because the aggregate and cumulative effect of 
these technologies could seriously threaten the collective foundations necessary for 
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human rights and fundamental freedom to operate in practice.  These threats point to 
the need to enhance and reinvigorate human rights discourse and protection in a data-
driven age (section 3.5.1); 
b) Human-computer interaction: Acute challenges arise in appropriately allocating and 
distributing responsibility between humans and machines, particularly when there is a 
‘human in the loop’.  A recurring concern has been that, in order to ensure that   
complex socio-technical systems that incorporate AI always operate in the service of 
humanity, they should always be designed so that they can be shut down by a human 
operator.  Yet individuals entrusted with the responsibility to supervise the operation 
of these systems may be understandably reluctant to intervene. This risks turning 
humans placed in the loop into ‘moral crumple zones’, largely totemic humans whose 
central role becomes soaking up fault, although they have only partial control of the 
system, and who are vulnerable to being scapegoated by tech developers and 
organisations seeking to avoid responsibility for unintended adverse consequences 
(section 3.5.2); and  
c) Interacting algorithmic systems: Even more intractable challenges arise in seeking to 
identify, anticipate and prevent adverse events that arise from the interactions 
between complex, algorithm-driven socio-technical systems that can occur at a speed 
and scale that was simply not possible in a pre-digital, pre-networked age (eg the stock 
market ‘flash crash’ of 2010).  The unpredictable nature of interactions between 
multiple algorithmic systems generates novel and potentially catastrophic risks, which 
we have barely begun to grasp, let alone anticipate and forestall (section 3.5.3).   
All of these problems warrant further sustained attention and consideration.  
While most of the discussion in Chapter 3 focuses on the responsibility of technology 
designers, developers and those who own and implement the systems which rely upon these 
technologies, the discussion in section 3.6 reminds us that it is states that bear the primary 
obligation to ensure that human rights are effectively protected.  It draws attention to the 
problem of collective action that the operation of AI systems in a global networked age is likely 
to generate, highlighting the vital importance of a) national legislation to ensure that human 
rights are protected, b) the need for properly resourced national enforcement authorities with 
adequate enforcement powers and c) the valuable role which accessible and convenient 
collective complaints mechanisms, in addition to individual legal remedies, may play to ensure 
effective human rights protection. 
The discussion then draws attention to a range of non-judicial mechanisms that have potential 
to help secure both prospective and historic responsibility for the adverse impacts of AI 
systems, including various kinds of impact assessment, auditing techniques and technical 
protection mechanisms (section 3.7). Technical protection mechanisms, in particular, have 
considerable promise.  This study emphasises the need to embed these mechanisms within a 
governance framework that enables the relevant technical standards to be set in a transparent 
and participatory manner, and to ensure independent external oversight and review of their 
operation.    
Before summarising the various findings in Chapter 3, the discussion in section 3.8 briefly 
considers whether our existing conceptions of human rights, and the mechanisms through 
which they are protected and enforced, are fit for purpose in a global and connected digital 
age.  It suggests that the power of networked digital technologies that have emerged in recent 
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years make possible practices and actions that were previously impossible, and thereby create 
novel threats, risks and forms of wrongdoing. Accordingly, we may need to reinvigorate human 
rights discourse in a networked digital age, in order to protect and nurture the socio-technical 
foundations necessary for human agency and responsibility, without which human rights and 
freedoms cannot be practically or meaningfully exercised.  The development of an enhanced 
and reinvigorated conception of human rights could lead to the development of new 
institutional mechanisms which are better placed to safeguard against the adverse effects of 
new digital technologies in a data-driven age. 
The findings of Chapter 3 are summarised at the end of the chapter (section 3.9). 
Chapter 4: Conclusion  
Chapter four concludes by summarising the argument made in the preceding sections.  It 
highlights four findings arising from this study: 
First, it is vital that we have effective and legitimate mechanisms that will prevent and forestall 
human rights violations, given the speed and scale at which many advanced digital systems 
operate in ways that pose substantial threats to human rights without necessarily generating 
substantial risks of tangible harm.  A preventative approach is especially important given that 
such threats could seriously erode the social foundations necessary for moral and democratic 
orders, which are essential preconditions for the exercise of individual freedom, autonomy and 
human rights.  This may include both a need to develop collective complaints mechanisms to 
facilitate effective rights protection, and to enhance and reinvigorate our existing conceptions 
and understandings of human rights. 
Second, the model of legal responsibility that applies to human rights violations is widely 
understood as one of ‘strict responsibility’ without the need for proof of fault.  In contrast, 
obligations of repair for tangible harms may be legally allocated and distributed in accordance 
with a range of responsibility models, each striking a different balance between our interests 
as agents in freedom of action, and our interest as victims in rights and interests in security of 
persons and property.  Identifying which (if any) of these models is appropriate for preventing 
the various threats and risks associated with the operation of advanced digital technologies is 
not self-evident: rather, it will entail a social policy choice.  In constitutional democratic 
societies committed to protecting and respecting human rights, states bear a critical 
responsibility for ensuring that these policy choices are made in a transparent, democratic 
manner and in ways that will ensure that the policy ultimately adopted will effectively 
safeguard human rights.  
Third, we should nurture and support technical research concerned with securing prospective 
and historic responsibility for ensuring due respect for many of the values underpinning 
human rights protection, which may facilitate the development of effective technical 
protection mechanisms and meaningful ‘algorithmic auditing’.  This research needs to be 
developed by interdisciplinary engagement between the technical community and those from 
law, the humanities and the social sciences, in order to identify more fully how human rights 
protections can be translated and given expression via technical protection mechanisms 
embedded within AI systems, and to understand how a human rights approach responds to 
problems of value-conflict. 
Fourth, the effective protection of human rights in a global and connected digital age requires 
that we have effective and legitimate governance mechanisms, instruments and institutions to 
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monitor, constrain and oversee the responsible design, development, implementation and 
operation of our complex socio-technical systems.  This requires, at minimum, both 
democratic participation in the setting of the relevant standards, and the existence of properly 
resourced, independent authorities equipped with adequate powers systematically to gather 
information, to investigate non-compliance and to sanction violations, including powers and 
skills to investigate and verify that these systems do in fact comply with human rights 
standards and values. 
Finally, the study concludes that if we are serious in our commitment to protect and promote 
human rights in a global and connected digital age, then we cannot allow the power of our 
advanced digital technologies and systems, and those who develop and implement them, to 
be accrued and exercised without responsibility.   The fundamental principle of reciprocity 
applies: those who deploy and reap the benefits of these advanced digital technologies 
(including AI) in the provision of services (from which they derive profit) must be responsible 
for their adverse consequences. It is therefore of vital importance that states committed to the 
protection of human rights uphold a commitment to ensure that those who wield digital 
power (including the power derived from accumulating masses of digital data) are held 
responsible for their consequences.   It follows from the obligation of states to ensure the 
protection of human rights that they have a duty to ensure that there are governance 
arrangements and enforcement mechanisms within national law that will ensure that both 
prospective and historic responsibility for the adverse risks, harms and wrongs arising from the 
operation of advanced digital technologies are duly allocated. 
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A study of the implications of advanced digital technologies  
(including AI systems) for the concept of responsibility within a 
human rights framework 
by Karen Yeung
 “A great global challenge confronts all those who promote human 
rights and the rule of law: how can States, companies and civil society 
ensure that artificial intelligence technologies reinforce and respect, 
rather than undermine and imperil, human rights?” 
David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
rights to freedom of opinion and expression, 
United Nations General Assembly (2018) 
                                                          
  With contributions from colleagues Ganna Pogrebna and Andrew Howes, and research assistance from 
Charlotte Elves and Helen Ryland, The University of Birmingham.  I am grateful to Imogen Goold for her 
advice concerning the content and contours of Anglo-American tort law. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
1.1 Scope of this study 
This study examines the implications of ‘new digital technologies and services, including 
artificial intelligence’ for the concept of responsibility from a human rights perspective. It 
focuses on technologies referred to as ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI).   AI is notoriously difficult to 
define, and even technical AI researchers do not appear to have settled upon a widely agreed 
definition. For the purposes of this study, the definition of AI proposed within the EU 
Commission Communication on AI will be adopted .1  It provides that:  
Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to systems that display intelligent behaviour by 
analysing their environment and taking actions – with some degree of autonomy – 
to achieve specific goals.  AI-based systems can be purely software-based, acting in 
the virtual world (eg voice assistance, image analysis software, search engines, 
speech and face recognition systems) or AI can be embedded in hardware devices 
(eg. advanced robots, autonomous cars, drones or Internet of Things 
applications)…Many AI technologies require data to improve their performance.  
Once they perform well, they can help improve and automate decision making in 
the same domain. 
Accordingly, this study uses the term AI to describe a set of advanced general purpose 
technologies that enable machines to do highly complex tasks effectively that draw upon a set 
of complementary techniques that have developed from statistics, computer science and 
cognitive psychology. 2   These technologies aim to reproduce or surpass abilities (in 
computational systems) that would require ‘intelligence’ if humans were to perform them, 
including the capacity for learning and adaptation; sensory understanding and interaction; 
reasoning and planning; optimisation of procedures and parameters; autonomy; creativity; 
and extracting knowledge and predictions from large diverse digital data.3  The scope of this 
inquiry is limited to AI technologies that are currently available (at least as initial research and 
development demonstrations) or are plausible in the next five years, with a particular focus on 
technologies leveraging machine learning, and it proceeds on the assumption that advances 
will continue to improve the performance of task-specific AI rather than the achievement of 
‘general AI’.4  It is concerned only with the use of AI as a technology, that is, for the purposes 
of undertaking useful tasks, rather than as a scientific research tool by academic and other 
researchers.5   
It is undeniable that AI technologies have generated extensive benefits, particularly by 
enhancing the efficiency, accuracy, timeliness and convenience with which many services are 
provided.  Many such applications can be understood as enhancing the practical reach and 
extending enjoyment of human rights and freedoms. For example, without the use of AI-driven 
search engines, the massive volume of information now available via the internet would not be 
practically useful and accessible, thus enhancing the right to freedom of information 
(protected under Art 10 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
                                                          
1  European Commission 2018a.  This definition is elaborated more fully in EU High Level Expert Group on 
Artificial Intelligence 2019b. 
2  EPSRC; Hall and Pesenti 2017. 
3  EPSRC. 
4  Bostrom 2014. 
5  The use of machine learning in commercial research and scientific research is not without difficulties.  See 
for example Leonelli 2018; Metcalfe and Crawford 2016. 
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Fundamental Freedoms, hereinafter ‘ECHR’).  Many national governments and regional 
organisations around the world are devoting considerable resources into developing strategies 
to foster innovation and development in AI technologies based on a widely shared belief that 
these technologies can and will deliver very significant benefits in terms of enhanced 
efficiency, productivity and service delivery.6  Yet early triumphs associated with these 
advanced networked digital technologies that have fuelled the so-called ‘AI boom’ and 
resulting ‘AI arms race’7 have been accompanied by rising public anxiety concerning the 
potential damaging effects of these technologies for individuals and for society more 
generally.8  These concerns have drawn attention to questions about where responsibility lies 
for these adverse impacts, threats and risks.  For this purpose, the importance of responsibility 
rests on the need to ensure, within constitutional democratic orders, that individuals and 
organisations are held to account for the adverse ‘other-regarding’ effects of their actions.9  
Accordingly, the primary purpose of this study is to examine the implications of advanced 
digital technologies (including AI) for the concept of responsibility, particularly in so far as they 
might impede the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.   For this purpose, it 
considers adverse effects, both intended10 and unintended,11 arising from the development 
and use of AI that can be understood as bearing directly upon the enjoyment of human rights 
and freedoms. However, the indirect adverse effects of AI, including those associated with the 
risks of mass unemployment, and other second- or third-order effects are excluded from 
scope, as are the implications of their use in military applications (including autonomous 
weapon systems). This is not to suggest that these risks are unimportant, but merely that they 
raise particular concerns that are beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
1.2 Structure of this study 
The aim of this study is to examine where responsibility should lie for the adverse individual 
and societal threats, risks and consequences associated with the actual and anticipated 
development and application of advanced digital technologies, particularly as they continue to 
grow in power and sophistication.  It adopts what might be understood as a ‘human rights 
perspective’, in so far as the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected under the 
ECHR, can help both to (a) understand the nature of those threats, risks and consequences; (b) 
help identify how responsibility for those threats, risks and consequences should be attributed 
and allocated, and (c) consider the kinds of institutional mechanisms that may be needed to 
ensure that human rights are effectively protected and that responsibility for the protection of 
human rights is duly allocated.12  To this end, this study draws on concepts and academic 
                                                          
6  The European Commission has committed “at least €20bn” to AI technologies to be spent by 2020 (White 
2018) while the UK has recently committed £1bn: UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
2018; UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2018.  
7  See Financial Times 2018.  On rivalry between China, US, and EU see European Political Strategy Centre 
2018.  
8  See the literature cited at n.50 below.  
9  See section 3.1 for a discussion of the concept of responsibility and its importance.  While questions may 
arise concerning how responsibility for the positive and otherwise beneficial other-regarding effects of AI 
should be allocated, because the concern of this report is on considering the potential adverse impacts of 
advanced digital technologies on human rights, this study focuses on responsibility for the adverse impacts, 
threats and risks associated with these technologies. 
10  Intentional attacks on others using AI have been described as the ‘malicious use’ of AI: Brundage et al 2018.  
Other adverse effects might be intended but not necessarily malicious.  See the examples discussed by 
Sandvig et al 2014.  
11  O’Neil 2016. 
12  As the Australian Human Rights Commssion has observed, a human rights approach provides ‘a more 
substantive mechanism by which to identify, prevent and mitigate risk’ compared to that of ‘technology 
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scholarship from law, the humanities and the social sciences, including moral, legal and 
political philosophy and political economy, and from computer science, rather than focusing 
on the case law jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.  It proceeds in four 
chapters.   
Chapter 1 provides a basic outline of how these AI technologies work, before identifying the 
responsibility-relevant attributes or properties which these technologies, and their 
contemporary and near-term applications, possess.     
Chapter 2 examines the potential adverse individual and collective consequences that the 
application of advanced digital technologies may pose. It begins by focusing on the use of data-
driven profiling technologies, highlighting how they may systematically threaten particular 
rights, as well as threatening more general collective values and interests.  It then considers 
the threats and risks posed by other AI technologies and their contemporary and anticipated 
applications.  Chapter Two concludes by drawing attention to the growing power asymmetry 
between those with the capacity and resources to develop and employ AI technologies, and 
the individuals, groups and populations directly affected by their use.   
Chapter 3 then considers where responsibility lies for addressing these potential adverse 
consequences, particularly if they ripen into rights violations and/or harm, including harm to 
collective values and interests, including those which might threaten the socio-technical 
foundations of democratic freedom in which human rights are anchored.   It considers several 
legal ‘models of responsibility’ that might be relied upon to allocate and distribute these risks 
and consequences.  It also identifies several challenges associated with seeking to ascribe and 
assign responsibility for the operation of highly complex socio-technical systems, which have 
typically involved multiple organisations, individuals, and interacting software and hardware 
components.  It then identifies a range of potential mechanisms that might help to address 
some of these challenges in order to secure effective and legitimate human rights protection.  
Chapter 4 concludes. 
1.3 Understanding the implications of AI for concepts of responsibility 
In order to examine the implications of AI for the concept of responsibility from a human rights 
perspective, it is necessary to acquire a basic understanding of how these technologies are 
developed and how they operate. 
(a) Machine intelligence and machine learning  
Much of the excitement about the promise and potential of AI to generate advances and 
improvements across a wide range of social domains, including industrial productivity, health, 
medicine, environmental management and food security, rely on the power and potential of 
machine learning.13  Machine learning is the technology that allows computers to perform 
specific tasks intelligently by learning from examples, data and experience.14  Although 
                                                                                                                                                                         
ethics’ by ‘turning concepts of rights and freedoms into effective policies, practices and practical realities. 
International human rights principles embody these fundamental values, and the human rights approach 
gives mechanisms and tools to realise them through implementation and accountabilities.’ Australian 
Human Rights Commission 2018:17. 
13  Russell and Norvig 2016. 
14  Royal Society 2017:16. 
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machine learning techniques have been available for some time, they have experienced major 
advances in recent years due to technological developments, enhanced computing power and 
the radical increase in the availability of digital data.  These advances have enabled the 
development of machines that can now out-perform humans on specific tasks (such as 
language processing, analysis, translation as well as image recognition) when, only a few years 
ago, they struggled to achieve accurate results.15  These technologies are now ubiquitous in 
the everyday lives of those living in highly industrialised, contemporary societies.  In these 
societies, people now regularly interact with machine learning systems that enable digital 
services (such as, for example, search engines, product recommendation systems and 
navigation systems) to provide accurate, efficient responses to user queries in real-time, while 
continually improving their performance by learning from their mistakes.16     
(b) Responsibility-relevant properties of AI 
In order to identify how advanced digital technologies (including AI) challenge our existing 
legal, moral and social conceptions of responsibility, it is important to identify the 
“responsibility-relevant” attributes or properties which these technologies possess, ie. the 
properties of these technologies that are likely to affect their impact upon others. 
Task automation 
For this purpose, one of the most important properties of these technologies lies in their 
capacity to undertake tasks (many of which formerly required human operators) 
“automatically”, that is, without the need for direct human intervention.17   
Machine autonomy 
Advances in machine learning techniques have resulted in the development and increasing use 
of systems that are not only automated, but they operate in ways that exhibit autonomy. 
Although the term ‘autonomy’ is commonly used to describe many AI-enabled applications in 
public and policy discussion, within the technical community there does not appear to be any 
widely used consensus about what, precisely, this term means, and the preconditions for 
characterising a non-human entity as ‘autonomous’.  However, in the policy literature, the 
term ‘autonomy’ is often used to refer to the functional capacity of computational agents to 
perform tasks independently that require the agent to make ‘decisions’ about its own behavior 
without direct input from human operators and without human control.    Computational 
agents of this kind operate by perceiving their environment and adapting their behaviour in 
response to feedback concerning their own task performance, so that their decisions and 
actions are thought not to be ‘fully deterministic’ at the outset (and therefore not fully 
predictable in advance) due to the almost infinite variety of contexts and environments in 
which these agents might operate.18  So understood, autonomy is a range property which may 
                                                          
15  Royal Society 2017: 16.  For example,  radiologists can be outperformed by image recognition algorithms 
(The Economist 2018a) while lawyers can be outperformed by AI in some of their functions (Mangan 2017). 
16  For an example of the co-evolution of human behaviours in response to machine-learning driven navigation 
systems, see Girardin and Blat 2010. 
17  Liu 2016. 
18  European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) 2018.  The EGE also observes that there 
seems to be a push for even higher degrees of automation and ‘autonomy’ in robotics, AI and mechatronics 
(a combination of AI and deep learning, data science, sensor technology, IoT, mechanical and electrical 
engineering) yet at the same time they see ‘development toward ever closer interaction between humans 
and machines’ noting that well aligned teams of AI systems and human professionals perform better in 
some domains than humans or machines separately. 
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be more or less present in degrees (rather than an all-or-nothing property), depending upon 
the extent to which human oversight and intervention is required for the operation of the 
system.19   
Some machine learning systems are distinguished by their capability to learn and change over 
time, dynamically setting their own sub-goals, and their ability to adapt to local conditions via 
external sensor information or updated input data.20  The individual designers of the system 
may decide and set its  initial state and parameters, including the overarching goal that it is 
intended to optimise, but once deployed, the operation and outputs of the system will evolve 
with use in different environments.   In particular, these computational systems are intended 
to operate in ways that allow the system to make independent decisions that choose between 
alternatives in ways that are not pre-programmed in advance, and to do so without any human 
intervention.  Current AI systems cannot determine the overarching goal which the system is 
designed to optimise (which must be specified by the systems’ human developers) but they 
are capable of determining their own intermediate sub-purposes or goals.   
                                                          
19   The range of levels of control or involvement that human operators can have in a system has been 
described by The Royal Academy of Engineering into four different grades of control: (a) controlled systems: 
where humans have full or partial control, such as an ordinary car (b) supervised systems: which do what an 
operator has instructed, such as a programmed lathe or other industrial machinery (c) automatic systems: 
that carry out fixed functions without the intervention of an operator, such as an elevator, and (d) 
autonomous systems that are adaptive, learn, and can make ‘decisions’: Royal Academy of Engineering 
2009: 2.  The SAE International has developed standard J3016_201806: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms 
Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Systems (SAE International 2018) which has been 
used, for example, by the US Department of Transportation as part of its Federal Automated Vehicles Policy: 
US Department of Transportation 2017. 
20  Michalski et al (2013). 
Box 1: Machine autonomy and sensitivity to context 
Contrast a self-driving vacuum cleaner with a self-driving car 
- Fundamentally the same technical architecture applies: their overarching purpose 
is set by the system’s human designers but both machine agents are capable of 
determining their own sub-goals in order to achieve that purpose 
- The behaviour of both kinds of machine agents cannot be fully determined at the 
outset 
- Each is capable of perceiving their environment and adapting decisions and 
actions accordingly 
- Yet these machines are expected to operate in highly contrasting contexts (home 
environments are relatively contained and stable in contrast to the dynamism and 
complexity of on-road conditions) 
Accordingly, the greater the stability and predictability of the environment or context 
in which these systems operate, the more foreseeable their possible outputs and 
responses.  Hence the anticipated behaviour of the self-driving vacuum cleaner is 
likely to be easier to foresee and anticipate when compared to that of the self-driving 
car. 
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For the purposes of identifying where responsibility lies for the outputs and the consequences 
of these systems, of particular importance is their stability and predictability (see Box 1).  
Because these systems learn dynamically and iteratively from their environment (which is itself 
often volatile and continuously changing) this means that these technologies, and their 
outputs, have the potential to evolve in unexpected ways. This means that, in practice, these 
technologies are sometimes characterised by their opacity and the unpredictability of their 
outputs (discussed below), which may have direct implications for whether, and in what ways, 
the concept of responsibility can be applied to their decisions, actions and the resulting 
consequences.   
In addition to their capacity to operate without direct human oversight and control, these 
technologies have a number of other responsibility-relevant characteristics, including their: 
a. Inscrutability and opacity: Concerns about the opacity of these technologies21 can be 
understood in three distinct but related senses.22  First, unlike early forms of AI, including 
so-called ‘expert systems’ which relied on rule-based ‘if-then’ reasoning, contemporary 
machine learning systems create and utilise more complex models which can make it 
difficult to trace their underlying logic in order to identify why and how they generated a 
particular output.   While some forms of learning systems enable the underlying logic to be 
traced and understood (for example, those which utilise decision-trees), others (including 
those that utilise neural networks and back propagation) do not.23  Secondly, even for 
systems that utilise algorithms whose underlying operation and logic can be understood 
and explained in human terms, those that have been developed by commercial providers 
may not be openly available for scrutiny because they are the subject of intellectual 
property rights, entitling the owner of those rights to maintain the secrecy of their 
algorithms.24  Thirdly, even if information about a system is provided (such as the 
technique used to train the machine learning algorithm, or the formal rules of a rule-based 
computational system), those who lack technical expertise will not be able to understand 
or meaningfully comprehend this information, effectively reducing the practical 
transparency of the system.25  The combined effect of the inscrutability and opacity of 
algorithms results in their characterisation as ‘black boxes’,26 and these properties have 
direct implications for the transparency, explainability and accountability of and for the 
applications that utilise them.27
b. Complexity and dynamism: Technological applications that utilise AI for specific social 
purposes can be understood as highly complex socio-technical systems, in that both the 
underlying mechanisms through which they work, and their dynamic and continual 
interaction with the environments in which they operate, are complex in their operational 
logic, generating outcomes that are often difficult to predict, particularly for those 
employing machine learning algorithms.28  This means that understanding and anticipating 
                                                          
21  See Wagner 2017: 36-37. 
22  Burrell 2016.  
23  A growing body of technical research on ‘explainable AI’ has emerged, seeking to identify methods through 
which these systems might be rendered intelligible to humans.  This form of opacity recognises human 
limitations in fully comprehending or explaining the operation of complex systems, because they reason 
differently to machines: Zalnieruite 2019. See below at section 3.7.1. 
24  See for example State vs Loomis 881 N.W. 2d 749 (Wis. 2016).  Noto La Diega (2018). 
25  Burrell 2016: 4.  
26  Pasquale 2015. 
27  Burrell 2016; Datta et al 2016.  Weller 2017; Yeung and Weller 2019.   
28  Schut and Wooldridge 2000. 
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how they function in real world contexts can be extremely challenging, even for those with 
the relevant technical expertise, typically requiring expertise from multiple domains. 
c. Human input, interaction and discretion: Although advances in AI are strongly associated 
with the so-called ‘rise of the machines,’ it is important to recognise that humans are 
involved at every stage of the development and implementation of AI-driven technologies: 
from the origination of ideas and proposal for development, design, modelling, data-
gathering and analysis, testing, implementation, operation and evaluation.29  In addition, 
these systems are also often expected to operate in real world environments in which the 
systems are designed dynamically to interact with humans, and in many cases are 
intended to do so at scale (eg Facebook’s News Feed system).  In particular, many 
applications that utilise AI are designed formally to preserve human discretion, so that the 
system’s output is offered to the user as a ‘recommendation’ rather than executing some 
pre-specified automated decision or function. 30  Thus, for example, digital product 
recommendation engines offer product suggestions to users, but the human user retains 
formal decision-making authority in deciding whether or not to act upon the 
recommendation and this may have significant implications for the concept of 
responsibility.31  
d. A general purpose technology:  AI technologies can be understood as ‘general purpose’, in 
that they can conceivably be applied to an almost limitless range of social domains.  This 
versatility means that AI technologies can be characterised as classic ‘dual use’ 
technologies, in that the motivations for their application may range from benevolent, to 
self-interested through to malevolent.32   
e. Global interconnectivity, ubiquity and scalability: It is important to recognise that the 
global interconnectivity and reach of the internet (and internet-connected technologies) 
have enabled the swift roll-out of AI technologies on a massive scale, particularly with the 
rapid and widespread take-up of ‘smart’ networked devices.  Many AI applications used 
daily by individuals in the industrialised world have now become ubiquitous.  Given the 
efficiency and convenience which they offer in managing the routine tasks involved in 
contemporary life, this means that, in practice, it is rapidly becoming impossible to 
conceive of modern living without them.33   Yet the reach and penetration of networked 
data infrastructure, and the take-up of smart connected devices into the global south, 
remains poor and limited compared with the global north, so that those living in these 
areas do not have equivalent access to the services and improvements in efficiency and 
convenience that are available to those living in wealthier, highly industrialised states.34   
f. Real-time automated and continuous operation: The efficiency and convenience which 
many AI applications offer can be attributed, in no small measure, to their ability to 
operate automatically and in real-time.35  Thus, for example, AI-enabled navigation 
systems can offer invaluable guidance to individuals as they seek to find their way to a 
destination which is entirely foreign to them by providing real-time guidance concerning 
                                                          
29  Bryson and Theodorou 2018. 
30  Su and Taghi 2009. 
31  See discussion of ‘humans in the loop’ at section 3.5.2 below. 
32  On the self-interested design of algorithmic systems, see the discussion of the SABRE airline reservation 
system in Sandvig et al 2014. On malevolent applications of AI, see Brundage et al (2018). 
33  Zuboff 2015; Royal Society 2017. 
34  McSherry 2018. 
35  For examples of real-time AI applications, see Narula (2018). 
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which direction to take and, at the same time, can advise on the anticipated journey time 
of alternative route options.36  These applications are possible because of the capacity of 
AI technologies to collect digital data from sensors embedded into and collected from 
internet-enabled devices, enabling them to track the activities and movements of 
individuals at a highly granular level, and often without the individual’s awareness.  These 
technological capacities have direct implications for concepts of responsibility in ways that 
may affect the enjoyment of human rights and freedoms in at least three ways.  Firstly, the 
networked nature of many of these technologies which the internet (and internet 
connected technologies) have made possible means that they can operate at scale and in 
real time.  As a result, there may be considerable distance in both time and space between 
the design and implementation of these systems, and the point at which their decisions 
and consequences arise  and are directly and immediately felt.  Secondly, this capacity to 
operate in real-time and at scale generates very significant challenges for their supervision 
and oversight, discussed more fully below.  Thirdly, in order to provide highly personalised 
advice that is contextualised against wider population trends (eg traffic congestion) in real-
time, this necessitates the continuous surveillance of individuals at a population wide-
level, entailing constant personal data collection and processing, which necessarily 
implicates the human rights to, and collective value of, privacy and data protection.37  
g. Reliance on large data-sets:  While the model upon which a computational algorithm is 
based will determine its operation, machine learning systems rely critically on the 
underlying data-sets for their accuracy and operation.38  Without access to relevant data 
sets, machine learning algorithms are but hollow shells.  Accordingly, the availability, size, 
and quality of the underlying datasets upon which algorithms are trained, tested and 
validated plays a critical role in their performance and the accuracy and legitimacy of their 
outputs, as does the availability and quality of the data which these systems rely upon 
during their operation.   
h. Capacity to generate insight from merging data sets: Much of the excitement surrounding 
AI technologies arises from their capacity to generate new insight from merged datasets 
which can then be used to predict and inform decision-making.  In particular, a data set 
might contain fairly mundane, innocuous data about individuals. But when multiple such 
data sets are merged and mined, this may generate insight that can enable quite intimate 
personal information to be inferred at a very high level of accuracy.39  Accordingly, issues 
concerning how to govern the collection and processing of digital data have far-reaching 
implications for human rights and for the concept of responsibility which, given the ease 
and almost negligible cost associated with transferring and copying digital data and the 
complexity of the contemporary global data eco-system, have become especially 
challenging and important. 
i. Capacity to imitate human traits: In recent years, the ability of AI technologies to imitate 
human traits, including voice simulation, visual representations of human behaviour and 
robots capable of interacting with humans with apparent emotional sensitivity, has 
become so high quality that it may be extremely difficult for ordinary humans to detect 
that those traits are artificially generated. This has provoked concern about their capacity 
                                                          
36  Swan 2015. 
37  See discussion at Section 2 below.   
38  Kitchin 2014.  Prainsack 2019. 
39  Kosinski et al 2013. 
Council of Europe Study 
24 
to deceive humans (particularly the production of so-called ‘deep fakes’) and harnessed 
for unethical or other malicious purposes.40
j. Greater software complexity: Machine learning and deep learning systems become 
progressively complex, not only due to the availability of data, but also due to increased 
programming complexity. As a result, these systems are subject to three types of 
vulnerability: first, increased programming complexity increases the propensity of these 
systems to generate stochastic components (i.e. make mistakes) 41 ; secondly, this 
complexity opens the door to a wide range of adversarial attacks;42 and thirdly, the 
unpredictability of their outputs can generate unintended yet highly consequential 
adverse third party effects (‘externalities’).  
k. Capacity to ‘personalise’ and configure individual choice environments: One way in 
which AI systems have contributed to the achievement of greater efficiency and precision 
across a wide range of processes and operations has been through the ‘personalisation’ of 
service provision. For example, the use of profiling techniques enables digital retailers 
(such as Amazon) to provide ‘personalised’ product recommendations to each customer, 
based on data-driven predictions (gleaned from the continuous collection and analysis of 
that customer’s digital traces when analysed in conjunction with those of other 
customers).43  While the personalisation of digital services and offers benefits to users in 
reducing the volume of irrelevant offers and services which they receive, it has the effect 
of segmenting individual users from each other, such that one user sees only his or her 
personalised informational environment, which may be very different from that seen by 
other users.  When AI driven personalisation takes place routinely and at scale, this risks 
fostering social fragmentation44 and eroding social cohesion and solidarity.45  
l. Capacity to redistribute risks, benefits and burdens among and between individuals and 
groups via the use of AI-driven optimisation systems which reconfigure social 
environments and choice architectures:   AI systems can operate in real time and at a 
scale via the internet’s global networked architecture.  As a result, these systems can be 
configured to operate in a manner designed to optimise the over-arching goal prespecified 
by its human developers at a scale that was previously impossible in a pre-internet 
enabled age.46  The capacity to harness AI systems to personalise the informational choice 
environments of each individual user is particularly powerful when configured to operate 
at scale.  It enables the design and deployment of AI content-distribution systems aimed at 
influencing and directing the behaviour of an entire population of users, rather than one 
isolated user, in accordance with the developer’s chosen optimisation function,  these 
systems inevitably prioritise certain values over others, and will do so in ways that 
configure and shape social and informational environments that may be beneficial for 
some individuals and groups, while detrimental to others.  For example, the optimisation 
                                                          
40  The Economist 2017.  Chesney and Citron 2019.  See discussion at Section 2.2.2 below. 
41   Recent research in image recognition demonstrated the lack of ability of technology to distinguish noisy 
informational inputs: chihuahua dogs pictures were mixed with muffin pictures and the AI algorithm could 
not tell them apart: Yao 2017.  
42   Current AI technologies can be easily and successfully attacked by cybercriminals who can use AI system 
vulnerabilities for their own benefit.  Cybercriminals can falsify voice recognition and CAPTCHA systems to 
break into personal and business accounts: Polyakov 2018.  
43  Yeung 2016. 
44  Pariser 2012. 
45  Yeung 2018a. 
46  Yeung 2016. 
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function of AI-driven navigation systems might be to enable each user to find the fastest 
possible route to her desired destination, given the volume and location of traffic 
prevailing at the user’s time of travel.   The routes identified by the system and 
recommended to users will, when aggregated, have distributional effects: residents in 
areas in which traffic is routed being confronted with greater noise levels, vehicle 
emissions and congestion, while these effects will not be experienced by residents in areas 
where traffic is not routed.  Accordingly, these optimisation systems raise questions about 
accountability and responsibility for their resulting distributional outcomes, particularly 
given that there is typically no consultation input or deliberation from affected individuals, 
groups and populations concerning the distribution of risks and benefits arising from their 
operation.47     
m. The capacity to generate problems of collective action: The capacity of AI optimisation 
systems to operate in a highly targeted manner which is personalised to individual users, 
and to do so at scale across an entire population of users, means that these systems can 
operate in ways that may have a relatively minor effect at the individual level, whilst 
having a serious and significant impact at the collective and/or societal level.  It is not 
difficult to imagine circumstances in which the operation of AI optimisation systems may 
therefore generate a ‘collective action’ problem.  Collective action problems arise when all 
individuals would be better off cooperating with other users, but each individual user fails 
to take action because the impact on each individual is too small to justify the effort and 
resources associated with so doing.48  Consider, for example, the problem of political 
micro-targeting and the provision of misleading, inaccurate or dubious political 
information to individual voters with the intention of encouraging them to vote for a 
particular candidate.   Even if a particular individual is misled into voting for a candidate 
that she might not otherwise have supported, she is in practice unlikely to be sufficiently 
motivated to initiate a complaint or other legal proceedings against those responsible for 
its dissemination.  Yet because these effect are felt at the population/collective level, they 
may pose real and potentially serious threats to the integrity of democratic elections, and 
to democratic processes more generally.49  In other words, one of the distinctive and novel 
challenges which AI systems now pose arises from their capacity to operate in a highly 
targeted and personalised manner, yet in real-time and at a population-wide scale, which 
could pose serious societal threats but for which the motivation for any individual to try 
and counter these threats may be extremely weak. 
1.4 Implications for the concept of responsibility from a human rights perspective   
The importance of understanding the human rights dimensions of AI is reflected in the various 
inquiries and reports commissioned and produced by a growing number of civil society 
organisations and is increasingly the focus of academic scholarship concerned with the ‘ethics 
of AI’50.  This includes the work of the Council of Europe, including its study on the human 
                                                          
47  Yeung 2017a. 
48  Olsen 1965 
49  UK Information Commissioner’s Office 2018.  UK House of Commons Digital Culture Media and Sports 
Committee 2019. 
50 See for example Amnesty International 2017; Access Now 2018; Australian Human Rights Commission 2018; 
Cath 2017; Hildebrandt 2015; Executive Office of the President 2016;  The Montreal Declaration for 
Responsible AI 2017; The Toronto Declaration: Protecting the Rights to Equality and Non-Discrimination in 
Machine Learning Systems 2018; Latonero 2019; Mantelero 2018; Raso et al 2018; Risse 2018; Rouvroy 
2016; UN General Assembly 2018; Mantalero 2019; Nuffield Foundation and Leverhulme Centre for the 
Future of Intelligence 2019;  EU High Level Expert Group on AI 2019a. 
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rights dimensions of automated data processing techniques and possible regulatory 
implications,  prepared by the Committee of Experts on internet intermediaries (MSI-NET) 
(hereafter the ‘Wagner Study’).51  The Wagner Study identifies examples of algorithmic 
decision-making systems currently in use that may violate or undermine the enjoyment of ‘the 
most obviously implicated rights that are to a stronger or lesser degree already in public 
discussion’,52 including rights to: 
• a fair trial and due process (Art 6)53; 
• privacy and data protection (Art 8)54;  
• freedom of expression (Art 10);  
• freedom of association (Art 11)55;  
• an effective remedy (Art 13)56
• the prohibition on discrimination (Art 14)57  and 
• the right to free elections (Art 3, Protocol 1)58  
Yet, as the Report commissioned by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) undertaken by the Rathenau Instituut concluded: 
Despite [the]…wide-ranging impact of digital technologies on human rights, so far 
little attention has been paid to this crucial topic and there has been scarcely any 
fundamental political and public debate on it.  As a result, a serious erosion of 
human rights is taking place.  Therefore, the human rights debate, which is 
seriously lagging behind the fast-growing technological developments, needs to be 
strengthened rapidly.59
The present study builds on the Wagner Study by critically examining how advanced digital 
technologies may implicate the concept of responsibility.  Chapter 2 begins by identifying and 
examining the adverse individual and societal risks posed by AI.  It adopts a ‘human rights 
perspective’ by focusing on how these technologies may undermine the practical capacity to 
                                                          
51  The Wagner Study focused primarily on the implications for human rights of algorithmic decision-making 
systems that affect the public at large, identifying various human rights concerns triggered by the increasing 
role of algorithms in decision-making, observing that these concerns are bound to expand and grow as 
algorithms, automated data processing techniques and related systems become increasingly complex and 
interact in ways that become ‘progressively impenetrable to the human mind’: Wagner Study 2017: 5.   
52  Wagner Study 2017: 32. 
53  See Section 2.1.1(a). 
54  See Section 2.1.1(b). 
55  Although the internet and social networking sights have enhanced the capacity for individuals to exercise 
their Art 11 ECHR rights to freedom of association, there are concerns that the automated sorting and 
profiling of protested on-line may erode these rights: Wagner Study 2017:  23-24. 
56  Art 13 ECHR requires that states ensure that individuals have access to judicial or other procedures that can 
impartially decide on their claims concerning violations of human rights, including on-line violations, 
including effective non-judicial mechanisms, and to ensure that private sector actors respect those rights by 
establishing effective complaint mechanisms that promptly remedy the grievances of individuals.  Yet the 
opacity of automated decision-making processes may impede the ability of individuals to obtain an effective 
remedy and the increasing use of automated decision-mechanisms for complaints handling raises ‘serious 
concerns’ about whether such mechanisms can be regarded as offering an effective remedy: Wagner Study 
2017: 24. 
57  See Section 2.1.1 (d). 
58 Art 3 of Protocol 1 ECHR requires states to support the individual right to free expression by holding free 
elections at reasonable intervals. These elections must enable you to vote in secret.  However the rise of 
social media and the use of automated content recommendation systems may be used for the purposes of 
political manipulation and could threaten the right to free elections: Wagner Study 2017: 30-32. 
59  Van Est and Gerritsen 2017: 46. 
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exercise particular human rights and freedoms on a systematic basis in an era pervaded by 
advanced AI technologies, rather than engaging in detailed analysis of particular AI 
applications that may adversely impact specific human rights and fundamental freedoms.  Two 
dimensions of these systematic impacts are considered: firstly, the threats to a set of rights 
posed by algorithmic decision-making systems.60  Secondly, the wider adverse collective social 
impacts of AI technologies (including but not limited to those incorporated into algorithmic 
decision-making systems), only some of which can be readily expressed in the language of 
existing human rights discourse.  Over time, these wider adverse effects could systematically 
threaten the socio-technical foundations which the very notion of human rights presupposes 
and in which they are rooted.  
                                                          
60  A number of these rights are examined in the Wagner Study 2017. 
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Chapter 2. Threats, risks, harms and wrongs associated with 
advanced digital technologies  
Many commentators claim that advances in networked digital technologies, including those 
currently referred to as AI technologies, are powering the emergence of a ‘New Industrial 
Revolution’ that will provoke far-reaching changes across every aspect of social life, of a 
magnitude and scale that will be as disruptive and unsettling as those wrought by the original 
Industrial Revolution.61  Before examining the potential threats and risks associated with these 
emerging technologies, it is helpful briefly to highlight the broader social-political and 
economic context which affect and condition their development, implementation and 
adoption, and the broader historic context and experience of modern scientific and 
technological innovation.   
To this end, there may be parallels between the larger societal effects of the original industrial 
revolution and the anticipated effects of the ‘New’ Industrial Revolution that is now dawning.  
For example, while the 19th century Industrial Revolution brought about myriad benefits to 
both individuals and society, and can be credited with very substantial and widespread 
improvements to living standards and individual and collective well-being, it generated 
unintended adverse effects.  These include both direct adverse effects on human health and 
safety associated with early forms of industrial production, and the burning of fossil fuels to 
power industrial activity which has led to a serious climate change problem at a global scale, 
and which we have not yet adequately addressed or resolved.  Yet the adverse effects on 
climate change arising from the technologies that provoked the original Industrial Revolution 
did not become apparent until over a century later, by which time it was too late to address 
and reverse them effectively.  Contemporary societies might now face a similar dilemma.  One 
of the difficulties in seeking to identify and anticipate the larger adverse societal effects of 
technological innovation arises not only from difficulties in predicting their likely applications 
and take up, but especially from difficulties in anticipating their aggregate, cumulative effects 
over time and space.     
2.1 The rise of algorithmic decision-making (ADM) systems  
Computational systems that utilise machine learning algorithms, combined with the rapid and 
widespread take-up of ‘smart’ devices, have fuelled the emergence of algorithmic decision-
making systems which seek to harness (and frequently to monetise) the digital data which can 
now be gleaned by systematically tracking and collecting the digital traces left from individuals’ 
on-line behaviours, and utilising advanced digital technologies (including AI) in order to 
produce new knowledge that can be used to inform real-world decisions. Many of these 
systems rely upon data-driven profiling techniques that entail the systematic and bulk 
collection of data from a population of individuals in order to identify patterns and thereby 
predict preferences, interests and behaviours of individuals and groups, often with very high 
degrees of accuracy.  These data profiles can then be used to sort individuals to identify 
‘candidates of interest’ with the aim of producing ‘actionable insight’ – that is, insight that can 
be used to inform and automate decision-making about individuals by those undertaking the 
profiling (or their clients).62  These systems are widely used by retailers seeking to target 
products to individuals identified as most profitable and most likely to be interested in them,63
                                                          
61  boyd and Crawford 2013.  Skilton and Hovsepian 2017. 
62  Mayer-Schonenberg and Cukier 2013. 
63  Draper and Turrow 2017; Gandy 1993. 
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by political actors and organisations seeking to tailor and target campaign messages to 
individuals who are identified as most likely to be persuaded by them,64 and, increasingly, by 
criminal justice authorities who seek to assess the ‘risk’ which particular individuals are 
algorithmically identified as posing to public safety in order to make custody decisions about 
individuals (whether criminal suspects or those convicted of criminal offences).65    
It is in this socio-economic context that public anxieties have emerged concerning the societal 
effects of advanced digital technologies (including AI), particularly given the increasing use of 
data-driven profiling.  Recent attention has focused on the way in which social media and 
other content distribution platforms utilize profiling technologies in ways that have profound 
implications for the Article 10 right to freedom of expression and information, particularly 
following the Cambridge Analytica scandal in which it is alleged that millions of profiles of 
Facebook users were illegally collected to microtarget individuals with political messages with 
the aim of swaying voter behavior.66  The following discussion, however, is concerned primarily 
with the way in which data-driven algorithmic decision-making systems more generally may 
systematically threaten particular human rights, rather than focusing on their application to 
specific domains of activity.   
2.1.1 How do ADM systems systematically threaten particular rights? 
The use of algorithmic decision-making systems may systematically threaten several rights 
including: 
(a) The right to a fair trial and rights of ‘due process’: Art 6.   
Many ADM systems utilise data driven profiling techniques to create digital profiles of  
individuals and groups across a wide range of contexts, sifting and sorting individuals into 
categories in order to assist decision-making.  When used to automate and inform decision-
making that substantially affect the rights and significant interests of individuals, data-driven 
profiling may have serious consequences.  For the affected individual, the opportunity to 
participate in, contest or otherwise challenge the outcome of the decision and/or the 
underlying reasoning upon which that decision was based, or the quality or integrity of the 
data that was used to inform the decision, are in practice, almost non-existent.67  While the 
right to a fair hearing (per Article 6) encompasses a series of more specific procedural rights,68
these include a person’s right to know the reasons for decisions which adversely and 
significantly affect that individual, yet the ADM systems used to inform decision-making may 
not be configured to, nor capable of, produce meaningful explanations in terms that are 
intelligible to the affected individual, or even (in the case of neural networks that rely on back 
propagation) in terms that are intelligible to the algorithm developers.69  These concerns are 
exacerbated by the opacity of these systems which can arise from their technical complexity, 
difficulties in assessing the quality and provenance of the underlying training data that was 
used to train the decision-making model,70 or because the algorithm enjoys intellectual 
property protection as a trade secret and therefore need not be publicly disclosed,71 a stance 
                                                          
64  Gorton 2016. 
65  Oswald et al 2018; Ferguson 2016.  
66  UK House of Commons, Digital Culture Media and Sport 2019. 
67  Hildebrandt 2015; Hildebrandt and Gutwirth 2008. 
68  Galligan 1997. 
69  Weller 2017; Matthias 2004; Burrell 2016. 
70  Lohr et al 2019.  
71  Pasquale 2015. 
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which organisations utilising these systems typically defend on the basis of that it prevents 
users from ‘gaming’ the system.72   Accordingly, these systems risk interfering with rights to 
due process protected under Article 6 (including the presumption of innocence), particularly in 
circumstances where the consequences for the affected individual are serious and life-
limiting.73   Particularly worrying is the increasing use of AI systems in criminal justice contexts 
to inform custodial and sentencing decisions, primarily in the USA, although they are being 
taken up elsewhere (including the UK).74  Yet, as Hildebrandt has observed, we have become 
resistant to the notion that the outcomes of an AI tool might be incorrect, incomplete or even 
irrelevant with regard to potential suspects.75   
(b) The right to freedom of expression: Art 10  
The operation of algorithmic profiling may significantly affect the Art 10 right to freedom of 
expression, which includes the right to receive and impart information, given the powerful 
influence which global digital platforms now exert over our informational environment at both 
an individual and societal level. For example, automated search engines act as crucial 
gatekeepers for human beings who wish to seek, receive or impart information, as content 
which is not indexed or ranked highly is less likely to reach a large audience or to be seen at all.  
Yet search algorithms are intentionally designed to serve their owner’s commercial interests, 
and are therefore inevitably biased towards certain types of content or content providers. It is 
typically automated algorithms, rather than humans, that decide how to handle, prioritise, 
distribute and delete third-party content on online platforms, including content handling 
during political and electoral campaigns.   These practices not only implicate the individual 
right to freedom of expression, but also Article 10’s inherent aim of creating an enabling 
environment for pluralist public debate that is equally accessible and inclusive to all.76    
In addition, online platforms are increasingly under pressure to actively counter online hate 
speech through automated techniques that detect and delete illegal content, particularly 
following the live video streaming via social media platforms of the attack on civilians by a lone 
terrorist in Christchurch in early 2019. Article 10.2 provides that any interferences with free 
expression, which would therefore include algorithmic systems that block access to content 
through filtering or removal, must be prescribed by law, pursue a specified legitimate purpose 
outlined in Art 10.2, and necessary in a democratic society.77   Accordingly, the widespread use 
of algorithms for content filtering and content removal processes, including on social media 
platforms also raises rule of law concerns, raising questions of legality, legitimacy and 
                                                          
72  Bennett-Moses and de Koker 2017. 
73  Davidow 2016.   
74  These applications not only implicate the rights under Article 6, but also the Article 5 right to liberty and 
security of the person, and the non-discrimination principle protected by Article 14.  
75  Hildebrandt 2016.  Hildebrandt argues that the Art 6 ‘equality of arms’ principle should be re-invented the 
moment that the public prosecutor, judge or lawyer is unable to check on how the police’s AI agent reached 
its conclusions, and that these AI agents should be required to log their activity and outputs, purposes, and 
how they reached the outcome to enable proper review .  The Rathenau Institut endorses Hildebrandt’s 
views, and has suggested that the Council of Europe consider establishing a framework of minimum norms 
to be taken into account when a ‘court’ (interpreted for this purpose as including all decision-making 
authorities within the legal system, particularly those involved in making custody decisions concerning 
individuals within the criminal justice system) uses AI – helping to prevent member states from devising 
their own individual frameworks which is likely to result in uneven and varying degrees of protection under 
Art 6 ECHR provided by individual member states: Van Est and Gerritsen (2017) 42-43. 
76  See UN General Assembly 2018. 
77 In line with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, any restriction of the freedom of 
expression must correspond to a ‘pressing social need’ and be proportionate to the legitimate aim(s) 
pursued.  See Yildirim v. Turkey, 18 March 2013, No 3111/10. 
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proportionality, particularly given that that online platforms often face an unclear legislative 
framework that encourages them to remove content voluntarily, without a clear legal basis. 
While their intentions are welcome, there is a lack of transparency and accountability 
concerning the process or about the criteria adopted to establish which content is ‘extremist’ 
or ‘clearly illegal’.78  These arrangements create the risk of excessive interference with the 
right to freedom of expression, and can be understood as ‘handing off’ law enforcement 
responsibilities from states to private enterprises.  National legal regimes which require digital 
intermediaries to restrict access to content based on vague notions such as ‘extremism’ oblige 
them to monitor all on-line communication in order to detect illegal content, thereby violating 
the established principle that intermediaries should not be obliged to conduct general 
monitoring because of their potential ‘chilling effects’ on freedom of expression.79   In 
addition, process related concerns arise due to the capacity of platforms to decide for 
themselves what constitutes ‘extremist’ content and therefore subject to removal: the tools 
and measures through which identification and removal decisions are made effectively rest 
with private providers and, unless those measures are not subject to meaningful and effective 
state oversight, risk exceeding legally and constitutionally prescribed boundaries, thereby 
contravening the rule of law.80  
While the imperative of acting decisively against the spread of hate messages and the 
incitement to racially-motivated offences is indisputable, such practices raise considerable 
concerns related to the legality of interferences with freedom of expression. Extremist content 
or material inciting violence is often difficult to identify, even for a trained human, due to the 
complexity of disentangling factors such as cultural context and humor. Algorithms are not 
currently capable of detecting irony or critical analysis. The filtering of speech to eliminate 
harmful content through algorithms therefore faces a high risk of over-blocking and removing 
speech that is not only harmless but might contribute positively to the public debate. On the 
other hand, the capacity of media content platforms to disseminate messages in real time and 
at a global scale substantially magnifies the reach, scope and thus the impact of harmful 
speech.  The turn to automated approaches to on-line content filtering highlights the acute 
responsibility challenges which the increasing reliance on algorithmic systems in contemporary 
life generates: while they offer the benefits of scale, speed and efficiency relative to human 
decision-making, digital platforms claim that human oversight is necessarily inadequate, 
generating a ‘responsibility gap’ which they typically argue they cannot fairly be expected to 
fill.81
                                                          
78   See Menn and Volz 2017 
79   This principle is enshrined in EU-law and in relevant Council of Europe policy guidelines, including the recent  
Council of Europe CM/Rec(2018)2.  See also UN General Assembly (2018).  Several states have introduced 
laws or initiated law reform initiatives to address the spread of harmful on-line content.  For example, 
Germany adopted its Network Enforcement Act (‘NetzDG’) in 2017. This law requires online platforms with 
more than two million registered users in Germany to remove ‘manifestly unlawful’ content, which 
contravenes specific elements of the German criminal code, such as holocaust denial and hate speech, 
within 24 hours of receiving a notification or complaint, and to remove all other ‘unlawful’ content within 
seven days of notification. Non-compliance risks a fine of up to €50 million. This law also seeks to increase 
platform responsibility through imposing greater transparency and significant reporting obligations.  The 
law has been subject to significant criticism on the basis of its restrictive implications for freedom of 
expression.  Eg Access Now 2018: 22.  The UK has recently issued its Online Harms White Paper, which 
introduces a legal duty of care to make companies take more responsibility for the safety of their users and 
tackle harm caused by content or activity on their services, to be enforced by an independent regulator:  UK 
Government 2019. 
80  See Wagner Study 2017, 19. 
81  See discussion of the so-called ‘control’ problem at Section 3.2.2 below.   
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(c) Right to privacy and data protection: Article 8 
The Article 8 right to respect for private and family life and rights to data protection are being 
placed under unprecedented strain due to the ability of algorithms to facilitate the collection 
and repurposing of vast amounts of data, including personal data gleaned from digital 
observation of individual users which may generate further data, with entirely unpredictable 
results for the data subject.82  As the Wagner Study observed, the use of personal data for the 
purposes of individual profiling, and its subsequent repurposing, threatens a person’s right to 
‘informational self-determination’83 particularly given that (as noted in section 2.1) even fairly 
mundane, innocuous data collected from the digital traces of individuals may be merged with 
other data sets and mined in ways that can generate insight that can enable quite intimate 
personal information to be inferred at a very high level of accuracy.84  While contemporary 
data protection regimes (including Conv. 108 as modernised) are an important safeguard, 
conferring a set of  ‘data protection rights’85 on data subjects, aimed at protecting them from 
unnecessary and unlawful data collection and processing, they might not provide 
comprehensive and practically effective guarantees against the use of intrusive profiling 
applications.  
(d) The prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of rights and freedoms: Art 14 
The potential for bias and discrimination arising from the use of machine learning (ML) 
techniques has attracted considerable attention, from both policy-makers and AI researchers 
alike.   Concerns about unfair or unlawful treatment directly implicate Article 14 ECHR which 
provides that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention shall be 
‘secured without discrimination on any grounds such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status’.86  There are many opportunities for bias to inadvertently affect 
the outputs produced by the use of machine learning techniques, arising from biases of the 
algorithms’ developers, bias built into the model upon which the systems are generated, 
biases inherent in the data sets used to train the models, or biases introduced when such 
systems are implemented in real-world settings.87  Not only might biased ML systems lead to 
discrimination and generate erroneous decisions, but this can entail significant wrongdoing, 
resulting in decisions that are systematically biased against groups that have historically been 
socially disadvantaged (and against individuals who are members of those groups), thereby 
reinforcing and compounding discrimination and structural disadvantage, even though these 
effects were not intended by the system’s designers.88  These concerns have been particularly 
                                                          
82  See, for example, tension between competition in on-line services and consumer privacy: Oxera 2018. 
83  Wagner Study 2017:14. 
84  Kosminski et al 2015. 
85  The new rights introduced by the recently modernised Conv 108 include: the right not to be subjected to a 
decision significantly affecting him or her based solely on an automated processing of data without having 
his or her views taken into consideration, the right to obtain knowledge of the reasoning underlying data 
processing where the results of such processing are applied to him or her, and the right to object at any 
time, on grounds relating to his or her situation, and to the processing of personal data concerning him or 
her, unless the controller demonstrates legitimate grounds for processing which override his or her interest 
or rights in fundamental freedoms: Article 5 of the Modernised Convention 108. 
86  Protocol No 12 ECHR Article 1 provides that ‘the enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’ See also Art 21 
CFEU.   
87  Veale and Binns 2017. 
88   Barocas and Selbst 2016;  Wagner Study 2017: 27-28. 
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acute in relation to the use of machine learning techniques to inform custody and sentencing 
decisions within the US criminal justice system, due to allegations that such techniques 
operate in ways that are substantially biased against black and other racial minorities.89  In 
response to these concerns, a growing body of work concerned with devising technical 
approaches for countering such bias has emerged.90
2.1.2 Societal risks associated with data-driven profiling 
Contemporary applications of data-driven profiling technologies may also undermine 
important collective interests and values, only some of which fall within the scope of existing 
human rights protection.  Much of the value of these technologies lies in their capacity to sort 
individuals and groups within a population, to automate decision-making, and to enable 
personalised, predictive interventions to be scaled and applied at the population-level.  The 
following practices may generate significant societal risks yet these are often overlooked in 
public and academic debate. 
a. Population-wide, highly granular surveillance    
Because data-driven profiling requires the collection of highly granular data from individuals 
on a population-wide basis (i.e. at scale) to profile individuals and groups within and across a 
population to identify their inferred preferences and interests,91 this necessitates the use of 
mass surveillance, often in a highly intrusive yet largely invisible manner.  Although the threats 
which these practices pose to individual privacy and rights to data protection are readily 
apparent (discussed above), these practices also pose serious risks to the collective nature of 
privacy – thereby eroding the fundamental societal conditions in which individual privacy is 
possible and without which individual privacy cannot exist.  As the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly92 observes,  
‘since many technologies nowadays can operate from a distance, most of us are 
not even aware of this mass surveillance and people are rather defenceless, since 
there are few possibilities to escape these surveillance activities. This creeping 
development and its impact on society and human rights have received so far little 
attention in political and public debate….(Yet) there has been little debate about 
the cumulative effects of mass surveillance.  Instead, triggered by specific 
applications and incidents ‘mini debates’ have been organised, and the outcome of 
each debate is a balancing act that mostly favours national security or economic 
interests.  The sum of the debates, however, is the gradual but steady dissolving of 
the privacy and anonymity of the individual’.93
                                                          
89  Angwin et al 2016.  But see Dieterich et al 2016. 
90  See below at Section 3.7.1.  As UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye has observed, ‘Tackling the prevalence of 
discrimination in artificial intelligence systems is an existential challenge for companies and governments; 
failure to address and resolve the discriminatory elements and impacts will render the technology not only 
ineffective but dangerous.’ UN General Assembly 2018, 18. 
91  As the Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media
has observed at para 18 ‘The primary business model of the internet is built on mass surveillance’: Council 
of Europe 2017. 
92  Council of Europe 2017, para 60-61. 
93  The Wagner Study also draws attention to the risks created by data aggregation and the generation of new 
data, which ‘may then be mined through the use of algorithms, which creates a risk of large-scale 
surveillance (‘data-veillance’) by private entities and governments alike…a view echoed by the UN Human 
Rights Council (22 March 2017)’: Wagner Study 2017: 15-16.  As the Rathenau Instituut observes, ‘modern-
day surveillance via the IoT or internet, performed by states or companies, inherently involves the 
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These risks have magnified and deepened as a result of recent advances in AI capabilities that 
have fuelled the emergence of powerful biometric applications that can be used for 
identification purposes in ways that seriously threaten several human rights, including those 
protected under Article 8.  In China, for example, AI-driven facial recognition technology is now 
being introduced in the Beijing subway to enable the facial features of subway users to be 
identified and tracked as they travel. These technologies have already been deployed in train 
stations, used at a pop concert to locate a suspected fugitive, and even implemented in 
schools to monitor student distraction and automatically alert the teacher when distraction is 
detected.94   Nor is it difficult to imagine how powerful AI-driven lip-reading  technologies 
recently developed by DeepMind (which are reported to outperform professional lip-readers95) 
could be deployed by repressive regimes in ways that magnify anxieties that strike at the very 
heart of the right to be left alone, and the potentially severe chilling effects that they may have 
on freedom of expression, individual self-development and democratic freedom, particularly 
when deployed by states to identify and detain individuals identified as political dissidents.96  
When combined with the use of data-driven profiling technologies that enable fairly innocuous 
and mundane data to be merged and mined in ways that may reveal highly personal 
characteristics (such as sexual orientation)97 these can be very powerful tools in the hands of 
governmental regimes, whether liberal or repressive, and therefore generate acute threats to 
the exercise of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
b. Population-wide personalisation 
The attractions of profiling technologies are readily identifiable: for those wishing to engage in 
profiling, they enable the automated sorting and targeting of candidates of interest in order to 
personalise the way in which those individuals are treated. These techniques can be applied at 
scale, yet in ways that allow for real-time readjustment and reconfiguration of personalised 
offerings in response to user behaviour.98   The capacity to engage in population-wide 
personalisation of digital services has potentially profound implications for social solidarity and 
community.  Consider, for example, the practice of ‘personalised pricing’ that data-driven 
profiling and the rise of digital retailing makes possible. Under industrial capitalism, goods 
were mass produced and supplied to retailers, and typically made available to consumers at 
geographic locations in-store and on terms that applied universally to all customers entering 
the store at a particular time at the same price.  In contrast, data-driven profiling now enables 
goods and services to be offered to potential customers at ‘personalised’ prices (because each 
customer only sees his or her own individualised ‘digital shop front’, and does not have access 
to the prices or offers made to others on-line), the level of which can be set by the use of data-
driven profiling in order to identify the maximum ‘willingness to pay’ of each individual, 
thereby optimising revenue for the retailer.99  While this kind of intentional discrimination 
might not be unlawful, in so far as it might not directly or indirectly discriminate individuals on 
                                                                                                                                                                         
processing of personal data.  Researchers are still trying to grasp the full extent of the harmful effects on the 
lives of individuals caused by such surveillance. The known effects are not comforting.  Not only does 
surveillance have a chilling effect on speech…but it also leads to behavioural effects.  For instance, as a 
result of surveillance, individuals conform to perceived group norms.  This conforming effect occurs even 
when people are unaware that they are conforming (Kaminski & Witnov 2015).  Both states and companies 
reinforce each other in their surveillance activities, as part of the surveillance-innovation complex (Cohen 
2016)’: Van Est and Gerritsen 2017: 20. 
94  Cowley 2018. 
95  Hutson 2018. 
96  Donahoe 2016.  
97  Kosinski et al, 2013.  
98  Yeung 2016. 
99  Townley et al 2017; Miller 2014. 
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the basis of protected grounds under contemporary equality law, nevertheless the effect is a 
serious departure from the pricing practices that prevailed in a pre-digital, pre-data driven age 
in ways that, if they become widespread and ubiquitous, may seriously undermine social 
solidarity and cohesion.100   
c. Population-wide manipulation 
The personalisation of informational environments that data-driven profiling makes possible 
brings with it new capacities to manipulate individuals in subtle but highly effective ways.101  At 
the individual level, manipulation may threaten personal autonomy and an emerging right to 
cognitive sovereignty102 but, as the recent Cambridge Analytica scandal in the run up to the US 
2016 election and the Brexit referendum vividly illustrates, when deployed at scale for the 
purposes of political microtargeting to manipulate voting behaviour (which may entail the use 
of automated bots operating on social media websites), it may threaten the right to freedom 
of expression and information (Article 10) and could seriously undermine the foundations of 
democratic orders by perverting the right to free elections protected under Article 3, Protocol 
1 ECHR.103  The manipulative practices which so-called ‘persuasive’ digital technologies enable 
can be understood as interfering with rights protected under Articles 8 and 10 because they 
can be configured automatically (and continually reconfigured) to tailor the informational 
choice environment and architecture of individuals through the use of data-driven profiling to 
predict (often with great accuracy) the behaviours, interests, preferences, and vulnerabilities 
of individuals at scale. These applications can be used to manipulate and deceive individuals 
thus interfering with both informational and decisional privacy.104   
The capacity to engage in manipulative practices has been exacerbated by the recent 
emergence of powerful AI applications that can simulate human traits (including voice 
simulation, visual representations of human behaviour and robots capable of interacting with 
humans with apparent emotional sensitivity), with such accuracy and precision that it can be 
extremely difficult for humans to detect that those traits are artificially generated.  These 
technologies are likely to be attractive tools for malign actors to deceive and manipulate 
others. For example, some researchers already predict that advanced human-like synthesised 
voices will be used to gather information over the phone for deceptive and fraudulent 
purposes.  If such attacks become commonplace and widespread, and cannot be readily 
detected by targeted individuals, this may seriously threaten the Article 5 right to liberty and 
security, and the collective security and respect for the rule of law upon which our individual 
and collective liberty and security depends.  Opportunities to utilise these technologies to 
                                                          
100  Yeung 2018a.  The European Commission has studied the prevalence of on-line personalisation practices: 
European Commission (2018b) In the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has commissioned 
economic research on the use of pricing algorithms and potential competition concerns, including collusion 
and personalised pricing: UK Competition and Markets Authority 2018. 
101  Yeung 2016.  For example, a recent study by the Norweigan Consumer Council analysed a sample of settings 
in Facebook, Google and Windows 10, and show how default settings and dark patterns, techniques and 
features of interface design meant to manipulate users, are used to nudge users towards privacy intrusive 
options:  ForbrukerRadet 2018.   
102  There is some academic support for recognition of a new right to ‘cognitive sovereignty’ aimed at providing 
individuals with rights-based protection against the forms of manipulation and deception that advancing 
digital technologies increasingly make possible, in order to guarantee to individuals a threshold level of 
sovereignty over their own minds (see Bublitz 2013).  While this might be a self-standing right, it is also 
possible that such a right might be recognised as falling within Article 9(1) ECHR, which establishes the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
103  Gorton 2016; Wagner Study 2017: 17.  UK House of Commons, Digital Culture Media and Sport 2019. 
104  Yeung 2016; Lanzing 2018; Council of Europe 2017. 
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undermine the integrity of the legal process might also become possible. As Brudage et al 
observe in their report on malicious AI: 
At present, recording and authentication technology still has an edge over forgery 
technology.  A video of a crime being committed can serve as highly compelling 
evidence even when provided by an untrustworthy source.  In the future, however, 
AI-enabled high-quality forgeries may challenge the ‘seeing is believing’ aspect of 
video and audio evidence.  They might also make it easier for people to deny 
allegations against them, given the ease with which the purported evidence might 
have been produced.  In addition to augmenting dissemination of misleading 
information, the writing and publication of fake news stories could be automated, 
as routine financial and sports reporting often are today.  As production and 
dissemination of high-quality forgeries becomes increasingly low-cost, synthetic 
multi-media may constitute a large portion of the media and information 
ecosystem.105
d. Systematic treatment of individuals as objects rather than moral agents  
Although the personalisation of individuals’ informational environments is portrayed by social 
media companies as enabling the provision of more ‘meaningful’ content, there are two 
characteristics of the underlying socio-technological system upon which these practices rely 
that tend to treat individuals as objects rather than moral subjects.  Firstly, individuals are 
singled out, not on the basis of any causal theory, but simply on the basis of correlations in 
data sets.  As a result, these systems typically do not provide any reasoned account to 
individuals explaining why they have been singled out for treatment of a particular kind.  
Secondly, their underlying logic and their processing operations are highly complex and 
opaque, in ways that are practically, and sometimes technically, incomprehensible (discussed 
above).  In other words, because many contemporary ML systems are designed to capture, 
commodify and optimise value extraction in the interests of the system owner, by tracking and 
analysing from the digital traces of the daily behaviour of individuals, they are not primarily 
concerned with identifying the reasons why individuals behave in particular ways.  Rieder 
therefore refers to commercial applications of these ‘big data’ techniques as offering 
‘interested’ readings of reality106 in contrast to the disinterested pursuit of knowledge that 
characterises the pursuit of scientific inquiry for academic purposes.107   The net effect of these 
applications is that humans are increasingly treated as objects rather than moral subjects, to 
be sorted, sifted, scored and evaluated by technological systems in ways that appear starkly at 
odds with the basic right of all individuals to be treated with dignity and respect, and which lies 
at the foundation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.108  As the EU European 
Group of Ethics (2018) explains,  
                                                          
105  Brundage et al 2018: 46. 
106  Rieder 2016. 
107  Merton 1942. 
108 Law enforcement applications of AI for individual profiling within the criminal justice system are especially 
troubling.  As AI Now has observed, Axon is now offering free body camera technologies to any US police 
department following their acquisition of two machine vision companies.  It reports that ‘Axon’s new focus 
on predictive methods of policing – inspired by Wal-Mart’s and Google’s embrace of deep learning to 
increase sales – raises new civil liberties concerns.  Instead of purchasing patterns, these systems will be 
looking for much more vague, context-dependent targets, like ‘suspicious activity’.  Behind the appearances 
of technical neutrality, these systems rely on deeply subjective assumptions about what constitutes 
suspicious behaviour or who counts as a suspicious person’ per AI Now 2017: 25. Thus, individuals become 
‘objects of suspicion’ on the basis of data analysis which have no demonstrable causal basis. 
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‘AI driven optimisation of social processes based on social scoring systems with 
which some countries experiment, violate the basic idea of equality and freedom in 
the same way caste systems do, because they construct ‘different kinds of people’ 
where there are in reality only ‘different properties’ of people.  How can the attack 
on democratic systems and the utilisation of scoring systems, as a basis for 
dominance by those who have access to these powerful technologies, be 
prevented?’… Human dignity as the foundation of human rights implies that 
meaningful human intervention and participation must be possible in matters that 
concern human beings and their environment.  Therefore, in contrast to the 
automation of production, it is not appropriate to manage and decide about 
humans in the way we manage and decide about objects or data, even if this is 
technically conceivable.  Such an ‘autonomous’ management of human beings 
would be unwelcome, and it would undermine the deeply entrenched European 
core values.’109
At the same time, commercial applications of AI for profiling purposes have been accompanied 
by the use of population-wide experimentation on individuals through the use of A/B testing, 
yet without being subject to the supervisory research ethics oversight provided by academic 
institutions pursuant to the Declaration of Helsinki. The latter sets out core requirements for 
the ethical conduct of human subject research.110  The widespread and routine use of these 
practices again reflects a belief that human users are merely objects ripe for experimentation, 
so that fundamental norms and institutional oversight mechanisms that are designed to 
safeguard and protect the dignity and rights of individuals are not applicable.  As Julie Cohen 
has put it ‘[W]e, the citizens have been reduced to raw material – sourced, bartered and 
mined in a curiously fabricated ‘privatised commons’ of data and surveillance.’111
e. Summary of the threats posed by data-driven profiling technologies 
Taken together, the cumulative effects of the above practices resonate with the concerns 
about profiling expressed by Korff in his report for the Council of Europe concerning the 
trends, threats and implications for private life and data protection from the use of the 
internet and related services, which he expresses in the strongest possible terms.  Because 
profiling systems provide the appearance of infallibility, objectivity, reliability and accuracy in 
the assessments that they produce, yet their outputs will inevitably and unavoidably generate 
errors (either false positives or false negatives) or generate discriminatory effects on certain 
groups112 which are practically impossible for individuals to challenge, Korff concludes: 
‘Profiling thus really poses a serious threat of a Kafkaesque world in which 
powerful corporations and State agencies take decisions that significantly affect 
their customers and citizens, without those decision-makers being able or willing to 
explain the underlying reasoning for those decisions, and in which those subjects 
are denied any effective individual or collective remedies.  That is how serious the 
issue of profiling is: it poses a fundamental threat to the most basic principles of 
the Rule of Law and the relationship between the powerful and the people in a 
democratic society.’113
These observations alert us to the collective and cumulative impacts of contemporary 
applications of data-driven technologies which, when undertaken systematically and at scale 
                                                          
109  European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 2018: 9-10. 
110  Kramer et al 2015; Tufecki 2015. 
111  Powles 2015. 
112  Korff and Browne 2013:6. 
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may, over time, seriously erode and destabilise the social and moral foundations that are 
necessary for flourishing democratic societies in which individual rights and freedoms can be 
meaningfully exercised.   
2.2 Collective societal threats and risks generated by other AI technologies 
Although the concerns listed above can be attributed to the use of data-driven profiling, there 
are additional societal-level concerns and threats to collective interests and values that do not 
arise from the use of individual profiling.  These include: 
2.2.1  Malicious attacks, unethical system design or unintended system failure 
Understandable and well-grounded fears have emerged concerning the safety and security 
implications of AI technologies, including concerns about the potentially catastrophic 
consequences of malicious attacks on AI systems (including data poisoning attacks and the use 
of adversarial ML) if safety critical systems are successfully targeted.  But even if unintended, 
many fear the failure of AI technologies within safety-critical systems (such as autonomous 
vehicles) which could seriously harm public safety and security.114  Worse, these systems could 
operate in ways that are designed to prioritise the safety of particular classes of persons over 
others, and which many would regard as unethical or even unlawful.  As societies become 
increasingly dependent upon internet-enabled devices and cyber-physical systems more 
generally (many of which are safety critical), ensuring the safety and security of these systems 
acquires even greater importance.115 This is especially due to the rise of various avenues and 
opportunities for malicious attack that are not confined to direct attack on the systems 
themselves, but may also include strategies aimed at exploiting network effects that enable 
the capacity to target and communicate to individuals at scale, yet with relative anonymity.116
2.2.2 Loss of authentic, real and meaningful human contact 
In addition to above-mentioned concerns about the use of AI technologies to imitate human 
behaviour are diffuse but often deeply-felt anxieties that our collective life may become 
increasingly ‘dehumanised’, as tasks previously performed by humans are automated.  Many 
fear that values and qualities that we cherish, including the value of real human interaction, of 
genuine empathy, compassion and concern, may be replaced by the relentless efficiency and 
consistency of AI driven services.  These concerns are particularly prevalent when AI 
technologies are utilised in care environments (eg robot nurses, care nannies and other 
robotic care assistants) or in ways that otherwise threaten to denude our societies of 
characteristic values and features that inhere in real, authentic human contact, connection and 
relationships (such as the use of sex robots, for example) which,  although inescapably fraught 
and imperfect, nevertheless contribute fundamentally to the meaning and value of human 
experience.117  These applications have generated concerns about the need to ensure that they 
are designed and operate in ways that respect the dignity of those in care and might fall within 
                                                          
114 ‘All technologies are liable to failure, and autonomous systems will be no exception (which is pertinent to 
the issue of whether autonomous systems should ever be created without manual override)’: Royal 
Academy of Engineering 2009: 3.   
115  Thomas 2017a. 
116  Brundage et al 2018. ForbrukerRadet 2018. 
117  Yearsley 2017. 
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the scope of Article 8’s protection of ‘private and family’ life and have prompted some to 
argue in favour of a ‘right to meaningful human contact’.118  
2.2.3 The chilling effect of data repurposing 
Additional concerns arise from worries that people might refrain from participating in systems 
that could improve their life conditions (eg. seeking treatment for cancer) due to fears that 
personal data taken in highly sensitive contexts might be used by AI systems in other contexts 
in ways that may be contrary to their interests.119  Concerns about these ‘chilling effects’ 
arising from the ease with which data obtained for one purpose may then be repurposed for 
other unrelated social ends helps explain the importance of honouring and upholding the 
‘purpose specification’ principle enshrined in many contemporary data protection regimes.  If 
individual autonomy and freedom is understood to include our capacity as individuals to move 
between multiple roles and identities, and to partition them and keep them separate if we so 
wish, then the systematic use of personal data for profiling and decision-making about 
individuals may threaten our capacity to do so.120
2.2.4 Digital power without responsibility 
Worries that AI systems essentially treat people as objects rather than as moral subjects can 
be understood as part of a wider set of concerns about the exploitation of individuals in the 
service of so-called ‘Big Tech’.  There are several strands of concern.  Firstly, there are serious 
concerns about the population-wide, instantaneous scale at which AI technologies can operate 
(eg Facebook News Feed) and the limited practical capacity for ‘meaningful human oversight’ 
of systems of this kind.   The wedge between the capacity of machines relative to the capacity 
of humans to monitor them is evident in repeated claims by social media firms that they 
cannot realistically be expected to respect fully the rights of individuals by providing 
comprehensive, timely content moderation given the scale and speed at which their platforms 
operate, because – quite simply – they outpace human performance.121  Yet by allowing AI 
driven automation to operate without comprehensive human oversight, this threatens to 
generate a serious responsibility gap, through which Big Tech reaps the benefits of these AI-
driven platforms without the concomitant burdens.122   
                                                          
118  Concerns of this kind prompted the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), to suggest that 
in contexts where human contact and interaction play a central role, as in raising children and caring for the 
elderly or people with disabilities, a ‘right to meaningful human contact’ could play a role: see  Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2017 para 65. 
119  There is evidence that this ‘chilling effect’ has occurred in the US in that individuals have been unwilling to 
undertake genetic testing in circumstances where this would likely assist in their healthcare, owing to fears 
that the resulting information may be used be others in ways that will be contrary to their interest, 
particularly in employment and life insurance contexts: Farr 2016. 
120  Understood in terms of Raz’s conception of autonomy, which requires that individuals have an adequate 
range of options, then widespread data repurposing to inform organisational decision-making about 
individuals may effectively diminish our autonomy by reducing the range of options available to us.  
According to Raz, ‘If a person is to be maker or author of his own life then he must have the mental abilities 
to form intentions of a sufficiently complex kind, and plan their execution.  These include minimum 
rationality, the abiity to comprehend the means required to realize his goals the mental faculties necessary 
to plan actions etc.  For a person to enjoy an autonomous ife he must actually use these faculties to choose 
what life to have.  There must in other words be adequate options available for him to choose from.  Finally, 
his choice must be free from coercion and manipulation by others, he must be independent.’ Raz 1986: 373. 
121  See above discussion at Section 2.1.1(b). 
122  Keen 2018.  
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Not only does this constitute a violation of basic norms of social reciprocity, amounting to a 
kind of ‘unjustified taking’ from citizens and communities, but it entails the naked exercise of 
power without responsibility.  In other words, the ‘responsibility gap’ which Matthias123 claims 
has arisen from the emergence of computational systems with the capacity to learn124 now has 
a more recent contemporary spin, at least in the context of social media platforms in which 
automated systems may be designed to remove or distribute content to users at a scale and 
speed which human content moderators cannot keep pace with, and which social media 
platforms claim that they cannot be responsible for.125  Secondly, Big Tech has hitherto 
successfully managed to immunise themselves against external regulation by claiming to abide 
by ‘ethical principles’, which includes their claimed use of technological solutions (discussed in 
section 3.7.1) that seek to hard-wire normative values into the design and operation of 
technological systems but which, unless they are subject to external oversight and sanction, 
are unlikely to provide meaningful protection.126   
2.2.5 The hidden privatisation of decisions about public values 
AI technologies aim to reproduce or improve human performance with respect to some task 
that would require ‘intelligence’ if humans were to perform them.  Yet the claim that these 
technologies ‘outperform’ humans is based on a very narrow definition of the overarching goal 
– couched in terms of performance of a narrowly defined task (such as identifying malign 
tissue from x-ray images).  But in seeking to incorporate task-specific AI into complex socio-
technical systems that are developed to provide services to individuals in real world contexts, 
this invariably implicates a wider range of values beside that of precision and efficiency in task 
performance.    
These systems will invariably reflect the values and value priorities of the system and its 
developers and might not be aligned with the collective values of the public or the democratic 
and constitutional values that human rights are designed to serve.  Yet, even in relation to AI 
systems that directly affect and interface with the public, citizens and other affected groups 
and organisations will typically not be given any meaningful opportunity to participate in 
identifying these values or value trade-offs that these systems are configured to reflect.127  The 
use of ML in risk-scoring systems used to evaluate the ‘recidivism risk’ of convicted criminals 
seeking release from custody offers a vivid example: although the criminal justice system in 
contemporary democracies is founded on, and is expected to give effect to, several important 
criminal justice values, these scoring systems have hitherto been designed to optimise only 
with one such value: public protection.128  As AI technologies become embedded as tools for 
optimising the efficiency of social coordination (such as smart navigation systems or smart 
infrastructure management, for example), they will inevitably make decisions that prioritise 
some values over others and impact directly on individuals and groups, some of whom may 
benefit and others who may not.  Yet, as Sheila Jasanoff129 and other STS scholars have 
repeatedly highlighted, technological systems reflect normative values.  Given their 
widespread effects, the determination of those values should be subject to democratic 
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124  Discussed below at section 3.3.2. 
125  But see discussion at n.79 above. 
126  See section 3.3.4 below.  These technological strategies can be interpreted as  “handing-off” human rights 
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participation and deliberation rather than being resolved privately by private providers 
motivated by commercial self-interest. 
2.2.6 Exploitation of human labour to train algorithms 
AI and ML systems are often claimed to ‘outdo human performance’ because the algorithms 
are trained by large numbers of human workers. For example, an ML algorithm for answering 
search queries will be evaluated against an army of Mechanical Turk workers who act like the 
algorithm until the algorithm outperforms their answers.  Even after the algorithm has been 
trained, there may be unwanted side effects of the use of these automated algorithms, 
requiring humans to identify and weed them out. This is exemplified in the case of social 
media content moderators who are asked to remove inappropriate content on social 
networks.  Both the training for ML models, as well as the consequent human clean-up 
activities to weed out the models’ externalities, are often concealed to maintain the 
mythology of seamless automation.130  The humans who train ML models are often located in 
poor communities, often in the global south, and typically work under extremely precarious 
conditions.131  Nor are they typically provided with support for dealing with the psychological 
burdens that may come with the ‘clean up’ activities.   Some claim that because many ML 
algorithms continue to learn on their general user population, this allows the system owners 
to ‘free ride’ on user labour, thereby nurturing a mode of AI production that contributes to the 
creation of conditions in which unpaid labour is normalised and legitimised, while human 
workers are denuded of rights or recognition.132  
2.3 Power asymmetry and threats to the socio-technical foundations of moral and 
democratic community 
The above-mentioned adverse impacts arising from the increasing power and sophistication of 
new and emerging digital technologies are exacerbated by the radical asymmetry in power 
between those who develop and deploy algorithmic systems and the individual users who are 
subject to them.  This asymmetry in power arises largely due to the former’s unique ability to 
engage in synoptic, pervasive real-time surveillance of users, collecting and accessing massive 
data sets gleaned from users’ digital interactions on a continuous and real-time basis.  This, in 
turn, enables them to subject individuals and populations to algorithmic evaluation in order to 
‘sort and score’ them accordingly133 while empowering platform owners to communicate 
directly to users on a one-to-many basis automatically and at scale.  In contrast, the practical 
capacity of individuals to understand and navigate the complexity of the data ecosystems in 
which they are embedded is extremely limited, as is individual users’ ability to identify 
whether or not digital information and other services are being made available to them on the 
same terms as to other users.134    
This power asymmetry suggests that, at least under current institutional arrangements, we 
need to re-examine the capacity of existing rights and our existing mechanisms of oversight 
and enforcement to respond comprehensively to the risks associated with our increasingly 
powerful digital technologies.  As the Wagner Study has observed:  
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131  See for example Chen 2014. 
132  Ekbia and Nardi 2014. 
133  Ferraris et al 2013. 
134  See the findings reported by Which? 2018. Mireille Hildebrandt refers to the ‘digital unconscious’ which is 
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Council of Europe Study 
42 
the increasing use of automation and algorithmic decision-making in all spheres of 
public and private life is threatening to disrupt the very concept of human rights as 
protective shields against state interference.  The traditional asymmetry of power 
and information between state structures and human beings is shifting towards an 
asymmetry of power and information between operators of algorithms (who may 
be public or private) and those who are acted upon and governed.135
In particular, existing human rights institutions may struggle to provide effective and 
meaningful protection  for at least three reasons.    
Firstly, given the highly complex and opaque nature of these technologies, it is very difficult in 
practice for individuals to identify if their rights have been infringed, and if so in what ways.  
Often individuals will be unaware that these technologies are being used for the purposes of 
evaluating them. Even if individuals are willing to assert their human rights against 
infringements that arise from the use of automated decision-making, for example, the 
remedies available to them might not provide them with their desired outcome.  Perhaps, for 
example, it is not so much that individuals want an explanation of why they were treated less 
favourably than others, but they want to insist that they should be entitled to equally 
favourable treatment.136   
Secondly, even if individuals are aware that their rights may have been interfered with as a 
result of the use of AI systems, one might question the likelihood that individuals will in 
practice seek to initiate remedial action if circumstances where they do not regard the 
interference as sufficiently serious to motivate them to invest the time, energy and resources 
associated with launching and maintaining a compliant.  The resulting collective action 
problem means that the aggregate adverse impacts of these systems are likely to continue 
unremedied, at least in the absence of collective complaints mechanisms or an official body 
with the competence, resources and remit to take enforcement necessary to ensure effective 
human rights protection. 
Thirdly, many of the larger adverse societal concerns cannot be readily expressed in the 
language and discourse of human rights because they concern collective values and interests, 
including threats to the broader and more amorphous moral, social and political culture and 
context in which advanced digital technologies operate.  At the same time, the speed and scale 
at which these technologies now operate poses novel threats, risks and challenges which 
contemporary societies have not hitherto had to contend with.   Yet many of the anticipated 
cumulative and collective effect of these systems over time could fatally undermine the social 
and technical conditions that are essential for the exercise of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Because current approaches to the interpretation and enforcement of human rights 
are highly individualised in orientation,137 they are likely to struggle to address the collective, 
aggregate and cumulative risks and harms that these technologies might generate.  In other 
words, existing rights-based approaches and rights discourse tend to overlook deeper 
systematic, societal concerns, including threats to the underlying democratic and moral fabric 
in which individual rights are anchored and without which they have no meaning.138
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2.4 Summary  
This section has examined the adverse individual and collective threats and risks to society 
that the application of advanced digital technologies may pose.  It has emphasized the way in 
which the widespread and growing use of advanced digital technologies (including AI), 
particularly those which rely upon data-driven profiling technologies, may systematically 
threaten the exercise of human rights, as well as more general collective values and interests 
that fall outside the scope of existing understandings of human rights protection.  It has also 
considered the threats and risks posed by other AI technologies and their contemporary and 
anticipated applications.  These include concerns associated with hostile and malicious 
applications or the unethical or unsafe design and operation of AI-enabled systems, 
diminishing opportunities for authentic, real and meaningful human contact, the chilling effect 
of data repurposing, the exercise by digital platforms and others with AI capabilities of power 
without responsibility, the creeping yet hidden privatisation of decisions about public values, 
and the exploitation of human workers to train algorithms.  Finally, it has highlighted the 
growing power asymmetry between those with the capacity and resources to develop and 
employ AI technologies and the individual users, groups and populations directly affected by 
their use, which may substantially diminish their capacity to identify and seek protection and 
redress under existing rights-protecting institutions.   The wide-ranging and potentially serious 
individual and collective threats and risks associated with the development and application of 
advanced digital technologies inevitably raise important questions about how responsibility for 
avoiding, preventing, and mitigating them should be allocated.  Furthermore, if those risks 
ripen into harm and/or violate human rights, how should responsibility for those 
consequences be attributed and allocated and what institutional mechanisms can be relied 
upon to ensure adequate enforcement and redress, particularly given the collective action 
problem faced by individual rights-holders?  It is these questions that Chapter 3 seeks to 
address, beginning with an examination of the concept of responsibility, why responsibility 
matters and an analysis of the ways in which AI technologies challenge existing conceptions of 
responsibility. 
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Chapter 3.  Who bears responsibility for the threats, risks, harms and 
wrongs posed by advanced digital technologies? 
As the preceding section has demonstrated, advanced digital technologies generate serious 
threats and risks to our individual and collective interests and values and may perpetuate the 
commission of substantial and systematic wrongdoing, including human rights violations.  
Taken together, these threaten the health of the collective moral and social foundations of 
democratic societies.  Accordingly, this section considers who bears responsibility for their 
prevention, management and mitigation, and for making reparation if they ripen into harms 
and rights violations, to individuals, groups and to society.  The following discussion highlights 
how the concept of responsibility is implicated by the emergence of advanced digital 
technologies (including AI), particularly in light of their implications for human rights protected 
under the ECHR referred to in Chapter 2.   
The following discussion proceeds in several stages.   
Firstly, it begins by clarifying what we mean by responsibility and why responsibility matters, 
emphasising its vital role in securing and giving expression to the rule of law and which is 
essential for peaceful social co-operation.   
Secondly, it then considers two core themes raised in contemporary discussions of the adverse 
risks associated with AI technologies, notably the role of the tech industry in promulgating and 
voluntarily committing themselves to abide by so-called ‘ethical standards’ and secondly, the 
alleged ‘control problem’ that is claimed to flow from the capacity of AI-driven systems to 
operate more or less autonomously from their human creators.   
Thirdly, it identifies a range of different ‘responsibility models’ that could be adopted to 
govern the allocation of responsibility for different kinds of adverse impacts arising from the 
operation of AI systems, including models based on intention/culpability, risk 
creation/negligence, strict responsibility and mandatory insurance schemes.  Because the 
focus of this report is on the implications for human rights, responsibility for human rights 
violations is widely understood ‘strictly’ (or as ‘strict’ – so that provided a human rights 
violation has been established, there is no need for proof of fault).  In contrast, the allocation 
of obligations of repair for tangible harm to health or property may be legally distributed in 
accordance with a variety of historic responsibility models.  Because the allocation of historic 
responsibility for tangible harm arising from the operation of AI systems also has a prospective 
dimension, through its guiding function in identifying the nature and scope of the obligations 
of those involved in the development, production and implementation of AI systems, these 
responsibility models are briefly outlined.   
Fourthly, it draws attention to the acute challenges for the allocation of responsibility 
generated by the operation of complex and interacting socio-technical systems, which entails 
contributions from multiple individuals, organisations, machine components, software 
algorithms and human users, often in complex and highly dynamic environments.   
Fifthly, it draws attention to a range of non-judicial mechanisms for securing both prospective 
and historic responsibility for the adverse impacts of AI systems, including various kinds of 
impact assessments, auditing techniques and technical protection mechanisms.   
Sixthly, it emphasises the role and obligations of states in relation to the risks associated with 
advanced digital technologies, focusing specifically on their obligations to ensure effective 
protection of human rights.   
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Finally, it highlights the need to reinvigorate human rights discourse in a digital age, drawing 
attention to the need to protect and nurture the socio-technical foundations necessary for 
human agency and responsibility, without which human rights and freedoms cannot be 
practically or meaningfully exercised.    
3.1 What is responsibility and why does it matter? 
In setting out the aims of this study, we have already noted that a society’s conceptions and 
practices of responsibility are of vital importance because they serve to ensure that, within 
constitutional democratic orders, individuals and organisations are held to account for the 
adverse ‘other-regarding’ effects of their actions. Despite the extensive legal and philosophical 
literature concerned with responsibility, relatively few academics focus their attention on the 
fundamental role of responsibility for individuals and for society.  Woven beneath the surface 
of this scholarship lies recognition that the concept of responsibility serves two critical 
functions, broadly reflecting what moral philosopher Gary Watson’s refers to as the ‘two faces’ 
of responsibility.139  The first face is essential to our sense of ‘being in the world’ as moral 
agents, that is, as authors of our own lives who act on the basis of reasons.  As Watson puts it: 
Responsibility is important to issues about what it is to lead a life, indeed about 
what it is to have a life in the biographical sense, and about the quality and 
character of that life. These issues reflect one face of responsibility (what I will call 
its aretaic face).140  
But Watson identifies a second face of responsibility which is concerned with practices of 
holding people accountable.141  For him, 
when we speak of conduct as deserving of “censure,” or “remonstration,” as 
“outrageous,” “unconscionable” (and on some views, even as “wrong”), is to 
suggest that some further response to the agent is (in principle) appropriate. It is to 
invoke the practice of holding people morally accountable, in which (typically) the 
judge (or if not the judge, other members of the moral community) is entitled (in 
principle) to react in various ways. 
The difference between these two faces of responsibility, which we might call the ‘self-
disclosure’ view of responsibility on the one hand, and the ‘moral accountability’ view on the 
other, is illuminated in the following scenario: 
If someone betrays her ideals by choosing a dull but secure occupation in favor of a 
riskier but potentially more enriching one, or endangers something of deep 
importance to her life for trivial ends (by sleeping too little and drinking too much 
before important performances, for example), then she has acted badly—cowardly, 
self-indulgently, at least unwisely. But by these assessments we are not thereby 
holding her responsible, as distinct from holding her to be responsible. To do that, 
we would have to think that she is accountable to us or to others, whereas in many 
cases we suppose that such behavior is “nobody's business.” Unless we think she is 
responsible to us or to others to live the best life she can—and that is a moral 
question—we do not think she is accountable here. If her timid or foolish behavior 
                                                          
139  Watson 2004. 
140  Watson 2004: 262-263. 
141  Watson 2004: 264. 
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also harms others, and thereby violates requirements of interpersonal relations, 
that is a different matter.142
A similar sentiment is reflected in the concept of ‘basic responsibility’ articulated and 
developed by legal scholar John Gardner who claims that our basic responsibility is central to 
our sense of being in the world.  It is fundamental to our identity as rational agents, that is, as 
creatures who act on the basis of reasons and who, as individuals, want our lives to make 
rational sense, to add up to a story not only of whats but also of whys.143  
For Watson, control is arguably central to the accountability practices that characterize the 
second face of responsibility.  
Because some of these practices—and notably the practice of moral 
accountability—involve the imposition of demands on people, I shall argue, they 
raise issues of fairness that do not arise for aretaic appraisal. It is these concerns 
about fairness that underlie the requirement of control (or avoidability) as a 
condition of moral accountability.  ‘Holding responsible’ can be taken as equivalent 
to ‘holding accountable’. But the notion of ‘holding’ here is not to be confused with 
the attitude of believing (as in, ‘I hold that she is responsible for x’). Holding people 
responsible involves a readiness to respond to them in certain ways.  To be “on the 
hook” in these and other cases is to be liable to certain reactions as a result of 
failing to do what one is required. To require or demand certain behavior of an 
agent is to lay it down that unless the agent so behaves she will be liable to certain 
adverse or unwelcome treatment. For convenience, I shall call the diverse forms of 
adverse treatment “sanctions.” Holding accountable thus involves the idea of 
liability to sanctions. To be entitled to make demands, then, is to be entitled to 
impose conditions of liability.144
Because this study is concerned with identifying where responsibility should lie for the 
individual and collective threats, risks, harms and human rights violations stemming from 
advanced digital technologies, it focuses primarily on the second face of responsibility, 
understood in terms of ‘holding accountable’. Nevertheless, there is a crucial link between 
these two faces of responsibility that rests in the status of the individual as a moral agent with 
the capacity to make active choices and decisions, including decisions that affect, and have the 
potential to cause harm or to perpetuate wrongs to others.  As Gardner puts it, ‘(w)e are moral 
agents only insofar as we are basically responsible.’145  Basic responsibility is therefore central 
to, and a reflection of, both faces of responsibility.   As Gardner observes, whenever we 
perpetrate wrongs or mistakes, we always hunt around for justifications and excuses, not only 
because, as rational beings we want to avoid (unpleasant) consequential responsibility (the 
‘Hobbesian explanation’) but also for a deeper reason (which he refers to as the ‘Aristotelian 
explanation’) that, as rational beings, we all want to assert our basic responsibility – and this 
requires that I can give a good account of myself.146   
Responsibility and the rule of law 
In other words, basic responsibility is essential, not only for our self-understanding as 
individuals as authors of our own lives but also as individuals as members of a community of 
                                                          
142  Watson 2004: 265-266. 
143  Gardner 2003. 
144  Watson 2004: 272-273. 
145  Gardner 2008: 140.   
146  Gardner claims that this account that we provide need not be to anyone in particular, but can and should be 
offered to all the world.   Hence he rejects the view that responsibility is necessarily ‘relational’.   
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moral agents.   Moral agents have the capacity and freedom to make choices about their 
decisions and actions, and to do so in ways that might be wrongful or cause harm, whether to 
other individuals or to the conditions that are essential to maintain the stability and social co-
operation needed to sustain community life.  It is our basic responsibility and our responsibility 
practices through which members of a community hold each other to account, that 
characterise a political community largely as a moral community (i.e. a community of moral 
agents).   Of critical importance is the mutual respect and self-restraint exercised by members 
of a moral community that makes possible and sustains community life, and which ultimately 
lies at the foundations of the contemporary rule of law ideal.147  A society that lacks a system 
for institutionalising its responsibility practices in order to hold people responsible for the 
adverse impacts of their other-regarding conduct (including conduct that harms others or 
violates their human rights) would not benefit from the vital protective functions that such an 
institutional system provides and that are essential for peaceful and trustworthy social co-
operation and coordination.  In other words, our system for ensuring that responsibility is duly 
allocated plays a critical role in sustaining the underlying social framework of cooperation 
without which the law cannot rule.  At the same time, it is important to recognise that the 
stability and continuity of these social foundations rest, ultimately, on the mutual respect and 
self-restraint of individual members of the moral community and not on a system of 
technological coercion and control.  It is this mutual respect and self-restraint that is absent 
from the ostensibly happy, stable, orderly and efficient society depicted in Huxley’s Brave New 
World.148  Inhabitants of Brave New World have no meaningful rights or freedoms. Theirs is not 
a moral community but a society comprised of members who are merely passive objects, 
whose thoughts and actions have been hard-wired and controlled by and through the exercise 
of technological power of an authoritarian dictator, and in which notions of freedom, 
autonomy and human rights not only fail to flourish, but simply lack any meaning or 
purchase.149
Accountability, answerability and transparency 
The critical importance of institutionalised systems of responsibility to secure the social 
foundations upon which the rule of law is founded highlights the need, within any moral and 
political community committed to respect for human rights, to establish and implement 
institutional mechanisms for holding members of the community to account for their other-
regarding conduct.    Although the concept of accountability is contested, for present purposes 
it has been usefully described as ‘requiring a person to explain and justify – against criteria of 
some kind – their decisions or acts, and then to make amends for any fault or error.’150  So 
understood, accountability mechanisms possess the following four features: setting standards 
against which to judge the account, obtaining the account, judging the account, and deciding 
what consequences (if any) should follow.  The concept of accountability is of particular 
importance in relationships between a principal and agent, in which the agent is expected to 
act for and on behalf of the principal, who is therefore required to give an account – to be 
answerable to - the principal on whose behalf the agent acts.   Transparency is directly linked 
to accountability, in so far as accountability requires that those being called upon to account 
can explain the reasons for their actions, and to justify those actions in accordance with a 
particular set of rules or standards for evaluation.  Transparency is therefore important for at 
least two reasons: to enable those affected by a decision or action to know the reasons for 
                                                          
147  Galligan 2006. 
148  Huxley 1932; Yeung 2017b. 
149  Yeung 2011. 
150  Oliver 1994: 245. See also Bovens 2007 and literature cited therein. 
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that action or decision, and to enable the affected party to evaluate the quality of those 
reasons.151   
Mechanisms for accountability have particular importance in relation to the exercise of 
governmental power within liberal democratic societies because governmental officials are 
regarded as the servants of the citizens upon whose behalf they act and from whom their 
power is ultimately derived.  Yet, the importance of accountability arises whenever the 
exercise of power has the capacity to affect others in adverse ways.  Accordingly, concerns 
about the power, scale and effects of complex socio-technical systems that rely upon AI 
technologies have given rise to a cluster of concerns that can be understood as united in a 
concern to secure ‘algorithmic accountability’, particularly given the opacity of these systems 
and their potential to be utilised in ways that can have highly consequential implications for 
individuals, groups and society in general.152  Securing accountability and responsibility for 
human rights violations and other adverse consequences resulting from the operation of these 
technologies is therefore essential.  Although existing laws, including data protection law, 
consumer protection law, competition law and constitutional laws that enshrine legal 
protection for human rights within national legal systems, have the potential to play a 
significant and important role in securing various dimensions of algorithmic accountability, 
their contribution to securing algorithmic accountability is beyond the scope of this study.  
Rather, the following discussion seeks to examine implications of advanced digital 
technologies (including AI systems) for the concept of responsibility, focusing primarily on their 
implications for human rights violations, drawing on both moral philosophy and legal 
scholarship. 
3.2 Dimensions of responsibility  
This general concept of responsibility as ‘holding accountable’ has been extensively examined 
in the legal and philosophical literature, and various insights from that literature are selectively 
drawn upon in the analysis which follows.  Although there are many different ‘senses’ in which 
the term ‘responsibility’ is used,153 for the purposes of this study, the temporal element of 
responsibility is worth emphasising, facing in two directions: 
(a) Historic (or retrospective) responsibility: which looks backwards, seeking to allocate 
responsibility for conduct and events that occurred in the past.  As we shall see, considerable 
difficulties are claimed to arise in allocating historic responsibility for harms and wrongs 
caused by AI systems; and 
(b) Prospective responsibilities: which establish obligations and duties associated with roles 
and tasks that look to the future, directed towards the production of good outcomes and the 
prevention of bad outcomes.   Prospective responsibilities serve an important guiding function.  
As Cane puts it, ‘one of the most important reasons why we are interested in responsibility 
and related concepts is because of the role they play in practical reasoning about our rights 
and obligations vis-à-vis other people, and about the way we should behave in our dealings 
with them.’154 In the context of responsibility for the actions and resulting consequences of 
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153  Hart 1968: 211-230. 
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autonomous AI/robotic systems, the idea of ‘role responsibility’155 has sometimes been 
foregrounded.156  
Any legitimate and effective response to the threats, risks, harms and rights violations posed 
by advanced digital technologies is likely to require a focus on the consequences for individuals 
and society which attends to, and can ensure that, both prospective responsibility aimed at 
preventing and mitigating risks, and historic responsibility for adverse effects arising from the 
operation of the complex socio-technical systems in which these technologies are embedded, 
is duly and justly assigned.  Only if both the historic and prospective dimensions of 
responsibility are attended to can individuals and society have confidence that efforts will be 
made first, to prevent harms and wrongs from occurring, and secondly, if they do occur, then 
institutional mechanisms can be relied upon to ensure appropriate reparation, repair and to 
prevent further harm or wrongdoing.  It will necessitate a focus on both those involved in the 
development, deployment and implementation of these technologies, individual users and the 
groups affected by them and action by the state (and states acting collectively and 
cooperatively) to ensure the establishment and maintenance of conditions needed to 
safeguard citizens against unacceptable threats and risks, thereby ensuring that human rights 
are adequately protected.    In other words, proper consideration of the responsibility of AI 
technologies and systems will attend to the positions of both the moral agent and the moral 
patient, as well as the larger moral community more generally, in order to answer the 
questions: responsibility to whom and for what? 157  
3.3 How do advanced digital technologies (including AI) implicate existing conceptions of 
responsibility? 
Having clarified what we mean by responsibility and highlighted the need to attend to both its 
prospective and retrospective dimensions, we are now in a position to consider where 
responsibility lies for the adverse consequences, threats and risks associated with the 
development and implementation of AI technologies, including human rights violations and 
other wrongs and harms arising from their operation.  Although this question is simple to 
state, there are considerable conceptual challenges in seeking to answer it.  As the EU 
European Group on Ethics158 has observed, AI technologies raise:  
…questions about human moral responsibility.  Where is the morally relevant 
agency located in dynamic and complex socio-technical systems with advanced AI 
and robotic components?  How should moral responsibility be attributed and 
apportioned and who is responsible (and in what sense)? 
In other words, the complexity of the technologies themselves, and the larger socio-technical 
contexts in which they are implemented and applied, can obscure lines of moral responsibility, 
particularly when they operate in unexpected ways that generate harm or violate rights.   But 
we must bear in mind that moral responsibility and legal responsibility are distinct, albeit 
related, concepts.  Unlike morality, the law has a highly developed system for institutionalizing 
and enforcing responsibility (including the application of sanctions in certain circumstances) 
because it must adjudicate real world disputes, and which requires both finality of judgement 
and legal certainty.159  A society cannot rely exclusively on individuals’ inclinations to ‘act 
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ethically’ because the lack of any institutional mechanisms to enforce those standards 
(including lawful authority to sanction non-compliance) means that such an entirely voluntary 
system for would fail to provide the stable and reliable social foundations necessary for 
trustworthy and peaceful social cooperation within contemporary societies.  The law’s role in 
securing and institutionalising responsibility to ensure the protection of legal rights and 
enforce the performance of legal duties is therefore essential.  As the following discussion 
demonstrates, the way in which legal systems have allocated historic responsibility has 
typically been more sensitive to the interests of victims and of society in security of the person 
and property in comparison with moral philosophical accounts of responsibility, which have 
tended to focus on the conduct of the moral agent and whether it appropriately attracts 
blame.  Yet applying these moral and legal concepts of responsibility to the development and 
implementation of advanced digital technologies (including AI) in contemporary contexts may 
not be straightforward.  The capacity of these technologies and systems to operate in ways 
that were not previously possible may challenge our existing legal, moral and social 
conceptions of responsibility, particularly given the properties identified in section 2.1 above 
as responsibility-relevant, including their: 
• inscrutability and opacity 
• complex and dynamic nature  
• reliance on human input, interaction and discretion 
• general purpose nature 
• global interconnectivity, scalability and ubiquity 
• automated, continuous operation, often in real-time  
• reliance on large data-sets 
• capacity to generate ‘hidden’ insight from merging data sets   
• ability accurately to imitate human traits 
• greater software complexity (include vulnerability to failure and malicious attack), and  
• capacity to ‘personalise’ and configure individual choice environments  
• capacity to redistribute risks, benefits and burdens among and between individuals and 
groups via the use of AI-driven optimisation systems which reconfigure social 
environments and choice architectures, and  
• capacity to generate collective action problems.  
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify the conceptual distinction between two different 
types of adverse effects that may (and have) arisen from the operation of AI systems: 
(a) violations of human rights, including but not limited to, the rights protected under the 
ECHR; 
(b) tangible harm to human health, property or the environment; 
These are separate and distinct concepts and consequences.  It is possible for a human rights 
violation to occur without any tangible harm, and vice versa.   For example, the removal by 
Facebook in 2016 of the iconic photograph of a naked 9-year old girl fleeing napalm bombs 
during the Vietnam War, on the grounds that nudity violated its community standards, can be 
understood as a violation of the Article 10 right to freedom of expression and information, 
although it did not generate any substantial tangible harm.160  Conversely, if a self-driving car 
collides with and injures a wild animal, this entails the infliction of harm without any human 
rights violation.  Yet any given event or series of events may entail both tangible harm and a 
violation of human rights.  Thus, if a self-driving vehicle collides with and fatally injures a 
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pedestrian, this would entail both a violation of the Article 2 right to life and the infliction of 
tangible harm.161
The focus of this report is on examining the responsibility implications of AI systems from a 
human rights perspective.  It is therefore primarily concerned with analysing responsibility for 
human rights violations, rather than responsibility for tangible harm arising from the operation 
of these systems.   The following discussion focuses primarily upon those who create, develop, 
implement and preside over AI systems.  It asks whether they can be held responsible for the 
adverse consequences those systems might generate,  beginning with an examination of two 
core themes that have arisen in contemporary responses concerned with identifying where 
responsibility lies for the risks which AI technologies may pose: first, voluntary action by the 
tech industry in promulgating and publicly proclaiming their commitment to so-called ‘ethical 
guidelines’, and secondly, claims that because AI systems act autonomously, this relieves their 
creators from responsibility for their decisions and any consequential adverse effects.  The 
obligations of the state in relation to these adverse effects is considered after various ‘models 
of responsibility’ that might apply in ascribing responsibility to those who develop and 
implement AI systems have been described. 
3.3.1 Prospective responsibility: voluntary ethics codes  
and the ‘Responsible Robotics/AI’ project  
Rising public anxiety and the recent ‘Techlash’162 in response to the growing power, practices 
and policies of the Big Tech firms, particularly following the use of political micro-targeting and 
the Cambridge Analytica scandal, have precipitated numerous voluntary ‘ethics’ initiatives by 
the tech industry.  These initiatives typically entail the promulgation of a set of norms and 
standards either by individual tech firms or by a group of tech firms (including non-profit 
organisations 163  or a technical standard setting organisation 164 ) publicly and voluntarily 
espousing their commitment to comply with those publicised standards of conduct (often 
called ‘codes of ethical conduct’).165   These initiatives can be understood as part of a 
movement towards what Liu and Zawieska refer to as the ‘responsible AI/robotics’ project.166    
Two features of these initiatives are worth highlighting.  Firstly, they are concerned with 
prospective responsibility, seeking to identify and allocate ‘role responsibility’ (or spheres of 
obligation) for those involved at each stage of the design, development and deployment of 
these technologies with the aim of demonstrating to the public the seriousness of their 
commitment to addressing ethical concerns.167  One notable feature of these initiatives is that 
they tend steadfastly to avoid explicitly referring to the historic responsibilities of those 
involved in the design, development and deployment of these technologies when things go 
awry.  Neither do they tend to specify upon whom the blame should fall for such 
consequences, nor acknowledge any obligation to compensate those adversely affected.   
                                                          
161  The scope of adverse effects regarded as constituting legally recognisable ‘harm’ varies between national 
legal systems.  In Anglo-Commonwealth common law systems, for example, some forms of non-tangible 
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compensation awards in personl injury cases: Gilliker 2000.  
162  The Economist 2018b. 
163  For example, the ‘beneficial AI’ movement is supported by the Future of Life Institute: see Conn 2017.  
164  See for example, the various recommendations and guidelines developed by the IEEE’s Global Initiative for 
Ethical Considerations in AI and Autonomous Systems 2017.  
165  For example, Google’s ‘Objectives for AI Applications’, see Pichai 2018. 
166  Liu and Zawieska 2017. 
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Rather, as Liu explains, role responsibility describes ‘a sense of responsibility that attaches to 
an individual by virtue of the position he/she occupies or the function that he/she is expected 
to fulfil and is therefore by the performance of obligations connected to an individual’s role 
and which can be pre-defined and specified in advance.’168  Thus, once an individual has 
discharged the duties attached to his or her role or office, that is regarded as due fulfilment of 
his or her responsibilities.169   
Secondly, these ‘Responsible AI/robotics’ initiatives can be characterised as an emerging 
professional self-governance movement which can be located within a longer standing social 
phenomena often discussed under the rubric of ‘corporate social responsibility’.  The character 
of these so-called ‘ethical codes’ as ‘social’ (rather than legal) and entirely voluntary, means 
that they the obligations and commitments specified in these codes are not legally enforceable 
if violated.  Nor do these initiatives typically make provision for the establishment and 
maintenance of enforcement institutions and mechanisms through which an independent, 
external body is empowered to evaluate the extent to which those commitments have been 
complied with or to impose sanctions for non-compliance.  Thus, although these initiatives 
provide welcome recognition by the tech industry that the ethical development and 
deployment of advanced digital technologies is a matter of public concern that warrants their 
action and attention, these initiatives lack any formal institutional mechanisms to enforce and 
sanction violations.  Nor is there any systematic representation of the public in the setting of 
those standards.  Accordingly, these initiatives have been roundly criticised as a form of ‘ethics 
washing’170 failing to take ethical concerns seriously.171
If these codes of practice were supported by institutional mechanisms, backed by law, 
including provision for external participation in the setting and evaluation of the standards 
themselves, and independent, external oversight to evaluate whether individual firms and 
organisations have in fact complied with the specified norms and standards, there would be 
stronger basis upon which those affected (and society more generally) could have confidence 
that meaningful and democratically legitimate safeguards were in place to prevent and 
mitigate some of the ethical risks associated with these technologies (see section 3.7 below).172  
It is the need for meaningful and effective safeguards that a human rights perspective insists 
upon.173  At the same time, prospective approaches cannot ensure that historic responsibility in 
the event that harm or wrongdoing occurs will be duly allocated.  As Liu and Zaweiska argue, 
although the ‘Responsible Robotics/AI’ project may be welcomed, it leaves a ‘responsibility 
gap’, because it is only concerned with role responsibility rather than causal responsibility.  
Unlike role responsibility, causal responsibility is a form of historic responsibility.  Its concern is 
to identify and establish a relation between cause and effect. It is thus retrospective in nature, 
inherently outward-looking, relational in orientation, because it foregrounds the moral patient 
                                                          
168  Cane is critical of the narrowly defined way in which role responsibility is attached to specific roles or tasks, 
observing that ‘being a responsible person involves taking seriously the prospective responsibilities, 
whatever they are, attaching to whatever activity one is engaged in at any particular time’: Cane 2002: 32. 
169  Liu 2016: 336. 
170  Wagner 2019.  Metzinger 2019. 
171  Green et al 2019; Hagendorff 2019. 
172  Nemitz 2018. 
173  See AHRC supra, n.10.  As David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression to the UN General Assembly stated, ‘The development of codes of ethics 
and accompanying institutiona structures may be an important compement to, but not a substitute for, 
commitments to human rights.  Codes and guidelines issued by both public and private sector bodies shoud 
emphasize that human rights law provides the fundamental rules for the protection of individuals in the 
context of artificial intelligence’, UN General Assembly 2018: 18.  
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(that is, the person or persons harmed by the relevant activity)174.  In contrast, the allocation of 
role responsibility focuses on the prospective role responsibilities of those identified as 
responsible agents.  Accordingly, a ‘responsibility gap’ arises, because discharging one’s 
prospective or role responsibilities will not necessarily guarantee that causal responsibility will 
be duly allocated.175  In other words, the designation of role responsibility cannot ensure 
retrospective accountability nor allocate blame because it is concerned only with the 
fulfilment of pre-established obligations, rather than atonement and accountability for 
consequences.176  
3.3.2 Machine autonomy and the alleged ‘control’ problem  
(a) The alleged ‘control’ problem  
Another frequent claim made in response to concerns about the need to identify where 
responsibility lies for the adverse implications of advanced digital technologies is that, because 
these systems operate more or less autonomously and without direct human intervention and 
control from the outside, those who develop and implement them cannot fairly be regarded as 
responsible for their decisions, actions and corresponding consequences. This view was 
outlined by Matthias177, who argues that 
the agent can be considered responsible only if he knows the particular facts 
surrounding his action, and if he is able to freely form a decision to act, and to 
select one of a suitable set of available alternative actions based on these facts.178
But an increasing class of machines, which Matthias refers to as ‘autonomous artificial agents’, 
are capable of fulfilling some, often quite narrow, purposes by moving autonomously through 
some ‘space’ and acting in it without human supervision.  That agent can be a software 
programme that moves through an information space (eg an internet search spider) but it can 
also have a physical presence (eg a robotic pet) and move through time and space.  These 
agents are deliberately designed to act, and inevitably interact, with other things, people, and 
social entities (laws, institutions and expectations). At least for those which have a physical 
presence and can learn from direct interaction in real environments, they can, in return, 
directly manipulate that same environment and share their environment with humans. 
Matthias argues that a ‘responsibility gap’ arises because, for machine agents of this kind, the 
human agent who programmed it no longer exerts direct control over the machine agent’s 
behaviour, which is gradually transferred to the machine itself. It would therefore be unjust to 
hold humans responsible for actions of machines over which they could not have sufficient 
control.179  He offers several examples of these kinds of machine agents, including those that 
rely upon: 
                                                          
174  In the legal literature, the term ‘victim’ or ‘potential victim’ tends to be used rather than ‘moral patient’, the 
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176  Liu 2016. 
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(a) the operation of artificial neural networks: instead of clear and distinct symbolic 
representation of information and flow control, we have a sometimes very large matrix of 
synaptic weights, which cannot be directly interpreted.  Rather, the knowledge and behaviour 
stored in a neural network can only be inferred indirectly through experimentation and the 
application of test patterns after the training of the network is finished; 
(b) reinforcement learning: usually based on the same neural network concepts, but 
additionally it lifts the distinction between a training and a production phase.  Reinforcement 
learning systems explore their action space while working in their operational environment, 
which is their central feature (enabling them to adapt to ever-changing environments) as well 
as a big drawback concerning their predictability.  The information stored in the network 
cannot be fully checked, even indirectly, because it always changes.  Even if we can prove 
mathematically that the overall performance of such a system will eventually converge to 
some optimum, there will be unavoidable errors on the way to that optimised state.  The 
creator of such a system (who Matthias comments is not really a programmer in the traditional 
sense) cannot eliminate these errors, for they must be explicitly permitted in order that the 
system can remain operational and improve its performance; 
(c) genetic programming methods in which an additional layer of machine-generated code 
operates between the programmer and the product of programming.  Unlike in neural 
networks, where the designer still defines the operating parameters of the system (the 
network architecture, the input and output layers, and their interpretation) and at least 
defines the alphabet used and the semantics of the symbols, the genetic programmer loses 
even this minimal amount of control, for she creates a machine that programs itself. 
At the same time, Matthias observes that autonomous agents deprive the programmer of a 
spatial link between the programmer and the resulting machine agent.  Accordingly, the 
machine agent acts outside the programmer’s observation horizon and might not be able to 
intervene manually (in the case of a fault or error, which might occur at a much later point in 
time).  Thus, these processes involve the designer of machines increasingly losing control over 
them, gradually transferring control to the machine itself, in which - according to Matthias – 
the programmer’s role changes ‘from coder to creator of software organisms’.  As the 
influence of the creator of the machine decreases, the influence of the operating environment 
increases such that the programmer transfers her control over the product to the environment 
(especially for machines that continue to learn and adapt in their final operating environment).  
Particularly given that these agents will have to interact with a potentially great variety and 
number of people (users) and situations, it will typically not be possible for the creator to 
predict or control the influence of the operating environment.  According to Matthias, the net 
result is that these machines operate beyond their creators’ control, and may thus cause harm 
for which we cannot justly hold them responsible.  Yet Matthias argues that because we 
                                                                                                                                                                         
technologies are conceived of as a tool employed by humans so that responsibility for fault will always 
reside with humans (be they programmers, coders, manufacturers, or developers, users etc): Johnson 2006; 
Bryson 2010; Sullins 2005.    Others have responded by considering AI to signal the instantiation of some 
moral or legal person of independent ontological status (eg Gunkel 2017) including the ascription of moral 
agency to computational systems (Dennett 1997; Sullins 2005).  However, the weight of academic opinion 
denies that non-human entities can have moral responsibility in their own right because they lack the 
mental qualities (and hence cannot meet the epistemic condition) generally accepted as necessary for moral 
responsibility, which – at least in the philosophical literature, are often expressed in terms of intentionality, 
the capacity to act voluntarily and an awareness of their actions and anticipated consequences of those 
actions: Johnson 2006; Kuflick 1999; Sparrow 2007; Asaro 2014 and Hanson 2009: 93.   
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cannot do without such systems, we must find a way to ‘address the responsibility gap in 
moral practice and legislation.’180  
(b) Choice-based theories of moral responsibility 
Matthias’s claim that those who create autonomous machines cannot be ‘justly’ held 
responsible for their actions rests on a ‘choice-based’ account of moral responsibility which 
has tended to dominate contemporary academic reflection concerning the ethical and moral 
implications of AI.  According to choice-based accounts of moral responsibility, conduct rightly 
attracts blame when it is at fault, fault being understood in terms of being freely chosen.181  On 
this account, an agent (X) is only morally responsible for an unwanted outcome (Y) if X ‘caused’ 
Y.  To establish that X caused Y, then X must have engaged in conduct for which X can be held 
causally responsible.  Establishing this causal link requires that X voluntarily chose to engage in 
the relevant conduct, even if that conduct turns out to have consequences and effects that X 
did not intend or want.  According to Matthias, because the developers of computational 
agents which have the capacity to make their own decisions in ways that have not been pre-
programmed in advance by human developers, those developers lack the requisite degree of 
control and therefore are not morally responsible for the decisions of those computational 
agents or their consequences.182
The validity of the claim that the capacity for computational agents to act autonomously 
breaks the chain of causation between the acts of their developers and the decisions taken by 
those agents is highly debatable.183  As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognise that 
choice theories of moral responsibility are particularly unsuitable as a model for identifying 
responsibility for human rights violations.  It is inherent in the nature and concept of rights 
generally, and human rights in particular, that they protect values of such fundamental 
importance that any interference with them attracts responsibility per se, without proof of 
fault.184 Consider again the example of Facebook’s removal of the iconic image of the 
Vietnamese girl in 2016.  In circumstances where national legislation imposes legal obligations 
on both state and non-state actors to respect human rights, Facebook would be regarded as 
legally responsible for violating the right to freedom of expression, without the need to 
demonstrate that it had the capacity to control whether the image was removed.  In other 
words, a violation of the right to freedom of expression occurred even if the decision to take-it 
down had been taken by an automated algorithmic system acting independently without 
direct human intervention, and even if the human designers of the automated system had not 
intended or foreseen that the specific image in question might be automatically removed.   
3.4 Models for allocating responsibility  
Although the model of responsibility that applies to human rights violations is widely 
understood as one of ‘strict responsibility’, without the need for proof of fault, the allocation 
of obligations of repair for tangible harm to health or property, may be legally distributed in 
accordance with a variety of responsibility models.  Because AI systems might operate in ways 
that result in both human rights violations and harm to individuals and/or property, and 
                                                          
180  Matthias 2004: 183. 
181  Wallace 1994, cited by Cane 2002. 
182  Matthias 2004.  For a recent affirmation, see Gunkel 2017. 
183  Ascribing causal responsibility to some action or event is an interpretive act and not a matter of scientific 
‘truth’ per se.   
184  See UN Special Representative of the Secretary General 2011 (the ‘Ruggie Principles’) 
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because the allocation of historic responsibility for harm serves as a guiding function to those 
involved in the design, development, production and implementation of AI systems by 
specifying the nature and scope of their obligations, these models are briefly outlined in the 
following discussion.  The variety of legal models that might be applied to allocate and 
distribute the adverse effects arising from our other-regarding conduct clearly demonstrates 
that it is a mistake to expect one single model of responsibility to apply fairly to all the 
different kinds of adverse consequences that might flow from the use of advanced digital 
technologies.    As previously noted, unlike philosophical analysis of responsibility, which tend 
to focus on agents at the expense of ‘victims’ and of society, legal models of responsibility185
are relational in the sense that they are concerned not only with the position of individuals 
whose conduct attracts responsibility (i.e. moral agents), but also with the impact of that 
conduct on other individuals and on society more generally.186 As legal scholar and philosopher 
Peter Cane has observed 
Responsibility is not just a function of the quality of will manifested in conduct, nor 
the quality of that conduct.  It is also concerned with the interest we all share in 
security of person and property, and with the way resources and risks are 
distributed in society.  Responsibility is a relational phenomenon.187   
In other words, legal responsibility emphasises the relationship between moral agents, moral 
patients and society more generally, rather than focusing exclusively on the conduct of moral 
agents and whether that conduct justly attracts responsibility.   Accordingly, academic analysis 
of the variety of ways in which national legal systems allocate responsibility for conduct that 
causes harm or other adverse events (including rights violations that may or may not result in 
harm) demonstrate how each of these models entails a different balancing of interest between 
moral agents and moral patients (or ‘victims’ are they are typically referred to in legal 
scholarship).188  This discussion does not, however, seek to evaluate whether current legal 
approaches adopted within national legal systems adequately allocate responsibility for harm 
through the application of national civil liability rules, particularly given the capacity of national 
law to allocate historic responsibility for harms and wrongs by AI systems is yet to be fully 
tested via litigation.189  Instead, the following discussion briefly outlines four broad models of 
responsibility reflected in Anglo-American legal systems, notably (1) intention/culpability-
based models (2) risk/negligence-based models (3) strict responsibility and (4) mandatory 
insurance schemes,190 as exemplars of different ways in which legal responsibility for risks, 
                                                          
185  The concept of ‘responsibility’ is used much more commonly outside the law to refer to ‘human conduct 
and consequences thereof that trigger such responses’ so that we tend to speak of ‘moral responsibility’ on 
the one hand and ‘legal liability’ on the other, with the latter referring primarily to formal institutionalised 
imposts, sanctions and penalties which are characteristic of law and legal systems but not of morality: Cane 
2002: 1-2. 
186  Cane 2002: 4-5. 
187  Cane 2002: 109. 
188  The European Commission is currently undertaking reviewing these issues.  See for example European 
Commission 2018c. 
189  Various bodies are working on seeking to evaluate the capacity of national civil liability rules to respond 
adequately to harm arising from the operation of AI systems.  For example, the European Commission 
intends to produce guidance in mid-2019 to address the way in which the EU Product Liability Directive 
applies to artificial intelligence, robotics and the Internet of Things: European Commission 2018c. 
190  This study identifies various models of responsibility utilised in Anglo-American legal systems for the simple 
reason that the author of this report has been trained in and is most familiar with the Anglo-American legal 
system.  This should not be taken as an indication that these models are representative of responsibility 
models reflected in other legal systems, or are in any way superior to models adopted elsewhere. 
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human rights violations and collective harms might be distributed.191  They are intended 
merely as heuristics aimed at highlighting the range of potential models of responsibility that 
might be used to allocate and distribute threats, risks and harms associated with the use of 
advanced digital technologies.192  These sketches therefore selectively describe the what I will 
refer to as the ‘control/conduct condition’ and the ‘epistemic condition’, applicable to each 
model, rather than providing a complete and detailed account of each model’s content and 
contours.  Taken together, they reveal how each model strikes a different balance between 
our interest, as agents, in freedom of action and our interest, as victims, in rights and interests 
in security of person and property.193 It suggests that identifying which (if any) of these models 
is most appropriate for allocating and distributing the various risks associated with the 
operation of advanced digital technologies is by no means self-evident194, but will entail a 
social policy choice concerning how these burdens should be appropriately allocated and 
distributed.   
3.4.1 Intention/culpability-based models 
Intention/culpability-based models, which constitute the core model of responsibility that 
underpins the criminal law, focus primarily on the voluntariness of the agent’s conduct.  They 
can be interpreted as requiring the satisfaction of two conditions: firstly, the ‘control’ 
condition, demonstrating that the agent was causally responsible for the legally proscribed 
conduct in so far as the agent had a free and voluntary choice concerning whether so to act, 
and secondly, the ‘epistemic condition,’ requiring proof of ‘fault,’ broadly understood as 
requiring that the agent had actual knowledge and awareness of the particular facts 
surrounding the harmful consequences of the agent’s conduct, and the agent’s action can be 
understood as based on these facts. 195   It is an intention/culpability-based model of 
responsibility that underpins the choice-based accounts of moral responsibility that have 
predominated in philosophically-oriented discussions concerning whether the human 
developers of autonomous computational agents are morally responsible for the actions of 
those agents.  For the time being at least, because computational agents lack the capacity for 
subjective knowledge, awareness and intent, these responsibility models cannot be readily 
applied to computational agents per se because they cannot satisfy the requisite epistemic 
condition.196  Intention/culpability-based models can, however, be applied to the human 
developers or users of such computational agents.  The conduct of individuals who 
                                                          
191  According to the European Parliament’ in its Draft Motion on the Civil Liability Rules on Robotics, ‘civil 
liability for damage caused by robots is a crucial issue which also needs to be analysed and addressed at 
Union level in order to ensure the same degree of efficiency, transparency and consistency in the 
implementation of legal certainty throughout the European Union for the benefit of citizens, consumers and 
businesses alike’: European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 2016:  16. 
192  In Anglo-American legal systems, the distinction between the civil and criminal law is of critical importance.  
The primary purpose of the criminal law is to impose penalties and punishments on those who engage in 
criminal conduct, and hence the paradigm of criminal liability focuses primarily on the alleged offender’s 
conduct and mental state.  In contrast, the primary purpose of the civil law is to identify and allocate legal 
obligations of repair on those identified as legally responsible for the relevant harm.  Accordingly, 
responsibility in civil law is two-sided, concerned not only with agent-conduct, but also with the impact of 
that conduct on others.  The operation of the civil and criminal law paradigms of cut-across fault based, 
negligence-based and strict responsibility models, and the distinction between the civil and criminal law 
paradigms are not further discussed.  For an extensive discussion, see Cane 2002. 
193  Cane 2002: 98. 
194  Danaher 2016. 
195  In Anglo-American law, the mental elements of legal fault criteria are intention, recklessness, 
knowledge/belief and malice.  See Cane 2002: 79.   
196  Hildebrandt 2013; Himma 2009; Solum 1991; Gless et al 2016; Andrade et al 2007.  
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intentionally develop or deploy AI technologies for dangerous or malicious purposes, for 
example, in order to commit fraud or misappropriate property, would clearly satisfy the 
requirements for establishing responsibility under an intention/culpability-based model.  In 
these circumstances197, a prima facie violation of human rights would arise (proof of subjective 
intent could be shown, but there would be no need to do so because legal responsibility for 
rights violations is typically ‘strict’) and would also be likely to generate both responsibility 
under the criminal law for offences against the person (or property) as well as triggering civil 
law obligations of repair and restoration.   
3.4.2 Risk/Negligence-based models 
In Anglo-American law, risk/negligence-based models of legal responsibility for tangible harm 
form the basis of a general duty to take reasonable care to prevent foreseeable risks of harm.  
These models of responsibility are conventionally applied to determine whether agents are 
subject to legal obligations of repair towards those who have suffered harm as a result of an 
agent’s failure to discharge this general duty of care.  A ‘control condition’ similar to that 
which applies to intention/culpability-based models of responsibility also applies to 
risk/negligence-based models (with some modification198), insofar as it must be shown that the 
agent caused the relevant damage or injury.  However, the epistemic condition applicable to 
risk/negligence-based models is considerably less demanding than those applicable to 
intention/culpability-based models.  For example, legal liability in negligence under Anglo-
American law does not require proof of the agent’s accompanying mental state, thereby 
seeking to strike a fair balance between the interest of agents (in freedom of action) and the 
interests of victims in safety and security.  As legal philosophers have emphasised, in order to 
hold an agent morally responsible, the agent need not in fact have actual subjective 
knowledge of the consequences of her behaviour in order to be justly held responsible for it.199  
As John Oberdiek explains, facts matter morally: they are endowed with a normative force that 
bears upon the permissibility of prospective action but only once they have been reasonably 
discoverable.200  In deciding upon a course of action, Oberdiek points out that the ordinary 
person can be morally expected to take ‘reasonable epistemic care’: she cannot be expected 
to know all the facts, but nor can she stick her head in the sand and fall back on her subjective 
understanding if she has failed to take reasonable care to find out or discover the relevant 
facts.  
Accordingly, whether or not responsibility based on a risk/negligence model can be ascribed to 
the human developers of computational agents and systems in circumstances where those 
systems generate decisions or behaviours that cause harm will depend upon whether that 
harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the computational systems’ actions and 
decisions.  In Anglo-American negligence law, legal responsibility for causing harm is only 
ascribed to those who are subject to a legal duty of care. Such a duty arises when, very broadly 
speaking, there is a reasonably foreseeable risk that an action could harm a proximate person. 
                                                          
197  The use of  AI technologies in the commission of a crime might appropriately be regarded as an aggravating 
factor in the commission of a criminal offence: see 6 2002.  See also Hallevy 2015.   
198  Causation in negligence may be negated by the application of principles of ‘remoteness of damage’: Horsey 
and Rackley 2015, chapter 9. 
199  Hart 1968. 
200  Oberdiek 2017: 57. 
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Foreseeability therefore operates both to define the kinds of risks for which a person may be 
legally responsible, and bounds the harms for which they may be liable.201  
Reasonable foreseeability also plays a role in determining how a person is expected to act. The 
duty of care is discharged if a person acts as an ordinary person exercising reasonable care to 
avoid foreseeable risks.202 Hence, reasonable foreseeability operates as the touchstone for 
determining the relevant ‘reference class’ for evaluating whether risk-taking activities (such as 
driving) that may result in tangible harm to others gives rise to a legal duty of care. As 
Oberdiek observes, this common law standard is a just and appropriate moral standard 
because, in the case of risk-taking activities, it is important that we should be able to hold each 
other accountable for our respective characterisations of risk.   In other words, we must be 
able to justify that characterisation in a way that withstands moral scrutiny.203  
Yet in order to identify whether or not it is reasonably foreseeable that any given risky action 
might ripen into harm, we encounter the so-called ‘reference class’ problem.  As Oberdiek 
explains:  
the reference class problem is…essentially a problem of redescribability – any 
particular risk can be infinitely re-described…there is no uniquely correct 
generative reference class that credible beliefs take as their object.204  
For example, consider the fatal injury caused by an Uber vehicle which it collided with a 
woman pushing a bicycle with shopping bags hanging from its handlebars in 2018.  The vehicle 
had been operating in self-driving mode for 19 minutes before it mistook the woman for a car 
(which it therefore expected would take evasive action), only recognising its mistake and 
handing back control to the vehicle’s human driver seconds before collision, which the human 
driver was not able to prevent.205 It seems unlikely that the car’s developers could have 
reasonably foreseen that the vehicle’s AI sensing system would mistakenly believe that a 
woman pushing a bicycle with shopping bags dangling from its handlebars was another 
vehicle.  On the other hand, it seems well within the bounds of reasonable foresight that the 
car’s sensing technologies would fail correctly to classify unusually shaped objects 
encountered during normal driving conditions, and that errors of this kind might lead to fatal 
collisions.    
At the same time, identifying whether particular events associated with the operation of a 
particular technological object is ‘reasonably foreseeable’ will invariably be a product of our 
experience and exposure to them.  In the emerging phases during which a new technology is 
being rolled out, expectations of their behaviours (and consequences) will be relatively 
unsettled and unknown.206  However, as time passes and we become more accustomed to 
                                                          
201  When it is an omission or failure to act that causes harm, these criteria manifest in a range of particular 
ways, such as one has a duty to protect others from risks that arise as a result of one creating a source of 
danger or because one has assumed responsibility for the other person’s interests.  See Lunney and 
Oliphant 2013, chapter 9. 
202  Oberdiek 2017: 40. 
203  Oberdiek 2017: 48.   
204  Oberdiek 2017: 40. 
205  Smith 2018. 
206  For example, Microsoft’ experimental Tay chatbot was designed to learn to converse in human 
conversational terms by observing and interacting with Twitter users, improving its performance via 
conversational interaction and in so doing learning how AI programmes can engage with web users in casual 
conversation.  Instead, it quickly learned to parrot a slew of anti-Semitic and other hateful invective that 
human Twitter users fed the bot, resulting in Microsoft’s decision to shut the chatbot down.  This kind of 
response was not in fact anticipated by Tay’s developers, yet it could persuasively be argued that responses 
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their patterns of behaviours and action, those behaviours and actions may become more 
familiar to developers and therefore more likely to be regarded as reasonably foreseeable. 
Therefore, developers of those technologies should be held responsible for negligently failing 
to take steps that would have averted the resulting harm and wrongdoing.207  Yet even then, 
this begs the question about our reasonable expectations of the tech industry in making the 
decision to release emerging technology into real world contexts: we rightly implement 
demanding governance regimes for new pharmaceuticals, is this not also true of risky 
advanced digital technologies?208
Additional questions arise concerning the minimum standard of care which AI system 
developers should be responsible for attaining in the design and implementation of 
autonomous computational systems.  Consider again the fatal collision of the Uber vehicle 
which misclassified a pedestrian wheeling a bicycle as an approaching vehicle.  In 
contemporary discussions, a common refrain is that autonomous cars will be ‘safer’ than 
human drivers, thereby suggesting that the relevant comparator is that of a reasonable human 
driver.  But is it appropriate to apply a model of responsibility and the same standard of care 
that we apply to an ordinary human vehicle driver operating a traditional human-directed car 
to that of unintended harm resulting from the actions of a self-driving car?   Or is it more 
appropriate to apply the model of responsibility which conventionally applies to product 
manufacturers to govern the development and operation of self-driving vehicles, which, in 
contemporary European law systems, is a model of strict responsibility for product defects 
(discussed below)?  In other words, there are important policy choices to be made and it is by 
no means self-evident that the standard of the ordinary human driver provides the most 
suitable comparator.209    
3.4.3 Strict responsibility  
As this study has already noted, the model of legal responsibility applicable to rights violations 
(including violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms) is that of strict responsibility, 
or ‘strict legal liability’ as it is called in Anglo-American legal parlance.  On this model, 
responsibility attaches to the agent without proof of fault, so that legal responsibility for rights 
violations attaches to those who cause them regardless of whether the responsible agent 
engaged in conduct that breached a legally specified standard of conduct, and regardless of 
whether the conduct was intended or accompanied by any particular mental state.210  Of the 
four varieties of strict liability identified by Cane, three are of direct relevance to this study: 
right-based, outcome-based and activity-based strict liability. 
(a) right-based strict liability: arises when legal rights are violated such that any violation of 
the sphere of protection bounded by the right triggers liability.  The classic example is 
trespass to land: by interfering with the land-owners’ right to exclusive dominion over the 
land, all intrusions without the consent of the land-owner constitute unlawful interference 
even if it the intruder was in no sense blameworthy.  As already noted, violations of 
human rights fall into this category of cases. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
of this kind were reasonably foreseeable, given the volume and frequency with which offensive posts are 
made online via Twitter. See The Guadian 2016. 
207  Liu and Zaweiska 2017. 
208 Nemitz 2018; Thomas 2017a; Thomas 2017b.  
209  Thomas 2017b.  
210  Cane 2002: 82. 
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(b) outcome based strict liability: this form of liability rests on the causation of adverse 
outcomes (i.e. extrinsic consequences) regardless of fault.  Contemporary European 
product liability laws are based on this model which imposes strict liability on 
manufacturers for defective products that cause harm to natural persons or property.211  In 
relation to advanced digital technologies, questions arise concerning what constitutes a 
relevant ‘defect’.  Consider again the fatal collision of the Uber vehicle which initially 
misclassified a pedestrian wheeling a bicycle as another vehicle, handing back control to 
the human driver as soon as it recognised its error but, however, too late for the human 
driver to prevent the collision.  It could be argued that in these circumstances, the vehicle 
was not ‘defective’ in so far as it functioned in precisely the way that its developers 
intended.  On the other hand, if ‘defective’ is interpreted to mean ‘fit for purpose’, then 
the vehicle’s failure to correctly classify the pedestrian and take evasive action to avoid the 
fatal collision could readily be characterised as defective.212  A similar approach is often 
applied where the risk of damage is linked to the unpredictability of behaviour of specific 
risk groups, such as animals. In these cases, liability is attributed to the persons that are 
considered responsible for supervising the animal, as they are typically regarded as best 
placed to adopt measures to prevent or reduce the risk of harm. 
(c) activity-based strict liability arises in connection with a specified activity, such as various 
‘possession’ offences, such as laws which prohibit the possession of guns, knives, illicit 
substances and so forth.  In Anglo-American law, vicarious liability is an important form of 
activity-based strict liability, where the relevant activity is defined primarily in terms of a 
relationship with another person, for whose breach of the law the first person is held 
strictly liable by virtue of that relationship.  Vicarious liability applies to the employment 
relationship, such that an employer will be strictly liable for the unlawful conduct of an 
employee carried out in the course of his or her duty.  Some jurisdictions may adopt a 
strict liability approach towards those who carry out dangerous activities (e.g. the operator 
of a nuclear power plant or of an aircraft) or are ultimately responsible for the dangerous 
activity (e.g. the owner of a vehicle). In such cases, the underlying rationale is that this 
person has created a risk, and at the same time also derives an economic benefit from this 
activity.213      
These various forms of strict liability distribute the risks associated with potentially harmful 
activity between agents and victims in ways that accord considerable weight to the interests of 
victims in security of the person and property.  In so doing, they recognise that responsibility is 
not merely a function of the quality of an agent’s will manifested in conduct, nor the quality of 
that conduct: it is also concerned with the interest we all share in security of person and 
property, and with the way resources and risks are distributed in society, thereby delineating 
the boundaries of what our responsibilities are.214  
3.4.4 Mandatory Insurance  
Rather than focus on allocating responsibility to potential candidates who can be understood 
as contributing to the harms and wrongs that might arise from the operation of advanced 
digital technologies, a society might decide instead to prioritise the need to ensure that all 
                                                          
211  See European Union 1985.  
212  Strict liability for damage caused by autonomous robots was favoured by the European Parliament’s draft 
motion on Civil Law Rules on Robotics: European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 2016. 
213  European Commission 2018b. 
214   Cane 2002:108-109. 
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those who are harmed by the operation of these technologies should be financially 
compensated.  This may be achieved by instituting some kind of mandatory insurance scheme 
(which could be established on a ‘no-fault’ basis), establishing an insurance fund to which all 
those harmed by the operation of these technologies could have recourse.215  Such a scheme 
might be funded in various ways, including via contributions from the tech industry, but with 
claims administered by some independent or public authority. One could also simply require 
firms involved in the value chain through which these advanced digital systems are designed 
and implemented to take out mandatory liability insurance.216  While it is beyond the scope of 
this study to evaluate the desirability of such schemes, they have the benefit of enabling those 
harmed from the operation of such technologies to seek financial compensation in 
circumstances where it is difficult to identify precisely which firms ought to be regarded as 
responsible for the harm, or if the relevant firms have become insolvent.  This may become 
increasingly important as we become more reliant on autonomous intelligent systems which 
continue to operate long after their human or corporate developers and owners have died or 
ceased to exist, so that societies may need to develop long-stop institutions such as collective 
insurance in order to ensure that victims are not systematically left uncompensated.217  
Proposals to confer legal status on intelligent machines in order to facilitate the administration 
of compensation payments to injured victims have been proposed in this context.218
3.5 Responsibility challenges posed by complex and dynamic socio-technical systems 
The preceding analysis has proceeded largely on the assumption that, in seeking to assign 
responsibility for adverse consequences of advanced digital technologies, cause-effect 
relations can be readily identified.  In practice, however, these technologies form an essential 
component of highly complex and sophisticated socio-technical systems, generating acute 
challenges in seeking to identify lines of causal, moral and legal responsibility.  Three such 
challenges are briefly outlined in the following discussion: the problem of ‘many hands’, 
‘humans in the loop’ and the unpredictable effects of complex dynamics that can arise 
between multiple interacting algorithmic systems. 
3.5.1 The problem of ‘many hands’  
Except in relation to some forms of strict responsibility, the assignment of responsibility for 
the threats, risks, harms and rights violations (including human rights violations) typically 
                                                          
215  The European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs recommended a scheme of this kind for harm caused 
by specific categories of robots, recommending that an obligatory insurance scheme, which could be based 
on the obligation of the producer to take out insurance for the autonomous robots it produces, should be 
established,  be supplemented by a fund in order to ensure that damages can be compensated for in cases 
where no insurance cover exist: European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 2016 at 20. 
216  European Commission 2018b. 
217  6:2001 at 429. 
218  For example, the  European Parliament’s Committee for Legal Affairs called on the European Commission to 
consider creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most sophisticated 
autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons responsible for making 
good any damage they may cause, and possibly applying electronic personality to cases where robots make 
autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently : European Parliament 
Committee on Legal Affairs (2016) at 18.  The European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizen’s Rights 
and Constitutional Affairs (the JURI Committee) has emphatically opposed this particular proposal: Nevjans 
2016 at 14- 16.  These proposals are separate and distinct from academic discussion concerning whether or 
not robots should be regarded as moral agents and entitled to moral rights protection.  An examination of 
the appropriate legal and moral status of AI agents as independent agents in their own right is beyond the 
scope of this study.  See Solum 1991; Koops 2010; Teubner 2006; Teubner 2018.   
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require an assessment of whether they can be understood as caused by the agent.    Yet when 
seeking to assign causal responsibility for some adverse event219 or effect that could plausibly 
be regarded as a direct consequence of the operation of any complex socio-technical system 
(whether or not it utilises AI technologies), one immediately encounters the ‘many hands’ 
problem.220  This problem arises if one adopts an intention/culpability based model of 
responsibility.  First identified in the context of information technology by philosopher of 
technology, Helen Nissenbaum,221 the problem of ‘many hands’ is not unique to computers, 
digital technology, algorithms or machine learning.  Rather, it refers to the fact that a complex 
array of individuals, organisations, components and processes are involved in the 
development, deployment and implementation of complex systems, so that when these 
systems malfunction or otherwise cause harm, it becomes very difficult to identify who is to 
blame, because such concepts are conventionally understood in terms of individualistic 
conceptions of responsibility.222 In other words, causal responsibility is necessarily distributed 
where complex technological systems are concerned, diluting causation to mere influence.223   
The ‘many hands’ problem may be especially acute in seeking to identify the locus of 
responsibility for harms or wrongs resulting from the development and operation of AI 
systems, given that they rely on a number of critical components, namely 
(a) The models that are developed in order to represent the feature space and the 
optimisation goal which the system is intended to achieve; 
(b)  algorithms, based on these models, which analyse the data to produce outputs 
which may trigger some kind of ‘action’ or decision; 
(c) The input data (which might or might not include personal data) on which those 
algorithms are trained; 
(d) The human developers involved in the design of these systems, who must make 
value-laden decisions about the models, algorithms and data that are used to train 
the algorithms upon which performance is tested. They include human beings who 
undertake the task of labelling the data that is used to train the algorithms224; and 
(e) The larger socio-technical system and context in which the algorithmic system is 
embedded and in which it operates. 
Even assuming that we could satisfactorily identify the allocation of moral responsibility for 
adverse impacts in relation to each of the above components, this is unlikely to ensure that 
lines of moral responsibility for unintended adverse consequences can be readily identified 
when they are dynamically combined within a complex integrated system.  These challenges 
are compounded by the fact that digital products and services are open to software 
extensions, updates and patches after they have been implemented.   Any change to the 
software of the system may affect the behaviour of the entire system or of individual 
components, extending their functionality, and these may change the system’s operational risk 
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profile, including its capacity to operate in ways that might cause harm or violate human 
rights.225    
In responding to these challenges, it may be helpful to bear three considerations in mind.  
Firstly, issues relating to the allocation of legal responsibility for harm arising from activities 
involving multiple parties are not new, and many legal systems have therefore developed a 
relatively sophisticated set of principles and procedures for determining liability where 
multiple potential defendants are involved.226  As the European Commission has recently 
observed, identifying the distribution of liability for redress amongst multiple actors involved 
in the value chain through which emerging digital technologies operate may not be relevant 
for the purposes of ensuring that victims obtain compensation for damage suffered, although 
resolving such questions is likely to be important from an overall policy standpoint in order to 
provide legal certainty to those involved in the production and implementation of these 
technologies.227  Secondly, and relatedly, the law’s ability to devise practical responses despite 
the apparent intractability of the many hands problem can be at least partly attributed to the 
greater emphasis which it places on the legitimate interests of the moral patient in security of 
the person, rather than the almost exclusive focus on the moral agent that is reflected in 
choice theories of moral responsibility (and upon which the ‘many hands’ problem rests).   
Thirdly, because the focus of this report is on responsibility for human rights violations arising 
from the development and implementation of advanced digital technologies, rather than on 
responsibility for harm, it is particularly important to ensure that we have effective and 
legitimate mechanisms that will operate to prevent and forestall human rights violations, 
particularly given that many human rights violations associated with the operation of 
advanced digital technologies may not result in tangible harm to individual health or property.  
The need for a preventative approach is especially important given the speed and scale at 
which these technologies now operate.  The resulting cumulative and aggregate effects of 
human rights violations caused by the operation of AI systems could seriously erode the social 
foundations necessary for moral and democratic orders that are essential preconditions for 
human rights to exist at all, suggesting that existing approaches to human rights protection 
may need to be reinvigorated in a networked, data-driven age.228
3.5.2 Human-Computer Interaction 
Not only are many individuals, firms and other organisations involved in the development and 
implementation of advanced digital technologies, but these technologies are often intended to 
operate in ways that involve retaining active human involvement.229  This points to serious 
challenges associated with identifying the appropriate distribution of authority and 
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responsibility between humans and machines, given the complex interaction between them.  
In particular, many tasks previously performed by humans are now undertaken by machines, 
yet humans are invariably involved at various points throughout the chain of development, 
testing, implementation and operation.  As the Royal Academy of Engineering has observed: 
There will always be humans in the chain, but it is unclear in the case of injury 
which human in the chain bears responsibility – the designer, manufacturer, 
programmer, or user.230  
The interaction between humans and machines within complex and dynamic socio-technical 
systems generate especially challenging questions concerning the appropriate role of humans 
in supervising their operation.  One recurring theme has been a concern that, in order to 
ensure that increasingly complex socio-technical systems always operate in the service of 
humanity, systems should always be designed so that they can be shut down by a human 
operator.  Yet, as the Royal Academy of Engineering has again observed: 
It might be thought that there is always need for human intervention, but 
sometimes autonomous systems are needed where humans might make bad 
choices as a result of panic – especially in stressful situations – and therefore the 
human override would be problematic.  Human operators are not always right nor 
do they always have the best intentions.  Could autonomous systems be trusted 
more than human operators in some situations?231  
On the other hand, even if humans are retained ‘in the loop’ with the aim of supervising 
computational systems, individuals placed in these positions may be understandably reluctant 
to intervene.  Over a decade ago, Johnson and Powers232 commented: 
In the case of future automated air traffic control…there will be a difficult question 
about whether and when human air traffic controllers should intervene in the 
computer-control of aircraft…Those humans who formerly held the role 
responsibility for the duties will either by replaced by caretakers of the technology, 
or will themselves become caretakers.  A concern in this environment is that the 
humans assigned to interact with these ‘automatic’ systems may perceive 
intervention morally risky.  It is better, they may reason, to let the computer 
system act and for humans to stay out of the way.  To intervene in the behaviour of 
automated computer systems is to call into doubt the wisdom of the system 
designers and the ‘expertise’ of the system itself.  At the same time, a person who 
chooses to intervene in the system brings the heavy weight of moral responsibility 
upon him or herself, and hence human controllers will have some incentive to let 
the automaticity of the computer system go unchallenged.  This is a flight from 
responsibility on the part of humans, and it shows how responsibility has been re-
assigned, in some sense, to the computer system.233  
Yet, as we increasingly rely on the expanding range of services and systems that automation 
makes possible, particularly as our digital technologies grow ever more powerful and 
sophisticated, continued insistence on placing a human in the loop to act in a supervisory 
capacity risks turning humans placed in the loop into ‘moral crumple zones’ – largely totemic 
humans whose central role becomes soaking up fault, even if they only had partial control of 
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the system, and who are vulnerable to being scapegoated by tech firms and organisations 
seeking to avoid responsibility for unintended adverse consequences.234  As Elish and Twang’s 
study of aviation autopilot litigation highlights, modern aircraft are now largely controlled by 
software, yet pilots in cockpits remain legally responsible for the aircraft’s operation.  Yet our 
cultural perceptions tend to display ‘automation bias’, elevating the reliability and infallibility 
of automated technology whilst blaming humans for error (see Box 2).235   
Box 2:  Automation bias and the responsibility of humans in the loop 
The collision of a Tesla car in semi-automated mode exemplifies the tendency to blame the 
proximate humans in the loop for unintended adverse consequences, rather than the 
surrounding socio-technical system in which the human is embedded.   
A semi-automated Tesla collided with a truck in May 2016 due to the vehicle’s autopilot’s 
failure to detect the truck.  The official investigation following the collision revealed that 
although the autopilot functioned as designed, it did not detect the truck. The human failed to 
respond, with the investigation concluding that the driver had over-relied on automation and 
the monitoring steering wheel torque, which were not effective methods for ensuring driver 
engagement.  
The authority undertaking the investigation concluded that the crash was not the result of any 
specific defect in the autopilot system, so that Tesla was not responsible for the accident.  
Because Tesla had provided an adequate warning to customers, indicating that the autopilot 
system must be operated under the supervision of the human driver, and that the driver’s 
hands should remain on the wheel and their eyes on the road, responsibility lay with the 
human driver.  In addition, Tesla’s Terms of Services included provisions that referred to the 
semi-autonomous nature of the autopilot, stating that the driver was to take over the control 
of the car in 4 seconds if the driver noticed problematic vehicle behaviour.  
Source: European Commission, Staff Working Document, ‘Liability for Emerging Digital Technologies’ 
(April 2018) 14-15. 
3.5.3 Unpredictable, dynamic interactions between complex socio-technical systems  
Even more intractable challenges arise in seeking to identify, anticipate and prevent adverse 
events arise from the interactions between complex, algorithm-driven socio-technical systems 
that can occur at a speed and scale that was simply not possible in a pre-digital, pre-networked 
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age.  The so-called ‘flash crash’ that occurred in 2010, during which the stock market went into 
freefall for five minutes before correcting itself, for no apparent reason, provides a vivid 
illustration.236   While individual AI agents, that have the capacity to learn from their 
environment and to iteratively improve their performance, might be subject to mathematical 
verification and testing, identifying how multiple different algorithms might interact with other 
algorithmic agents in a complex and dynamic ecosystem generates risks of unpredictable, and 
potentially dangerous, outcomes.  In other words, these interactions generate risks that we 
have barely begun to grasp.237  The challenge of devising solutions that will enable us reliably 
to predict,  model and take action to prevent unwanted and potentially catastrophic outcomes 
arising from the interaction between dynamic and complex socio-technical systems generates 
a new and increasingly urgent frontier for computational research.  Leading computer 
scientists Shadbolt and Hampson warn of the dangers of “hyper-complex and super-fast 
systems” generating considerable new risks, and for which: 
Our response needs to be vigilant, intelligent and inventive.  So long as we are, we 
will remain in control of the machines, and benefit greatly from them.  We need to 
develop policy frameworks for this.  Beyond the dangers, a world of opportunity
arises.238
3.6 State responsibility for ensuring effective protection of human rights  
One of the most significant concerns about the emergence of algorithmic systems has been 
the increasing power of Big Tech firms, including concerns about the radical power asymmetry 
between these firms and the individuals who are subject to them.239  Accordingly, it is in the 
hands of these firms that the power to deploy algorithmic systems overwhelmingly resides.  
Yet, the obligation to protect human rights in the international domain law lies primarily on 
nation states, given that human rights protection is primarily intended to operate vertically, to 
protect individuals against unjustified interference by the state.  However, it is well established 
in ECHR jurisprudence that the rights protected by the Convention ground positive substantive 
obligations requiring member states to take action in order to secure to those within their 
jurisdiction the rights protected by the Convention.240  Accordingly, states are obliged under 
the ECHR to introduce national legislation and other policies necessary to ensure that ECHR 
rights are duly respected, including protection against interference by others (including tech 
firms) who may therefore be subject to binding legal duties to respect human rights.241  It is 
these enforceable legal obligations, grounded in the Convention’s protection of human rights, 
including the right to an effective remedy, that offers solid foundations for imposing legally 
enforceable and effective mechanisms to ensure accountability for human rights violations, 
well beyond those that the contemporary rhetoric of ‘AI ethics’ in the form of voluntary self-
regulation by the tech industry can realistically be expected to deliver.242
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The discussion of various models for allocating historic responsibility outlined in the section 3.2 
draws largely on Anglo-American legal approaches introduced via legislation (and adjudicated 
on by courts) or developed by courts in their interpretation and application of the common 
law in determining legal liability for harm or other wrongdoing.  One significant drawback 
associated with reliance upon judicial remedies to redress these concerns is that they are 
better suited to remediating substantial harms suffered by the few, as opposed to less 
significant harms suffered by the many.  The difficulties of seeking redress via the courts are 
magnified in the AI space by the challenge of detecting the harm and determining and proving 
causation, to say nothing of the serious practical obstacles and disincentives faced by 
individuals in invoking the judicial process.243  At the same time, the capacity of AI systems in a 
globally networked environment to generate collective action problems has already been 
highlighted, underlining the need for, and importance of, properly resourced national 
enforcement equipped with adequate enforcement powers authorities and which may also 
suggest that accessible and convenient collective complaint mechanisms may be necessary to 
ensure that enforcement action is taken in relation to human rights violations resulting from 
the operation of AI systems.  At the same time, it is important to recognise that, in addition to 
conventional legal mechanisms of redress via the courts, there are many other institutional 
governance mechanisms that could help secure responsible human rights-compliant 
development and implementation of advanced digital technologies.  The following section 
therefore provides a brief outline of other possible institutional governance mechanisms 
(beyond ‘voluntary’ self-regulatory initiatives currently emerging) that may serve to enhance 
both prospective and retrospective responsibility for the threats, risks, harms and wrongs 
arising from the operation of advanced digital technologies.  It briefly outlines several possible 
mechanisms and governance institutions that might have an invaluable role to play in securing 
accountability for human rights violations that could complement existing legal mechanisms.  
3.7 Non-judicial mechanisms for enforcing responsibility for advanced digital technologies 
Although regulatory governance mechanisms can be classified in many different ways, three 
features are worth highlighting for the purposes of this study.  Firstly, we can distinguish 
between mechanisms which operate on an ex ante basis, which provide oversight and 
evaluation of an object, process or system before it has been implemented into real world 
settings and are therefore primarily concerned with securing prospective responsibility. On the 
other hand, there are ex post mechanisms that operate during or after implementation has 
occurred and are therefore primarily concerned with securing historic responsibility.  As this 
study has already emphasised, both dimensions of responsibility must be attended to in order 
to secure the responsible development and implementation of AI systems.  Yet because this 
study is primarily concerned with the human rights implications of these technologies, the 
need for effective and legitimate mechanisms that will prevent and forestall human rights 
violations is of considerable importance, particularly given the speed and scale at which AI 
systems can now operate, combined with a culture of ‘move fast and break things’ that 
characterises the operational strategy of leading tech firms.  This strategy consists of forging 
ahead with rapid technological innovation without attending carefully to their potential risks in 
advance, preferring to deal with any adverse ‘blow-back’ after the event by which time it may 
not be practically possible to unwind or roll-back the technological innovations that have 
already been brought to market.244   Secondly, it is important to attend to the legal 
enforceability of regulatory governance institutions and mechanisms in order to identify 
whether, and to what extent, they are to be regarded as optional mechanisms which the tech 
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industry has the freedom selectively to adopt or ignore altogether, or whether they are legally 
mandated and for which substantial legal sanctions attach for non-compliance.245  Thirdly, 
although regulatory governance mechanisms have conventionally taken the form of social 
institutions, in the present context, the role of technical protection mechanisms, which rely 
upon a modality of control sometimes referred to as ‘regulation by design’246 may be equally (if 
not more) important. It is to these that this study now turns. 
3.7.1 Technical protection mechanisms 
One of the most promising fields of research that has flourished in response to growing 
awareness of the ethical and legal concerns raised by the use of AI technologies, can be found 
in the technical responses that have emerged with the aim of seeking to ‘hard-wire’ particular 
values into the design and operation of algorithmic techniques that are incorporated into AI 
systems.247  One of the features often associated with some of these ‘design-based’ regulatory 
governance mechanisms is their capacity to operate in real time, rather than on an ex ante or 
ex post basis.248  Although early work in the field utilising technical measures to secure the 
protection of particular interests and values through the use of ICT focused primarily on 
technological solutions to the protection of IP rights249, parallel work also began to take place 
in the field of data privacy, which became known as ‘privacy by design’ or ‘data protection by 
design’.  This work recognised that technology could be applied in the service of interests and 
values that it concurrently threatened, seeking to improve the bite of legal norms on IP rights 
and data privacy by seeking to build the norms into information systems architecture.250  In 
addition to the work on ‘privacy engineering’, more recent research in machine learning and 
software engineering can be understood as building on this approach, seeking to secure what 
may be called ‘human rights protection by design’ and include the following:  
(a) Explainable AI (XAI): Advances in machine learning techniques, including those relying on 
neural networks (NN), are often used to aid human decision making,251 yet their logic is not 
easily explainable (i.e., when they opt for a particular choice, we do not know why they do 
so) or readily interpretable (i.e., they cannot explain or present outcomes in ways humans 
can understand).  There is growing recognition of the need to ensure that outputs 
generated by AI systems can be rendered intelligible to users252 and this has opened up a 
significant field of computational research in ‘explainable AI’ (XAI).253   
(b) Fairness, Accountability and Transparency in Machine Learning (FATML):  Similarly, a 
growing community of ML researchers have directed their attention towards developing 
techniques to identify and overcome problems of ‘digital discrimination’254 referring to bias 
and discrimination arising from the use of data mining and other machine learning 
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techniques (known as ‘discrimination-aware’ or ‘fairness-aware’ techniques for machine 
learning).255     
3.7.2 Regulatory governance instruments and techniques 
More conventional, social and organisational forms of regulatory governance instruments have 
also emerged in response to recognition that AI technologies might be utilised in ways that 
could undermine important values, including those explicitly concerned with ensuring that 
these technological systems operate in ways that respect human rights.  Two are briefly 
discussed here: human rights impact assessment and algorithmic auditing techniques. 256
(a) Algorithmic/Human rights impact assessment: Various scholars and organisations have 
proposed various forms of ‘algorithmic impact assessment’ that are, in effect, proposed 
risk-assessment models that are to be applied by those seeking to procure or deploy 
algorithmic systems in order to identify the human rights, ethical and social implications of 
their proposed systems, and to take steps to ameliorate those concerns in the design and 
operation of algorithmic systems prior to implementation.  While various general impact 
assessment models have been proposed, a number of domain-specific models have also 
been proposed.257   
These risk assessment models vary widely in terms of their: 
o Criteria of assessment:  while EU data protection law now mandates the use of ‘Data 
Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs)258’ in certain circumstances, building on pre-
existing approaches to ‘Privacy Impact Assessment’ they are largely focused on the 
evaluation of impacts upon data quality and security.  Other models, such as ‘Human 
Rights Impact Assessment259’ are concerned with evaluating the impact of a proposed 
system on human rights more generally.260
o Party undertaking the assessment: some proposed models are intended to be applied by 
the data controller (eg DPIAs) while others propose that the assessment be undertaken by 
an external third party or accreditation body, which is the approach reflected in the UN 
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Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in relation to ‘human rights due 
diligence’261. 
o Mandatory or voluntary adoption: Some algorithmic-human rights impact assessment 
proposals are intended to be adopted on a voluntary basis, so that it is up to the data 
controller to choose whether or not to undertake the assessment and what, if any, steps 
to take in light of that assessment.262  Others, such as the DPIA, are mandated by law if 
certain threshold conditions are satisfied.263
o Scale of evaluation: While Human Rights Impact Assessment is concerned with scrutinising 
a wide range of business operations to assess their conformity with human rights 
standards, other forms of impact assessment, such as the DPIA or PIA, are much narrower 
in their scale of evaluation, focusing on a single data processing activity. 
Impact assessment techniques can be valuable in focusing attention on the various ways in 
which a proposed activity may risk interfering with human rights,  in ways that might 
otherwise be overlooked or ignored.  Yet, in order for impact assessment approaches to 
provide real and substantive protection, it will be necessary to develop a clear and 
rigorous methodological approach that firms and other organisations are willing to adopt 
consistently and in ways that reflect a genuine commitment to identifying human rights 
risks, rather than merely regarding them as a bureaucratic burden resulting in ‘ritual’ 
displays of formal compliance without any genuine concern to respect human rights.264  
(b) Algorithmic auditing:  Unlike impact assessment approaches which are intended to take 
place before system implementation, algorithmic auditing techniques are aimed at testing 
and evaluating algorithmic systems once they are in operation.  Algorithmic auditing is 
emerging as a field of applied technical research, that draws upon a suite of emerging 
research tools and techniques for detecting, investigating and diagnosing unwanted 
adverse effects of algorithmic systems.265  It has been proposed that techniques of this 
kind might be formalised and institutionalised within a legally mandated regulatory 
governance framework, through which algorithmic systems (or at least those algorithmic 
systems that are regarded as ‘high risk’ systems in terms of the seriousness and scale of 
the consequences in the event of failure or unintended adverse effects) are subject to 
periodic review and oversight by an external authority staffed by suitably qualified 
technical specialists.  For example, Cukier and Mayer-Schonenberg suggest that a new 
group of professionals are needed (‘algorithmists’) to take on this role, which may 
constitute a profession akin to that of law, medicine, accounting and engineering and who 
can be relied upon to undertake the task of algorithmic auditing either as independent and 
external algorithmists to monitor algorithms from the outside, or by ‘internal’ 
algorithmists employed by organisations to monitor those developed and deployed by the 
organisation, which can then be subjected to external review.266   
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3.7.3 Standard setting, monitoring and enforcement 
The techniques and approaches described above have significant potential as instruments 
through which prospective and historic responsibility for systems that rely upon advanced 
digital technologies might be secured.  Yet in order for this potential to be realised, we must 
also attend to the legal and institutional governance frameworks in which they are embedded.  
For example, the various strands of technical research referred to at section 3.7.2 have 
considerable potential to facilitate prospective responsibility for digital technologies, providing 
welcome recognition by the technical community that digital systems are not ‘neutral’ but are 
imbued with values and might act in ways that are not consistent with human rights.  Not only 
is it important that this work is nurtured and supported, but it is also important that it emerges 
from interdisciplinary engagement between the technical community and those from law, the 
humanities and the social sciences, in order to elaborate more fully how human rights values 
can be translated into technical mechanisms of protection, and how a human rights approach 
responds to the problem of value conflict.  It is equally important that we attend to the legal 
status of these techniques.  Although the tech industry has been keen to adopt technical 
responses to ethical problems, merely placing ‘blind faith’ in industry solutions risks becoming 
merely another form of ‘ethics washing’.267  In other words, unless these technical approaches 
are themselves backed by law and subject to transparent evaluation by and oversight by a 
competent independent authority to ensure their validity and operation, they may not provide 
effective human rights protection.   As regulatory governance scholarship has emphasised, it is 
vital that all three elements of the regulatory governance process are attended to: the setting 
of standards, information gathering and monitoring of activity that is required to comply with 
those standards, and enforcement action and sanctions for non-compliance.268    Effective and 
legitimate regulatory governance requires both stakeholder participation in the setting of the 
relevant standards and a properly resourced, independent authority equipped with adequate 
powers systematically to gather information, to investigate non-compliance and to sanction 
violations.269  If we are to have confidence that technological protection mechanisms intended 
to ensure that human rights values are respected during the operation of digital processes, 
then we must have robust mechanisms of oversight that can investigate and verify that they 
do in fact so operate.  Hence technical standards themselves should be developed 
independently (and ideally through a participatory process in which all affected stakeholders 
can be involved) and subject to external scrutiny and examination, and that compliance with 
those standards can and will be scrutinised by an external body who has the power to impose 
(or seek to ensure the imposition of) sanctions for violation.  In other words, without 
meaningful independent oversight, these mechanisms are unlikely to provide the foundations 
for securing meaningful human rights accountability.   Various national and local governments 
are increasingly recognising the need for more formal, institutionalised and systematic 
consideration and evaluation of algorithmic systems, reflected in the various task-forces and 
public authorities commissioned to provide review and/or oversight of data-driven socio-
technical systems.270
3.8 Reinvigorating human rights discourse in a networked digital age 
As we enter a new globally networked digital age, the need to protect human rights and the 
underlying value commitments upon which they rest, is of paramount importance.  This 
                                                          
267  Greene et al 2019. 
268  Morgan and Yeung 2007; Lodge and Wegrich 2014. 
269  Nemitz 2018. 
270  For a summary of national initiatives across Europe, see Access Now 2018. 
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prompts consideration of whether our existing conceptions of human rights and the 
mechanisms through which they are enforced are fit for purpose in this new socio-technical 
landscape.  The powerful networked digital technologies that have emerged in recent years 
make possible practices and actions that were previously impossible and thereby create novel 
threats, risks and forms of wrong-doing, provoking reflection on whether additional new 
human rights and regimes of institutional governance are required to ensure that those risks 
can be meaningfully addressed in practice.271  Although the basic structure and institutional 
framework for human rights protection, which is well-established and universally recognised, 
can reasonably be expected to develop effective responses to many of the threats and 
challenges wrought by the rising power of digital automation and machine intelligence, there 
are several reasons why our existing rights discourse and enforcement mechanisms may 
require reinvigoration if they are to provide effective protection.   Firstly, many of the rights 
conferred upon data subjects are difficult to assert in practice, largely due to the opacity of 
many of the socio-technical systems in which these technologies are embedded.  Secondly, our 
understanding of the scope and content of existing rights were developed in a pre-networked 
age.  So conceived, these rights might fail to provide comprehensive protection against the full 
range of threats and risks to individuals which these technologies may give rise to, particularly 
in relation to illegitimate attempts to deceive and manipulate individuals that so-called 
‘persuasive technologies may enable (see above) and problems of discrimination (see above).  
For example, although the rights to data protection confer upon the data subject a right to 
insist upon human intervention, to express her view or to contest a fully automated decision 
that has ‘profound effects’ on her, these rights do not apply to partially automated decisions.  
Nor do they necessarily ensure that, in practice, an affected individual can readily detect 
whether she has been treated unequally vis-à-vis others, and if so, whether such differential 
treatment amounted to discrimination and was thus prima facie unlawful.  Thirdly, and 
perhaps most importantly when considering the adequacy of existing human rights and 
fundamental freedoms to address the new risks associated with new digital technologies, is 
the data subject’s freedom to waive some of these rights by consenting to specific practices 
that would otherwise constitute a rights-violation, thereby forgoing the protections these 
rights provide.272  For example, if individuals were to rely only on Article 8 to protect the rights 
and interests implicated in the provision of data-driven services, there is a significant risk that 
these rights would be too readily waived by individual right-holders in a networked age built 
upon a ‘free services’ business model: thus, in return for ‘free’ access to digital services and 
the efficiency and convenience they offer, individuals willingly exchange their personal data.273  
In contrast, the core data protection principles upon which contemporary European data 
protection regimes (including modernised Convention 108) rest (and reflected in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court on Human Rights under Article 8), include mandatory 
obligations imposed on data controllers that cannot be waived by individual right-holders, 
                                                          
271  Brownsword, Scotford and Yeung 2017.   
272 The extent to which the European Court On Human Rights is willing to recognise the possibility of individuals 
waiving their ECHR rights, and the conditions required for an effective waiver, is likely to depend upon the 
right in question and the specific context in which a claimed waiver is alleged to arise.  For example, 
Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2),  17 September 2009, no. 10249/03, para. 135, the Court stated “Neither the letter 
nor the spirit of Article 6 prevents a person from waiving them of his own free will, either expressly or 
tacitly. However, such a waiver must, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, be established in an 
unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance [...]. In 
addition, it must not run counter to any important public interest [...].”  In relation to private law and 
contractual relationships between non-state actors, the Court is likely to consider the issue of waiver in 
terms of the positive duty of states to take reasonable measures to protect individuals from infringement of 
Convention rights by other private persons, including the obligation to ensure (through legal regulation or 
other measures) that the relevant rights are ‘practical and effective’ in their exercise.  
273  Solove 2012. 
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including the principles of lawfulness of the processing, of purpose specification and data 
minimisation, thereby offering more systematic protection of the core underlying values and 
collective interests which these regimes ultimately seek to protect. 
But quite apart from these potential weaknesses, the individualised orientation of 
contemporary conceptions of human rights and  existing mechanisms for their enforcement, 
may fail to give due attention to the threats which these technologies may pose to collective 
goods, particularly the need to preserve and nourish the underlying socio-technical 
foundations that make it possible for moral agency and human rights to have space to operate.  
Leading philosopher of law and technology, Mireille Hildebrandt, expresses these concerns in 
terms of the technical conditions that are assumed to exist in order for the law (and 
contemporary understandings of the rule of law) to fulfil its functions.274  Yet within ‘smart’ 
environments that operate by continuously collecting digital data from the material world in 
order to infer, predict and therefore anticipate future behaviour of things, people and systems, 
these technical conditions are both supplanted and augmented, thereby altering the very 
possibility for the exercise of what we currently understand as thought, choice and reason 
because smart technologies operate continuously and immanently, and because they are 
designed to learn, producing outcomes that their designers did not specify.275  
North American jurist Julie Cohen develops Hildebrandt’s insights, drawing on both legal 
scholarship and a growing body of work in the sociology of science referred to as Science and 
Technology Studies (or ‘STS’).276  Cohen argues that to ensure that human rights can be 
operationalised in an era of smart environments, we must ‘take affordances seriously’, 
otherwise our rights will be ineffective.  According to affordance theory, the design of our 
technological objects and environments condition and constrain the possibilities for action, 
including the range of actions and responses which the design of the object ‘affords’ to the 
user.   Thus, once we recognise that smart digital technologies continually, immanently and 
pre-emptively mediate our beliefs and choices, then our legal discourse about human rights 
(including privacy) can be understood as incomplete.  Cohen therefore persuasively argues 
that this requires more than merely extending rights discourse.  Rather, it will require us to 
reconceive of rights in new ways, as well as developing a different vernacular for rights 
discourse – one that recognises the central role of sociotechnical configurations in affording 
and constraining the freedoms and capabilities that people in fact enjoy.277  In particular, our 
rights discourse has operated on a set of often unexamined assumptions about the built 
environment’s properties, about both constraint (such as the physical impossibility of universal 
surveillance) and lack of constraint (such as the open-ended possibilities for spaces people use 
to gather and assemble, for various purposes including democratic protest).  But advances in 
networked digital technologies are challenging these assumptions, and we are only now 
learning that the relevant constraints and affordances include not only those affecting our 
physical space, but also the affordances that govern the flow of data and information, and that 
these have direct impacts for our rights and freedoms.  We therefore need to expand our 
frame of rights discourse to encompass our socio-technical architecture, in which rights can be 
conceived in terms of affordances as a practical matter in ways that ‘speak with effective force 
to new kinds of material and operational considerations.’278  
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275  Cohen 2017 at 3 citing Hildebrandt 2015 at 88-102. 
276  Cohen 2017. 
277  Cohen 2017: 7. 
278  Cohen 2017: 9. 
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In other words, the inability of rights to provide a comprehensive response to the threats 
posed by AI technologies is more deeply rooted in the inherent limitations of rights-based 
approaches effectively to address systematic harms that are experienced primarily at a 
collective, societal level, rather than at the level of the individual right-holder.  For example, 
the introduction of a new ‘right to meaningful human contact’279 has its attractions, but it 
might not be effective in addressing the concerns about systematic, societal dehumanisation 
which lies at the foundation of many of the anxieties expressed about our increasing reliance 
on computational technologies.  In other words, it is the aggregate and cumulative effects of 
these technologies over time, and at scale, that may systematically threaten the socio-
technical foundations which the very notion of human rights presupposes and in which they 
are rooted.280   
Because smart digital technologies are ‘radically different in kind’ from other kinds of 
technologies, the societal challenge is to contend with their difference and power.281  By 
focusing on the architectural implications of these technologies, our attention is drawn to a 
perspective that Cohen describes as ‘inherently communal’.  It highlights the responsibility of 
states, and our collective responsibility as a moral community, to attend to the socio-technical 
foundations of moral and democratic freedom, and the way in which the aggregate, 
cumulative impact of the adverse social concerns referred to above could fundamentally 
undermine the ‘moral and democratic commons’282 and without which human rights and 
fundamental freedoms cannot, in practice, be realised or asserted.   These social foundations 
must, at minimum, ensure that conditions necessary for moral agency and responsibility are 
present and secure, for in their absence, there is no freedom, and human rights have no 
meaning.283  Yet we lack institutional mechanisms for monitoring the health of the socio-
technical foundations in which our human rights and democratic freedom are anchored, and 
this may require us to develop both a new ‘vocabulary’ of rights, and institutional mechanisms 
for ensuring the health and sustainability of these foundations to secure meaningful human 
rights protection in a new hyper-connected digital age.284
3.9 Summary 
This section has highlighted the importance of ensuring that responsibility for the actual and 
potential adverse consequences associated with the development and operation of advanced 
digital technologies is allocated prospectively and retrospectively.  The fair and effective 
allocation of responsibility for these threats, risks and adverse impacts is vital, not only to 
protect human rights and safeguard the welfare of individuals, groups and society at large , but 
also, and even more fundamentally, to ensure that our society remains a moral community.  
Yet attributing responsibility for the adverse risks and effects of our increasingly powerful and 
sophisticated digital technologies generates considerable challenges, owing to the fact that 
there are a great many individuals and organisations involved in their development and 
implementation, and because they may operate in unexpected ways.   
Welcome recognition of the need to take seriously responsibility for the risks and other 
adverse effects of advanced digital technologies can be found in the proliferation of voluntary 
                                                          
279  Discussed above at section 2.2.2. 
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283  Brownsword 2005. 
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initiatives through which the tech firms and the tech industry have promulgated codes of good 
ethical practice, which they publicly proclaim they will aspire to meet.  Yet because these 
voluntary self-regulatory initiatives lack any institutional mechanisms for meaningful public 
participation in the setting of the relevant standards, nor any external enforcement and 
sanctioning mechanisms, they do not constitute legitimate and effective safeguards.   
Although the capacity of advanced digital systems to operate more or less autonomously has 
been claimed to distance their developers from responsibility for their operation, this claim 
rests on a very particular and narrow conception of moral responsibility.  We have seen that a 
range of responsibility models might be available for allocating responsibility for the adverse 
impacts of AI systems, noting that in relation to human rights infringements, responsibility is 
appropriately assigned on a strict basis, without proof of fault.  As states bear the primary duty 
for ensuring effective protection of human rights, this grounds a legal obligation to introduce 
national legislative frameworks that give rise to legal duties and obligations on non-state 
actors. In addition, the fundamental value of human rights is of such strength and importance 
that they are increasingly recognised as grounding horizontal effects on non-state actors, 
including tech developers.285  While judicial remedies constitute an important avenue through 
which those adversely affected by the operation of AI technologies might seek redress, we 
have also identified a range of other governance instruments (including technical protection 
mechanisms) that could be utilised to secure meaningful and effective accountability and 
which warrant further consideration. 
Yet although there are various governance mechanisms (described above) that, if backed by 
law, can help to secure meaningful human rights protection, they are – in and of themselves – 
unlikely to provide adequate and comprehensive protection.  In particular, our advanced 
networked digital technologies are now of such power and sophistication that they can be 
understood as ‘radically different in kind’ from other kinds of technologies, particularly given 
their profound implications for our collective and shared technical, social, democratic and 
moral architecture of our societies.  We must therefore reinvigorate our existing human rights 
discourse and instruments in ways that foreground our collective responsibility to attend to 
the socio-technical foundations of moral and democratic freedom, and the way in which the 
aggregate, cumulative impact of the adverse social concerns referred to above could 
fundamentally undermine the ‘moral and democratic commons’and without which human 
rights and fundamental freedoms cannot, in practice, be realised or asserted.    
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who ‘codified’ the corporate social responsibility to respect human rights and act accordingly even in 
countries where national legislation does not demand that. 
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Chapter 4.  Conclusion 
Advances in techniques now referred to as artificial intelligence are likely to continue to 
develop and grow in power and sophistication in the foreseeable future.  Relatively recent 
success in AI, combined with the global and interconnected data infrastructure that has 
emerged over time, have enabled the proliferation of digital services and systems. These have 
already delivered very considerable benefits, particularly in terms of the enhanced efficiency 
and convenience which they offer across a wide range of social domains and activities, 
although access to these remains largely the province of inhabitants of wealthy industrialised 
nations.  They bring with them extraordinary promise, with the potential to deliver very 
substantial improvements to our individual and collective well-being, including the potential to 
enhance our capacity to exercise and enjoy our human rights and freedoms.  Yet, there are 
also legitimate and rising public anxieties about their adverse societal consequences, including 
their potential to undermine human rights protection which, as this study has highlighted, 
could threaten to destabilise the very foundations upon which our moral agency ultimately 
rests.  This study has therefore sought to examine the implications of advanced digital 
technologies (including AI) on the concept of responsibility from a human rights perspective.  It 
has identified a series of ‘responsibility relevant’ properties of these technologies, outlining a 
range of adverse impacts which these technologies may generate, and has sought to identify 
how responsibility for preventing, managing and mitigating those impacts (including the risk of 
human rights violations) may be allocated and distributed.   
This study has shown that any legitimate and effective response to the threats, risks, harms 
and rights violations potentially posed by advanced digital technologies is likely to require a 
focus on the consequences for individuals and society which attends to, and can ensure that, 
both prospective responsibility aimed at preventing and mitigating the threats and risks 
associated with these technologies, and historic responsibility, to ensure that if they ripen into 
harm and/or rights violations, responsibility for those consequences is duly and justly assigned.  
Only then can we have confidence that sustained and systematic effort will be made to 
prevent harms and wrongs from occurring, and that if they do occur, then the underlying 
activities will be brought to an end, and that effective and legitimate institutional mechanisms 
for ensuring appropriate reparation, repair, and prevention of further harm are in place.  It will 
necessitate a focus on both those involved in the development, deployment and 
implementation of these technologies, individual users and the collective interests affected by 
them, and on the role of states in ensuring the conditions for safeguarding individuals subject 
to their jurisdiction against risks and ensuring that human rights are adequately protected.   
Four findings of this study are worth highlighting:   
1. It is particularly important to ensure that we have effective and legitimate mechanisms 
that will operate to prevent and forestall human rights violations, particularly given 
that many human rights violations associated with the operation of advanced digital 
technologies may not result in tangible harm.  The need for a preventative approach is 
especially important given the speed and scale at which these technologies can 
operate, and the real risk that such violations may erode the collective socio-technical 
foundations that are essential for freedom, democracy and human rights to exist at all.  
This has several implications.  Firstly, it suggests that states have an important 
responsibility to ensure that they attend to the larger socio-technical environment in 
which human rights are anchored.  Secondly, stronger collective complaints 
mechanisms may be needed to ameliorate the collective action problem that 
individuals may encounter in responding to rights violations generated by the 
operation of AI systems.  Thirdly, our existing conceptions of human rights may need 
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to be reinvigorated in a networked, data-driven age in order to account for the way in 
which these technologies may reconfigure our socio-technical environments, and the 
threats which they may pose to collective goods and values. 
2. The model of legal responsibility that applies to human rights violations is widely 
understood as one of ‘strict responsibility’, without the need for proof of fault.  In 
contrast, the allocation of obligations of repair for tangible harm may be legally 
distributed in accordance with a variety of responsibility models (briefly outlined in 
Section 3.4 above).  This variety of potential legal models that could be applied to 
allocate and distribute the adverse effects arising from our other-regarding conduct 
clearly demonstrates that it is a mistake to expect one single model of legal 
responsibility to fairly apply to all the different kinds of adverse consequences that 
might flow from the use of advanced digital technologies.    Legal models of 
responsibility emphasise the relationship between moral agents, moral patients and 
society more generally, unlike much applied philosophical analysis of responsibility for 
AI systems, which has tended to focus on the conduct of moral agents and whether 
that conduct justly attracts responsibility agents at the expense of moral patients 
(‘victims’) and of society.  These various legal models of responsibility strike a different 
balance between our interest as agents in freedom of action, and our interest as 
victims in rights and interests in security of person and property.  Identifying which (if 
any) of these models is most appropriate for allocating and distributing the various 
risks associated with the operation of advanced digital technologies is by no means 
self-evident, but will entail a deliberate social policy choice concerning how these risks 
should be appropriately allocated and distributed.  In democratic societies that 
espouse a commitment to human rights, the state bears a critical responsibility for 
ensuring that these policy choices are made in a transparent, democratic manner 
which ensures that the policy ultimately adopted will effectively safeguard human 
rights. 
3. Various strands of technical research have considerable potential to help secure 
prospective and historic responsibility for advanced digital technologies through the 
development of techniques that may enable both effective technical protection 
mechanisms and meaningful ‘algorithmic auditing’.  This research should be nurtured 
and supported, and needs to be developed through interdisciplinary engagement 
between the technical community and those from law, the humanities and the social 
sciences, in order to elaborate more fully how human rights norms can be translated 
into technical mechanisms of protection, and how a human rights approach responds 
to the problem of value conflict.   
4. Taking human rights seriously in a hyperconnected digital age will require that have 
effective and legitimate governance mechanisms, instruments and institutions are in 
place to monitor and oversee the development, implementation and operation of our 
complex socio-technical systems.  Some suggestions for how we might take forward 
the need to ensure that we have governance mechanisms and institutions that have 
the capacity to do this are set out in Appendix A.  Voluntary initiatives by the tech 
industry via the promulgation of so-called ‘ethical’ standards of conduct which they 
publicly claim they will seek to honour constitute welcome recognition by the tech 
industry that the technologies which they develop may produce adverse effects for 
which they bear some responsibility. They do not, however, provide adequate and 
robust human rights protection.  At minimum, responsible development and 
implementation of AI requires both democratic participation in the setting of the 
relevant standards and the existence of properly resourced, independent authorities 
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equipped with adequate powers systematically to gather information, to investigate 
non-compliance and to sanction violations.    In particular, if we are to have confidence 
that technological protection mechanisms intended to ensure that human rights 
values are respected during the operation of digital processes, then we must have 
robust independent mechanisms of external oversight that can investigate and verify 
that they do in fact so operate, otherwise they are unlikely to provide the foundations 
for securing meaningful AI accountability.   In this respect, it is the obligation of states 
to ensure that these governance mechanisms are established and implemented in 
ways that will ensure the protection of human rights. 
If we are serious in our commitment to protect and promote human rights in a 
hyperconnected digital age, then we cannot allow the power of our advanced digital 
technologies and systems, and those who develop and implement them, to be accrued and 
exercised without responsibility.   The fundamental principle of reciprocity applies: those who 
deploy and reap the benefits of these advanced digital technologies (including AI) in the 
provision of services (from which they derive profit) must be responsible for their adverse 
consequences. It is therefore of vital importance that nations committed to protect human 
rights uphold a commitment to ensure that those who wield digital power (including the 
power derived from accumulating masses of digital data) are held responsible for their 
consequences.   It follows from the obligation of states to protect human rights that they have 
a duty to introduce into national law, governance arrangements that will ensure that both 
prospective and historic responsibility for the adverse risks, harms and rights violations arising 
from the operation of advanced digital technologies are duly allocated. 
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Appendix A  
This appendix identifies a range of measures and institutional mechanisms that might warrant 
further consideration and research in order to help ensure that human rights are protected in 
an age of advanced networked digital technologies. They are not intended as 
recommendations, but merely to invite further reflection and discussion. 
Prospective responsibility 
Consider offering additional funding to support and encourage interdisciplinary research 
aimed at developing techniques, mechanisms and standards that can help ensure that 
prospective responsibilities for preventing and mitigating risks of harm or wrongs arising from 
the operation of advanced digital technologies are duly assigned.   
Consider measures to encourage states and interstate cooperation to work towards 
developing legally supported institutional governance mechanisms to facilitate the protection 
of human rights against threats and risks posed by advanced digital technologies.  These might 
include: 
a. Legal requirements to undertake ‘human rights impact analysis’ (incorporating 
algorithmic impact analysis) prior to deployment of advanced digital technologies, 
including a publicly available statement identifying how potential interferences with 
human rights and value conflicts are resolved in system architecture and operation; 
b. Develop, in conjunction with a wide range of stakeholders, a code of best practice for 
preparing human rights impact analysis for advanced digital technologies. 
c. Clarify the scope and content of legal obligations of all those involved in the 
development of digital services (including software developers), particularly 
obligations that bear directly upon human rights protection; 
d. Consider the need to subject developers and providers to legal obligations to engage 
in, and demonstrate adequate verification and testing of, complex computational 
systems that may have a direct and substantial impact on human rights, both prior to 
release and at periodic intervals following implementation in real-world environments; 
e. Encourage the use of technical protection mechanisms (such as ‘human rights by 
design’, fairness-aware data mining techniques, and explainable AI), identifying how 
they can serve a valuable role in ensuring human rights adherence.  Consider the need 
to provide legal support for these techniques, including by subjecting them to external 
oversight and review in order to provide a greater level of assurance that these 
mechanisms operate in fact in ways that are human rights compliant; 
f. Encourage further research into the development of techniques and standards that 
support responsible, human-rights compliant innovation in digital tech industry 
(including modelling, data provenance and quality, algorithmic auditing, validation, 
verification and testing).  
g. Consider establishing a professional accreditation scheme for appropriately qualified 
technical experts trained in algorithmic auditing techniques as a class of professionals 
who are subject to fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith in verifying and certifying 
the design and operation of algorithms. 
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h. Develop a methodological framework and set of metrics for systematically identifying, 
and evaluating the magnitude and seriousness of, potential threats and risks to 
individual rights (including the threats they pose to the socio-technical foundations in 
which human rights and fundamental freedoms are anchored) posed by proposed or 
potential AI applications.   
i. Consider whether AI applications which pose threats that are judged to be so serious 
and disproportionate in their human rights impact that they should be prohibited 
unless they are subjected to prior public consultation and approval from an 
appropriately constituted independent supervisory authority.  A framework of this 
kind might include a class of AI applications that should be prohibited outright because 
they pose unacceptable grave and potentially catastrophic threats to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.286     
Historic responsibility 
Consider supporting the development of guidance and techniques that can help ensure that 
historic responsibility is duly assigned for individual and collective harms or rights violations 
resulting from the operation of advanced digital technologies.  This may include encouraging 
states and intergovernmental cooperation towards developing legally supported institutional 
governance mechanisms that might include: 
a. Member state action to review and assess whether national legal systems will operate 
to ensure that responsibility for harm caused by advanced digital technologies can be 
duly allocated, identifying any potential gaps which may need to be addressed via 
legislative reform; 
b. Consider the need to develop standard-setting instruments to clarify and locate 
default historic responsibility for the harms and wrongs to those involved in the 
design, developers, deployment, ownership and provision of digital systems.  This 
could include legal liability to make reparation to those harmed or wronged by the 
operation of these services, including an obligation to compensate and introduce 
measures to avoid future occurrence.  In developing a suitable instrument, 
consideration might be given to the desirability of some kind of ‘due diligence’ defence 
in certain clearly and narrowly defined circumstances, leading to a reduction in the 
extent of the developer’s legal responsibility for harm or wrongdoing;  
c. Support further research into the appropriate distribution and allocation of authority 
between humans in the loop of complex computational systems, in light of the 
acknowledged problem of ‘automation bias’ and tendency to allocate responsibility to 
individual humans in the loop, rather than on those who develop and implement the 
socio-technical system in which the human is embedded; 
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d. Consider the desirability of mandating a compulsory insurance regime for the digital 
tech industry, including whether to establish a national insurance scheme, funded by 
digital tech industry, to ensure that victims are not left uncompensated; 
e. Support the development of further capacity to establish new (and extend the capacity 
of existing) governance institutions that can meaningfully and rigorously investigate 
and enforce prospective and historic responsibilities of digital service developers and 
providers. 
f. Consider the desirability of introducing collective complaints mechanisms and whether 
to liberalise standing rules in order to overcome the problem of collective action which 
may arise when a large number of individuals may be vulnerable to rights infringement 
but are unlikely to be sufficiently motivated to take action even though their 
cumulative effect may be very substantial.   To this end, consider whether the 
collective complaints procedure adopted to enhance the effectiveness, speed and 
impact of the implementation of the European Social Charter provides a suitable 
model. 
g. Review adequate resourcing and powers of investigation, sanction and remedies for 
public enforcers.  This may include the need to develop and build technical expertise 
and competence in machine learning and other software development and evaluation 
techniques within the public sector. 
Reconfiguring human rights discourse in a networked digital age 
Consider ways in which existing human rights protection and discourse may need to develop in 
order to ensure the effective protection of human rights in a globally connected digital age, 
recognising the need to attend to the socio-technical foundations that form the basis of the 
rule of law and of moral community.  This might include: 
a. Consider the desirability for a new Convention on Human Rights in a Networked Digital 
Age which would, at minimum,  recognise that both prospective and historic 
responsibility for risks, harms and rights violations must be fully allocated and 
distributed;   
b. Consider the need for formal recognition within such a Convention (or other similar 
multilateral instrument) of the role of independent institutional mechanisms to 
safeguard against the collective risks which these technologies pose to the social 
foundations of democratic orders in which human rights are anchored;  
c. Consider whether new collective decision-making and monitoring mechanisms may be 
necessary or desirable in order to track and evaluate the aggregate and cumulative 
effects of these technologies on human rights across member states.  To this end, 
consider the need or desirability of establishing a ‘global observatory’ to undertake 
this monitoring and reporting function on a systematic basis; 
d. Apply a precautionary approach in cases where interacting algorithmic systems have 
the capacity to cause catastrophic harm which could not reasonably have been 
foreseen by any individual digital service provider;  consider the prohibition of 
particular kinds of algorithmic applications with the potential for causing catastrophic 
harms ; consider the need for systematic monitoring structures and expert institutions 
in order to prevent such applications from being developed and deployed. 
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